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Order and the Virtual: Toward a Deleuzian Cosmology 
Bill Ross 
 
Introduction 
 
Order is a more or less explicit topic for any thinker who undertakes to write about nature. 
Even those who assert that randomness or chaos is the most fundamental trait of nature 
are obliged to account for the apparent permanence, organisation and structure we 
observe around us. No less is true for Gilles Deleuze, who champions the power of chaos 
through his work. On one reading, Deleuze’s chief impulse is to wrench loose the lynchpins 
of order; to ‘affirm chaos’ and disarticulate the law of excluded middle; to refuse 
jurisdiction to laws of nature and render provisional its every constant; to banish identity 
and negation alike. If we are to be left with no fixed point, we might ask, what remains of 
order? This study is nevertheless an examination of that notion in Deleuze’s natural 
philosophy. For me the counter-reading is much more productive and insightful. Deleuze is 
rather a firm believer in order, even there where he affirms chaos. If we could furnish a 
‘Deleuzian Question’ par excellence, it would be; ‘Given that there are no fixed points, how 
is order expressed in the world?’ This question is implicitly reprised across the entirety of 
his work and inflected at each stage by fresh vocabulary coined to treat it anew, as though 
for each new Deleuzian territory a new phrasebook is required.  
I have opted to approach this question from a particular point of view, in its way a lesser 
thesis. Deleuze’s philosophy of nature is a Cosmology. This framing is for multiple reasons. 
In one sense it serves simply to foreground those elements in his text which operate on the 
cosmological level. The concept of ‘Chaosmos’ is one such, as is ‘The Plane of Immanence’. 
Perforce any discussion of Plato’s Timaeus or the Lucretian void or the Stoic universe such 
as we find in Deleuze’s work belongs in this vein, but so too does Deleuze’s own fabulous 
figure of the calculating God, whose calculations, if ever they worked out exactly, would 
spell the end of the world. Nietzsche’s Eternal Return and Deleuze’s own elaboration 
thereof are nothing if not cosmological. All the complexity and nuance of Deleuze’s thought 
can be unpacked through this approach.  
In another sense the frame serves pragmatically to put this philosophy into conversation 
with the contemporary field of scientific cosmology, which in itself, has a number of 
perspectival advantages. Modern cosmology is in truth not so much a field of its own as a 
particularly vibrant intersection of the Venn diagram representing multiple fields of physics. 
General Relativity is from the start a cosmological theory, predicated as it is on those scales 
at which gravity becomes significant. Yet the micro-scale which Quantum Physics treats has 
been no bar to cosmological speculation. The universe may have been generated, we learn, 
from the inflationary expansion of a quantum fluctuation in the vacuum. Supersymmetry 
posits a history of the universe in which the disparate laws, atomic and sub-atomic forces 
are simply remnants of a single force which fractured through symmetry-breaking as the 
formidably high-energy initial conditions underwent discharge. String Theory could be seen 
as a prodigious laboratory for a vast number of theoretically viable universes, each of which 
is a permutation of higher-dimensional conditions for sub-atomic-scale matter-energy. Its 
offspring Brane Theory envisages a higher-dimensional multiverse in which lesser-
dimensional universes are embedded and which may in theory come into collision with 
each other. Modern Cosmology it seems has a singular capacity to furnish an increasingly 
diverse range of speculative solutions to the question of natural order, and as such is fitting 
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ground to explore the equally singular creative capacities of Deleuze’s natural philosophy. 
Of particular interest will be ‘network’ and ‘holographic’ paradigms. It is my hope that this 
fresh territory for Deleuzian commentary will serve to expand the focus for Deleuzian 
studies beyond a justified but overly strong association of Deleuze’s work with the field of 
Chaos Theory.  
There are no few elements in Deleuze’s text which appear to place his philosophy almost 
irremediably at odds with fundamental tenets of physics, and a great deal of the detailed 
argument here is devoted to negotiating these points of contention. This is not an attempt 
to promote a ‘minor’ science over a ‘major’. It seems to me that the scientific community is 
quite diverse and supple enough to cross-pollinate descant ideas and outlying paradigms; it 
is both major and minor. Any attempts today on the part of a philosophy of science to 
diagnose a positivist, Newtonian paradigm with which the scientific community blithely 
labours on is nostalgic at best. Rather, the focus is on the productive potential of the 
concepts in play between the philosophy and the physics. More importantly, I hope to 
show that the philosophy is salient enough to promote certain strands in physics rather 
than others; that is what makes a natural philosophy worth its salt.  
The final motivation for the cosmological viewpoint is due to the importance of a twin 
philosophical spirit in the themes explored here. A.N. Whitehead categorised his 
philosophy of nature as a Cosmology. While it is possible he meant by this to associate his 
philosophical activity with the spirit of the pre-Socratic, Ionian branch of natural enquiry, 
he devotes no real time to establishing this connection. The acknowledged debt (in Process 
and Reality) goes rather to Plato’s Timaeus. He does nevertheless share with that ancient 
philosophy a concern to encapsulate the overall macroscopic character of nature through 
analysis of its microscopic event; in his terminology, the ‘philosophy of organism’ provides 
the basis for the cosmology. Nevertheless, this is avowedly rather in the service of 
establishing a metaphysics adequate to the revolution in physics which had firmly taken 
hold by the 1920s; 
…[I]t must be one of the motives of a complete cosmology to construct a scheme of 
ideas which brings the aesthetic, moral and religious interests into relation with 
those concepts of the world which have their origin in natural science. (PR p.xii) 
Clearly he understands the cosmology to comprehend philosophy and metaphysics as a 
whole, with science at least on a par with the other elements. The ‘natural science’ he 
refers to, the landscape through which our own contemporary physics still makes its way, is 
first and foremost an account of energetic or intensive processes. In a Relativistic World, 
matter and energy are strictly exchangeable; in a Quantum world, the enquiry is focused on 
those processes by which matter is derived from energy. This was certainly not lost on 
Whitehead.1 This feature, the primacy of the intensive, is the most important connecting 
factor between Deleuze and Whitehead for this investigation. Both provide an account of 
nature partitioned (but in constant permeable exchange) into two regimes of energy. 
Deleuze speaks of the intensive and extensive regimes. Whitehead recognizes the same 
distinction, but coins for himself the terms ‘mental pole’ and ‘physical pole’ respectively. 
For both, the intensive underlies and is prior to the extensive. On this last criterion both 
meet the entry requirement for a metaphysics which can speak to our contemporary 
natural sciences. Beyond this, but certainly not unrelated, the potential for conversation 
with contemporary physics is furthered by a common understanding on the part of both 
philosophers of the character of space. There is nothing given for either about the 
structuration of space; it is the result of underlying intensive relations, which in themselves 
do not require any prior determination of dimension or location. On the contrary, it is the 
intensive process itself which produces both dimension and location. As such, there is 
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common ground between our philosophy and quantum physics, which has been obliged to 
admit the occurrence of causal relations unconstrained by contiguous spatial location. This 
recognition was first prompted with respect to the phenomenon of entanglement. The 
capacity of entangled particles to correlate with respect to measured aspects, such as spin 
or polarisation, is problematic for any account of causality which relies on spatial 
contiguity. This capacity for correlation is shown to persist even when the entangled 
particles in question have travelled sufficient distance from each other to rule out even the 
greatest possible speed of causal propagation, the speed of light. The adopted scientific 
label for such phenomena is ‘non-locality’. This feature of the world prompts one of three 
interpretations, each of which have been proposed; either causal influence is able to take 
place instantaneously regardless of distance and propagating milieu (Einstein’s ‘spooky 
action at a distance’), or in the quantum realm the future is able to influence the past 
through so-called ‘retrocausality’.2 Lastly, it is proposed that the topological structure of 
space includes higher dimensions which allow ‘contact’ between locations apparently 
distant according to our three-dimensional metric (just as distant points on a two-
dimensional piece of paper can be brought into contact by folding within three 
dimensions). The latter conclusion, a substantive existence for higher dimensions, is not 
confined to explanatory convenience for entanglement; it has played out in science as 
speculation with respect to wormholes in space, the above-mentioned dimensional 
configurations of string theory, and again in holographic and network paradigms. Both the 
metaphysics and the physics countenance the substantive existence of a greater number of 
spatial dimensions than our familiar three. Yet the mere functional fit between the two is 
not the point; in what way does this contribute to the conversation? I will argue that in 
fact, separately but in interesting and productive ways, both Deleuze and Whitehead are 
able to bring to the fore questions of ‘the limit’ and ‘the constant’ which raise foundational 
and unavoidable questions for that science which seeks to account for event independently 
of location. Finally, Whitehead makes the claim that ‘The general aspect of nature is that of 
evolutionary expansiveness.’ Deleuze in his turn speaks of novelty or creation as the 
fundamental characteristic of nature, on occasion adopting the cognate term ‘evolution’. It 
is this specifically evolutionary aspect on which I will focus. In neither case is this to be 
taken as solely a reference to biological evolution. The evolution in question refers rather 
to the mutability of the laws to which nature is subject, to the potential for natural 
constants (such as the speed of light) to change, and even the permutation of seemingly 
primitive ‘natural kinds’ such as the electron or the proton. The mutability of all these three 
elements are envisaged by both philosophers, and, I hope to show, are equally important in 
formulating a conception of nature truly capable of evolution. This subscription to a 
principle of radical mutability again risks placing our philosophy beyond the purview of a 
scientific discourse which seems rather intent on discovering the invariant, the immutable 
and symmetric principles underlying nature. But in truth we will find no shortage of 
scientific thinkers amenable to and positively affirmative of this unconstrained self-
reinvention in nature. There are indeed a number of current cosmological accounts which 
adopt evolution as a specific paradigm, including those which acknowledge the entailed 
mutability of each element of the triad; laws, constants and natural kinds.  
If Deleuze’s work reveals an affinity and enthusiasm for Whitehead’s philosophy, the 
deeper roots of this affinity are revealed in a remark he makes to a class in 1987; he 
encourages the students to mark the systematic way in which Whitehead’s own philosophy 
adopts, supplements and elaborates on the work of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Leibniz is an 
indispensable figure for Deleuze in the history of philosophy. He claims several times that 
his chef d’oeuvre, Difference and Repetition, is devoted to the interrogation of Leibniz’ 
Principle of Sufficient Reason. His last solo substantial work, The Fold: Leibniz and the 
Baroque, revisits and reworks recurrent Leibnizian themes. Deleuze’s Leibnizian 
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engagements are the focus of this reading, and in particular his negotiation with Sufficient 
Reason. Yet Difference and Repetition is by no means a simple endorsement of that 
principle. Deleuze performs a decisive schism with Leibniz’ philosophy for the sake of a 
‘Superior’ Sufficient Reason, which he locates in the Nietzschean notion of The Eternal 
Return. The argument he stages amounts to a clash of cosmological principles. The divine 
condemnation of many possible worlds to inactuality that we find in Leibniz’ metaphysics is 
overly neat, at odds with the Repetition-compulsions of nature in Deleuze’s Chaosmos. For 
Deleuze, worlds do not disappear to be taken off the balance-sheet of cosmological history, 
but are revalorised, recycled and redistributed in a syncopated rhythm, always bending the 
refrain. Insofar as The Principle of Sufficient Reason serves Leibniz to remove discordant, 
incompatible motifs at each bar from the symphony of worlds, leaving ultimately only one 
final world in Harmony, it is inadequate to the chaosmos Deleuze describes. Nietzsche’s 
Eternal Return, on the other hand, is just such a redistributive recycling of forces, just such 
a syncopation, he claims. Everything at each moment, is subject to mutable redistribution 
in the next. Ultimately, Deleuze names a principle for this Nietzschean process; the 
‘sufficient reason of all that appears’, he says, is ‘Disparity’. Disparity is an irreducible 
feature of energetic relations. The motor of each event is a tension between forces, an 
energy gradient which forces movement. An asymmetry in energetic balance. The 
irreducibility of energetic gradients is the singular feature of disparity; it is due to a 
primitive incommensurability between forces; they will not in principle ever balance. All 
energy, all force, is already multiple, forces in tension. This principle, disparity, is what is at 
stake in the search for a superior sufficient reason. It is no small part of this project, 
however, to argue that Deleuze is in fact poorly served by the Eternal Return in reaching 
and supporting this goal. The resources he requires are on the contrary fully met by the 
Leibnizian version of sufficient reason. It will require a close reading of Leibniz’ short text 
‘On the Ultimate Origination of Things’ and some Whiteheadian embellishment of his 
metaphysics to bring this into view. This counterclaim against Deleuze rests on a reading of 
sufficient reason as a principle of dissymmetry, rather than the argument from symmetry it 
is more routinely taken to be. 
The detail of this argument over sufficient reason matters because it bears directly on the 
question of entropy, or the tendency of all systems in nature to expend free energy. 
According to thermodynamic theory, all action requires a tithe of free energy, an 
incremental collapse of available energy-gradient towards the inert balance of equilibrium. 
The principle of disparity is a denial of the substantive existence of equilibrium; if all forces 
are irreducibly incommensurable, no given system will ever reach equilibrium. Ultimately 
on a cosmological scale, the denial of equilibrium amounts to a denial of the end-state 
referred to as Heat Death, at which point all energy gradients are exhausted, and all action 
ceases. The overwhelming majority of scientific reasoning subscribes to the principles of 
thermodynamics; they underpin and serve to generalise the ubiquitous overall losses of 
entropy. Deleuze’s position presents an apparently insurmountable challenge to any 
serious attempt at productive dialogue between his natural philosophy and physics classical 
or contemporary. The impasse is not quite so black and white, however. Firstly, the 
tendency of systems to move toward equilibrium is not presented as exceptionless in 
thermodynamic theory, but probabilistic. It is simply much more likely that this is the 
direction of travel. Because this is so, it is understood over the long term to be inevitable 
that any system, no matter how large, will quit the state of equilibrium; Heat Death can 
only be a Heat Sleep. On the other hand, Deleuze’s position on entropy embraces an 
important caveat; entropic principles do apply, but only in the extensive regime, not the 
intensive. Entropy, he claims, is a transcendental illusion, which amounts to the claim that 
there is a regime of energy, the intensive, which is capable of maintaining energy gradient 
without cease. It is only by taking the order applicable to the explicate as the order of 
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nature in general that the thermodynamic account attains any plausibility. That plausibility 
is merely illusory, however; for Deleuze, after Henri Bergson, there is no such thing as order 
in general. In light of these two factors, the thermodynamic and the Deleuzian caveats, it 
seems some rapprochement is possible on the issue of disparity, though at a cost to the 
scope of thermodynamic principles. I maintain nevertheless that this apparent 
reconciliation can only come by relinquishing a comparably fundamental tenet of Deleuze’s 
philosophy; the continuous, unceasing nature of the Event. Neither the Nietzschean nor the 
Leibnizian variant of sufficient reason will serve thus far to resolve the impasse without 
development. 
The goal is coherent orientation, not agreement, between the philosophy and the science. 
To contradict an article of faith in science requires not merely intellectual boldness, but 
also at a minimum that scientists could meaningfully evaluate the cost of recalibration 
levied by the philosophy. For the philosophy to inform the science, it must contain the 
potential to distinguish one line of enquiry as scientifically more fruitful than another. 
Michelson and Morley can banish the ether, but then what? Somehow there must be a 
structurally analogous sense of the order of nature between the philosophy and the 
science, or the disciplines talk past and lose traction on each other. This question of 
coherent orientation becomes more acute for the present argument with an appreciation 
of the explanatory role played by entropy in the scientific corpus. It is at once an index of 
disorder and of order. Both at the same time. The reasoning is axiomatic; if nature requires 
free energy, the existence of an energy gradient, to furnish order, to accommodate 
combination and structure, then lack of free energy (equilibrium) is by definition disorder. 
If the direction of travel, the arrow of time, is from order to disorder, and this tendency is 
ubiquitous in the long term, then the state we expect to encounter in nature is disorder, 
disorganization, equilibrium. It is by far the most likely. Correlatively, the distinguishing 
mark of order is its unlikeliness, the extent to which a given system diverges from that most 
likely state. A number of mathematical formulations have been adopted to formalise 
entropy (Boltzmann’s, Gibbs’, Shannon’s, Prigogine’s, Hawking’s), but each of them speak 
to us simultaneously of order and disorder. In the scientific literature it is little short of a 
default to reference any discussion of order or complexity against the notion of entropy. 
The paradox deserves (and not infrequently receives) acknowledgement; the very source of 
order and complexity, the expenditure of free energy, is at one and the same time its 
undoing. Every structure is fated to unravel by the very same expenditure of energy which 
made it possible in the first place. In this light, the problem of orientation between 
Deleuze’s philosophy of difference and the scientific corpus widens. A schism on the 
question of entropy is at the same time a schism on the question of order.  
Yet this problem of orientation does not go unaddressed in Deleuze’s work. What Is 
Philosophy? presents a dynamic structural analogy between philosophy and science. Each is 
presented as one of the three so-called Chaoids (the third is the arts). Each is an aspect of 
what Deleuze calls the Plane of Immanence, the open domain of virtual potential, a chaos 
which spawns its chaoids. Each enjoys its distinguishing relation to the Plane, characterised 
by a particular form of speed. Philosophy retains something of the infinite speed of event in 
chaos, while science imposes a ‘freeze frame’ to isolate, delimit and furnish its object. The 
line of argument here reprises a recurrent theme in Deleuze’s work, inherited from 
Bergson; décalage, slowing down or retardation. This theme receives some emphasis in the 
present argument; it is a vital key to grasping the nature of order and complexity in 
Deleuze’s work. For the concept of retardation is much more than an explanatory 
metaphor, it is much more than a reifying imposition on the part of science onto empirical 
data. Deleuze claims, ‘… [I]t is by slowing down that matter, as well as the scientific thought 
able to penetrate it with propositions, is actualized.’ (WP p.118, my italics). It is only due to 
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retardation that matter may actualise. To understand why Deleuze is given to make this 
extraordinary claim, that the very being of becoming is slowing down, is to appreciate the 
debt to Henri Bergson at work here.  
For Bergson, there was no substantive disorder in the world; all phenomena were an 
admixture to varying degrees of two forms of order; the mechanistic and the vital. The 
mechanistic, deterministic, form would exhaust its every propagation instantaneously if it 
were the sole manifestation of order in the world. It would lack interruption, deviation or 
divergence; everything would happen at once, the entire course of time. The vital is what 
defers this instant collapse, suspends the determinist fate and introduces divergence. 
Existence, any sustained becoming, is dependent on this delaying form of order. It is by 
slowing down that matter is actualised. At one and the same time, by the same principle of 
delay, the simple ineluctable laws of mechanism are deflected, not singly but in a ramifying 
cascade, just as the swerving atoms of Lucretius are cast into turbulence. Retardation is the 
principle of complexity, of folding. There is much continuity from the Bergsonian picture of 
natural order into Deleuze’s natural philosophy. It is the root of Deleuze’s resistance to the 
idea of entropy; entropy is mechanistic, but everywhere mechanism is thwarted by the 
virtual, vital, diverging remainder within every instance of actualisation. Yet, again, as with 
Leibniz, Deleuze offers a critique of this core of Bergson’s natural philosophy, aimed at 
asserting the primacy of intensive relations over Bergsonian ‘qualitative’ relations. I will 
argue that his reasoning is better understood as drawing out implications that are already 
on full display in Bergson’s work, but that in the process all meaning is effectively drained 
from Bergson’s distinction between ‘inert’ matter (simple deterministic order), and the 
vital, qualitative, complex form of order; both come to represent the ‘race to the grave’ of 
entropy. Pursuing this line one step further raises a potential problem for Deleuze, and one 
which he does not specifically address. While it leaves him free to agree with Bergson that 
there is no such thing as disorder, it seems to commit him to the claim that the only form 
of order is complexity. This is another potential barrier to orientation with scientific 
narrative. The distinction between simple and complex is on the face of it inherent to 
natural enquiry, perhaps too valuable to relinquish. 
As we shall see, there are numerous resources in the scientific literature which offer 
common ground on these problems. Though the scientific register might prefer 
‘propagation’ to ‘retardation’, nevertheless, the standard model has come to embrace an 
account of matter which depends essentially on a primordial slowing down. The Higgs Field 
is understood to act as a brake on massless particles, thereby endowing them with mass. 
The advent of this field in the timeline of the universe is a transition from an epoch in 
which all particles are massless, all travelling at the speed of light. It is only by slowing 
down that material combination is possible. We shall see too that the relatively new 
discipline of Loop Quantum Gravity may be read analogously. It is perhaps in the end not 
too far-fetched that all propagation can be read as retardation. As for the opposition 
between the simple and the complex, the quantum theorist David Bohm was concerned to 
collapse the distinction, while the work of Murray Gell-Mann, among others, renders it 
problematic. In all, I hope to show, the problem of the orientation of our philosophy to 
contemporary scientific discourse proves less intractable than it might at first appear.  
One pre-eminent difficulty remains, however, for this line of argument. It is the role of 
symmetry in scientific reason. This is much more than geometric or topological symmetry; 
it is embedded in scientific reasoning as a search for the invariant or constant under the 
translations of systems in evolution, and codified for routine use by the community as a 
whole in the work of Emmy Noether. Symmetry underwrites all laws of conservation. 
Deleuze’s resistance to the concept is perhaps the most profound circle to square for our 
purposes; it is the more general form of that same resistance he expresses to entropy. This 
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is why the construal of Sufficient Reason as a principle of dissymmetry is indispensable. Yet 
again, however, there are dissenting voices within the scientific community which align 
themselves with this view. There is a certain reversal of logic inherent to this insight. The 
argument from symmetry (by which laws, constants and laws of conservation are 
traditionally furnished) implicitly assumes symmetry to be the backdrop against which all 
event is traced. That which can be identified as invariant regardless of displacement in 
time, place and circumstance is rooted most firmly in the fabric of the world; such 
invariants represent the laws on which nature depends. The result of an experiment in one 
part of the world will tend to be reproducible in another. The total amount of energy in an 
isolated system will be preserved over time. From this perspective, symmetry is the 
necessity on which contingency, incongruence and dissymmetry depend. Each really 
occurring event has its share of symmetry and dissymmetry, but in the end it is the 
symmetries which must be the default. The reversal of this logic follows from the 
observation that in a world where that default were observed without exception, nothing 
would happen. A situation of original and complete symmetry is condemned to stasis more 
absolutely than any system in equilibrium. As A. Zee puts it; 
 Symmetry is beauty, and beauty is desirable. But if the design is perfectly 
symmetrical, then there would be only one interaction. The fundamental particles 
would all be identical and hence indistinguishable from one another, such a world 
is possible, but it would be very dull: there would be no atom, no star, no planet, 
no flower and no physicist.3 
This is no more or less than an expression of the twin Leibnizian principles of Sufficient 
Reason and the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. The default condition is 
discernibility, dissymmetry, divergence, or the world lacks sufficient reason for any event. 
As Deleuze says, the first series are divergent, not convergent. Symmetry depends on 
dissymmetry, not the reverse. Laws depend upon Chaos. 
Evolution is the name for this condition. The last chapter is devoted to an exploration of 
the foregoing themes as a whole with reference to contemporary physics. Here it is a 
question of evaluating both what the evolutionary paradigm must entail for a Deleuzian 
cosmology, and of examining candidates among evolutionary cosmological models which 
speak to those same entailments. Finally, I will claim that to subscribe to a Deleuzian 
cosmology is to subscribe to a certain form of openness, the most open form of 
metaphysics; the evolution of laws, constants and natural kinds. 
Chapter one is devoted to two forms of Chaos. The first is that defined by the scientific 
fields of Chaos and Complexity Theory. I argue that the commentary too readily assimilates 
Deleuze’s philosophy of nature to Chaos Theory, in the process collapsing a key tenet of 
Deleuzian philosophy; the ‘ceaseless’ nature of the Event. Restoring this factor to its central 
place opens up lines of communication with other contemporary fields of physics. The 
second form of Chaos is the radical notion of chance which Deleuze inherits and adapts 
from Nietzsche. This Chaos is the underpinning for Deleuze’s resistance to the concepts of 
equilibrium, entropy and Heat Death. Chaos is in essence an irreducible disparity between 
forces which in principle can never collapse. The state of equilibrium is definitionally 
unattainable. Chaos, chance, is the only necessity. 4 I argue that Deleuze’s stated rationale 
for this position, the arguments underpinning Nietzsche’s Eternal Return, is flawed as a 
means of critiquing thermodynamic theory. This is not because it contradicts a foundation-
stone of physics, the Second Law of thermodynamics, but because it is unable to secure 
sufficient distance from that principle on its own terms. This remains true, I argue, for post-
classical formulations of entropy; Deleuze’s critique ‘runs past’ the target. Granted this 
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point, we must also conclude that Deleuze’s intention to locate a superior form of Leibniz’ 
Principle of Sufficient Reason in Nietzsche’s Eternal Return fails concomitantly. 
Chapter two begins to re-evaluate Leibniz’ own formulation of Sufficient Reason under the 
rubric of the ‘Complete Concept’. I make the claim (with Dan Smith) that Leibniz’ Complete 
Concept refashions subject-predicate logic into a logic of the Event. Equally, I argue that the 
close dovetailing of Leibniz’ central principles places his metaphysics in close conversation 
with the thermodynamic issues which Deleuze takes on. Leibniz’ short piece, ‘On the 
Ultimate Origination of Things’ offers the lens for this reading. It is significant that when 
Deleuze comes to take issue with the Leibnizian form of Sufficient Reason, it is the 
Complete Concept which is the target of his critique, as ultimately too closely aligned with 
the retention of identity as a metaphysical foundation, rather than ‘difference’. Pace 
Deleuze, I argue that this objection can be levelled effectively only in context of the ‘Many 
Possible Worlds’ scenario that Leibniz outlines. In truth, the Complete Concept, shorn of 
this association is everywhere in play in Deleuze’s Chaosmos. These lines of argument 
begin to establish Leibniz’ Sufficient Reason as a principle of dissymmetry, or disparity, and 
are pursued with respect to Deleuze’s engagements with Gilbert Simondon and A.N. 
Whitehead. Simondon’s work illustrates the connection between the metaphysical 
principles in play at the cosmic scale and the microscale, the local and the global, and 
brings our parallels between Deleuze and Whitehead in this respect. This is an important 
feature in the cosmic evolutionary framework I will develop subsequently. The rest of the 
chapter is devoted to illustrating the tensions between the role of symmetry in scientific 
reasoning and the principle of dissymmetry held by Leibniz and Deleuze. While this line 
goes some way to recasting the thermodynamic aporias, I argue, they cannot yet be 
resolved.  
If entropy and chaos represent ‘negative’ forms of order, they are nevertheless not left 
behind in chapter three, where I begin to address its positive forms. I rehearse the 
Bergsonian treatment of ‘order’ in its dual form, the mechanistic and the vital. For Bergson, 
as for Deleuze, there is no such thing as disorder. The concept of ‘retardation’ is brought 
forward, as a principle which intervenes in all mechanistic processes, furnishing the vital or 
the complex. This framework recasts the argument again, since for Bergson, the 
mechanistic is the entropic, while the vital is the complex. The questions raised are played 
out under the rubric of ‘reciprocal determination’ or immanence, through an extended 
comparison of physical action by analogy to a game. Separate instances of this figure, 
belonging to Leibniz, Michel Serres and Deleuze himself, are examined with a view to 
foregrounding the relative importance of reciprocal determination in each. Ultimately it is 
the role of chance as radical contingency which we can see in both Serres and Deleuze 
which underpins the basis for the mutability of laws in an evolutionary cosmology.  
The fourth chapter identifies a consequence to the schism Deleuze draws between himself 
and Bergson in Difference and Repetition. It is that Deleuze implicitly elides the existence of 
Bergson’s ‘inert matter’, the mechanistic order, in favour of a sole principle of complexity. 
The nature of retardation is correspondingly altered. Retardation is a limitation of the 
absolute, arbitrary speed of mechanism; for Deleuze, it becomes complexity, ‘life’, which 
limits itself, and all limitation is to be couched in terms of relative speed, or slowing down. 
The difficulties of orientation to scientific reasoning are addressed, with respect to the 
Complexity Theory of Stuart Kauffman and David Bohm’s notion of ‘generative order’. This 
serves to foreground the question of ‘limits’ in both Deleuze and Whitehead. These 
questions are shown to inform our orientation to scientific principles.  
The final chapter returns to the question of symmetry, and bolsters the case for Sufficient-
Reason-as-dissymmetry. In a world of complete symmetry, nothing would happen, Leibniz’ 
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God would have no reason to decide. Dissenting voices on the foundational role of 
symmetry are brought to the fore from the scientific community, which feeds into a 
discussion of the ‘limits’ and ‘laws’. The line of reasoning brings out the place of ‘non-
locality’ in the science and the philosophy. In both cases, non-locality is conjoined with the 
substantive existence of higher (than three) dimensions, which is subject to limitation 
through explication. Loop Quantum gravity, a ‘network’ model, is cited to illustrate the 
case. A shared association proves to hold (among the science and the philosophy) between 
the idea of limitation and retardation. Finally, the elements are brought together to outline 
the nature of the evolutionary cosmology; there is a particular form of ‘openness’ which 
must pertain in a Deleuzian evolutionary cosmos; the mutability of laws, constants and 
natural kinds. It is this formulation which can ultimately serve to orientate Deleuze’s 
iconoclastic refusal of entropy to contemporary science.  
 
 
 
1 In a discussion of quantum theory as dependent on vibration, for instance, Whitehead says; ‘A 
steadily sounding note is explained as the outcome of vibrations in the air: a steady colour is 
explained as the outcome of vibrations in the ether. If we explain the steady endurance of matter on 
the same principle, we shall conceive each primordial element as a vibratory ebb and flow of an 
underlying energy, or activity.’ Whitehead, A.N., Science and the Modern World (UK: CUP, 2011), 
p.46. 
2 Retrocausality would allow the measurement of one particle of a pair to prompt a signal backwards 
in time to the point at which the entangled particles had collided, thereby correlating for the 
measured property ‘in the past’. First proposed as an alternative solution to explanations in terms of 
nonlocality by Olivier Costa deBeauregard in the 1940s, retrocausality has had relatively few 
advocates, the philosopher Huw Price being a notable exception. See Becker, A. (Feb. 2018), ‘Blast 
from the Future’ in New Scientist #3165. 
3 Zee, A., Fearful Symmetry (US: Princeton, 1986), p.212. 
4 I adopt this formulation, ‘ chance is the only necessity’ as a gloss for Deleuze’s ‘chaos’ on a number 
of occasions in this work. In the first instance it is prompted by Deleuze’s own codocils to Nietzsche’s 
concept of chaos in his monograph Nietzsche and Philosophy (US: Athlone, 1983): ‘[P]lay affirms 
chance and the necessity of chance.’ ; ‘We affirm chance and the necessity of chance.’ I have 
adopted the stronger formulation in recognition of the fact that for Deleuze (as for Nietzsche), there 
would be no world if not for a primordial and perennial chaos. If there is a world, it is due to radical 
chance. I address this theme at some length in the argument.  
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Chapter One: Chaos 
 
 
Chaos #1: Chaos and Complexity Theory 
 
There are a number of rich cross-pollinations to be gleaned from a consideration of the 
frameworks of Chaos and complexity theory and Deleuze’s work. They have been explored 
by (among others) Manuel DeLanda, Brian Massumi and John Protevi. 1 Indeed, the 
connections are much more than coincidence. Deleuze is cited as an influence in the first 
work to catalyse Chaos Theory as such, Order out of Chaos, by Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle 
Stengers. Equally, Deleuze recognized the resonance of Chaos Theory with his own work. In 
a discussion of ‘inexact yet completely rigorous notions’ 2 which are capable of crossing 
disciplinary boundaries, he says; 
One of the many concepts created in [Order out of Chaos] is that of a region of 
bifurcation. Prigogine draws it out from his own field, but it’s a good example of a 
concept that’s irreducibly philosophical, scientific and artistic too.3 
We might note a further such transdisciplinary instance in Deleuze’s co-option of 
Mandelbrot fractals in elaborating the term ‘smooth space’.4  
It is a moot point, in short, how far we might go in aligning Deleuze’s work with the fields of 
Chaos and Complexity, all the more so since the general spirit of his thought is far from 
precious over the co-habitation of the philosophical apparatus with promising concepts and 
modes of thought in the mathematical and natural sciences. I would argue, however, that 
there are points in the commentary on Deleuze which exceed productive cross-pollination 
with these particular fields in the direction of too close an identification. This is counter-
productive for two essential reasons: firstly, it is reductive to identify Deleuze’s work too 
neatly with any one branch of science; secondly, it runs the risk of closing down 
illuminating connections to other fields, most notably for our purposes, quantum physics 
and relativity.  
The example of ‘bifurcation’, in which Deleuze expresses interest in the quotation above, is 
a quite important example of this too-close conflation. In Chaos theory, a system is said to 
bifurcate at that point when there are two equally possible developments of its activity, 
two possible reconfigurations of its state space, and one of these comes to pass but not the 
other. For as long as neither path is ‘chosen’, the system remains in the ‘region of 
bifurcation’ which Deleuze alludes to; a region of state space associated with far-from-
equilibrium conditions.5 What is the appeal of this concept for Deleuze? There is an 
undoubted affinity here with a key tenet for Deleuze; he holds that divergent series are 
prior to convergent series. For Deleuze, divergent series are primordial phenomena, 
convergent series secondary. ‘Series’ may be series of anything; a trajectory is a series of 
points, the relative density of given chemical components and products may be a series in a 
cyclical reaction. The priority given to divergent series may be read in a similar way to the 
central place of the clinamen in Lucretian cosmology; the initial strict parallel paths of 
atoms in a downward fall through the void is broken by a swerve, a divergence, a clinamen, 
on the part of a single atom, bringing it into contact with others, and by chain reaction a 
convergence into structure and form which ever and again undoes and remakes itself, 
diverging first then reconverging. For Deleuze, this sense of divergence belongs equally 
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primordially to the question of genesis; if it were not for divergence from an initial stasis, 
nothing would happen at all. ‘The only way to escape from chaos,’ he says, ‘is to form a 
series.’ 6  
Bifurcation, then, offers us a bridge between our metaphysics and the rolled-up sleeves of 
the scientific discipline. John Protevi considers the link significant enough to make a firm 
association between chaotic bifurcation and the Event, which is without doubt one of the 
key concepts in the Deleuzian vocabulary; 
Deleuze calls the triggering of a bifurcator an ‘Event’, which unleashes an ‘emission 
of singularities’, providing for a new set of attractors and bifurcators, or patterns 
and thresholds of the intensive processes that are ‘buried’ under forms of actual 
behaviour. 7  
Indeed, beginning from the twin terms ‘divergence’ and ‘bifurcation’, both indispensable 
initial conditions of the respective frameworks, it is possible to elaborate a far-reaching set 
of correspondences, as Protevi does. Where Deleuze attributes to the Event a power of 
‘redistribution of singularities’, Chaos theory attributes to Bifurcation the generation of a 
‘new set of attractors and bifurcators’, which are in turn themselves termed singularities. 
We might, for instance, discover a chaotic cycle to shift from a state space featuring one 
basin of attraction to another featuring two or more; it is not just that the system itself has 
evolved along a particular path through its attendant state space, but that the state space 
itself is recast as a result of the evolution of the system, perhaps acquiring more degrees of 
freedom. Its long-term tendencies, its attractors are so to speak redistributed. Moreover, 
the singularities spoken of in each framework occupy an ontologically comparable role. 
Where for Deleuze singularities as such belong to the virtual domain, serving as conditions 
for actualisation which may never themselves fully actualise, so too for chaotic attractors, 
which are to be understood as ideal points in state space, which the system will tend to 
approach but on principle cannot occupy. This is an inherent feature of the formalisation of 
state space structure proposed first by Henri Poincaré; the ‘knots’ and ‘saddles’ etc. of 
Chaos Theory. There is in a quite straightforward sense a chaotic ‘virtual’. It seems we can 
legitimately map (if not translate) the two systems of thought onto one another, as Protevi 
does; 
The actual behaviour of the system, its oscillation at frequency #1 or #2, would be a 
trait, while oscillation frequencies #1 and #2 would occur as the result of a (near-) 
actualisation of virtual attractors, a selection of divergent series that actualises a 
certain set of virtual singularities. 8 
This set of mappings, however, is conditional on the relegation of a particular feature of 
Deleuzian ‘divergence’ to the background. For Deleuze, divergence, the motor of the Event, 
is continuous, without interruption, just as is the Event itself. In the passage below we can 
detect the mark of a power attributed to divergent series which far transcends the 
relatively domestic shifting between phases portrayed above: 
The basic series are divergent: not relatively, in the sense that one could retrace 
one’s path and find a point of convergence, but absolutely divergent in the sense 
that the point or horizon of convergence lies in a chaos or is constantly displaced 
within that chaos. This chaos is itself the most positive, just as the divergence is the 
object of affirmation. It is indistinguishable from the great work which contains all 
the complicated series, which affirms and complicates all the series at once.  
(DR p.123) 
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We are rather here presented with a chaos of another stamp entirely than that of the 
scientific field, belonging more squarely to the ancient cosmologies of the Greeks; a tract 
from which existence or becoming pours. A Chaosmos, as Deleuze has it. Singularities are 
indeed redistributed within the Event, but there is no punctuation, no tipping point or 
bifurcation; rather a ‘constant displacement’. It could not be otherwise according to the 
syntheses of time which Deleuze propounds in Difference and Repetition. The past, with all 
its conditions for the present, returns at each moment, in its entirety, but reshuffled and 
recombined subject to the exigencies, accidents and evolutions of the present. What is 
added from the present is no mere addition, but serves to promote some of the series 
ramifying out of the past and mercilessly to demote others; the past is cast anew at each 
moment instantaneously and forever, like the instant reconfiguration of a magnetic field. 
The future is another covariant field whose potentialities reconfigure accordingly; what was 
likely, possible or hypothetically necessary no longer is so, but the adjacent possible shivers 
into view as if the sensors for a lighting system in some vast hangar were triggered.  
There are numerous indications that Deleuze took the Event to be continuous in nature. 
Leonard Lawlor draws our attention to the number of times he insists on this; 
Despite its singularity and novelty, the event does not end; it is incessant (Deleuze 
negates the French verb, cesser, at crucial points in his discourse). The event has a 
potency that cannot be stopped (“il ne cesse pas”). 9  
Lawlor cites some seven instances of this construction in The Logic of Sense. Deleuze leaves 
little doubt on this matter in a chapter entitled ‘What is an Event?’ in The Fold, when he 
adopts a particular exemplification offered by Whitehead. Whitehead includes the 
apparent permanence and fixity of a structure such as a pyramid under the category of 
Event: 
A permanence has to be born in flux, and must be grasped in prehension. The 
Great Pyramid signifies two things: a passage of Nature or a flux constantly gaining 
and losing molecules, but also an eternal object that remains the same over the 
succession of moments. (FLB p.79) 
 
Finally, this sense of the event is arguably inherent in Deleuze’s terminology; he coins the 
phrase ‘constant variation’, which connotes a continuous divergence of series, of form in 
relation to environment. 
Pace Protevi, there is no straightforward identification to be made between Deleuze’s 
chaotic ‘divergence’ and the ‘bifurcations’ of Chaos Theory, nor can such an identification 
underwrite the Deleuzian Event qua Event; this is in effect akin to comparing the knots in a 
piece of wood to the sap which laid the grain. But it would only be pedantry, and of a 
distinctly un-Deleuzian stamp, to labour the point if it were merely to stand on the letter of 
the Deleuzian text. Rather, to insist on the incessant nature of the Event is to recoup and 
remobilise a certain momentum in the Deleuzian metaphysics which opens up connecting 
lines to fields rather less explored in the commentary. This is at the heart of the motivation 
for this project. It will entail foregrounding elements of the Deleuzian text which are less 
frequently treated. When Deleuze refers to ‘décalage’ (‘delay’, or ‘retardation’) in the 
passage of nature, he is on that same shared territory which Bergson forged between 
philosophy and Relativity Theory; but then how are we to understand the continuous Event 
– the Event that elapses at each given moment - in a ‘retardative’ cosmos which admits of 
no absolute simultaneity, no simple ‘given moment’? The answer I will put forward bears 
heavily on what concept of order we can attribute to the Event, and to nature, and 
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suggests a schism between Bergson and Deleuze in terms other than Deleuze himself 
offers. Equally, the continuity attributed to the Event must ultimately be at the expense of 
any restriction of location for the Event as such. To subscribe to the Deleuzian Event is to 
be obliged to entertain those same questions of ‘non-locality’ which have occupied 
Quantum theorists since the early twentieth century. Questions of ‘the limit’, the ‘constant’ 
and ‘the law’ underly Deleuze’s orientation to science, and must be placed in context of 
continuous variation, of divergence. These questions, and Deleuze’s response to them, 
suggest correspondences to modern developments in physics which extend far beyond 
those offered by Chaos Theory. They entail attitudes to the values of symmetry and 
symmetry-breaking, a trope which is by no means confined to that field. They circle around 
questions of energy and entropy, ever-present throughout the discourse of natural 
sciences, and force us to address not merely whether the universe is ‘open’, but what it is 
that might constitute such ‘openness’. Finally, these questions conjoin with the increasingly 
prevalent paradigm of evolutionary cosmology. These themes will form the basis of the 
discussion in the chapters to come, but there is (at least) another aspect of chaos to 
address first.            
 
Chaos #2: Nietzschean Chaos and the Superior Principle of Sufficient Reason 
 
The Chaos which Nietzsche describes in his work leaves a lasting imprint on Deleuze’s own. 
Without Nietzschean Chaos, there would be no Deleuzian Difference; it is the only motor of 
Recurrence in the Eternal Return, just as Difference is the only motor for Deleuze’s 
Repetition. Deleuze makes this connection in his early monograph on Nietzsche, published 
some six years prior to Difference and Repetition; 
This is why we can only understand the eternal return as a principle which serves as 
an explanation of diversity and its reproduction, of difference and its repetition. 
(N&P p.45) 
What, then, is Nietzschean Chaos, and more importantly, how does Deleuze understand 
and ultimately come to modify it? Tackling these questions will reveal a great deal about 
one of the stated motivations for writing Difference and Repetition; the search for a 
superior form of The Principle of Sufficient Reason, and as we shall see Deleuze’s stand on 
this point is decisive in triangulating his attitude to symmetry with those arguments from 
symmetry on which so much of science relies.  
In a scientific register, Nietzschean Chaos represents a denial of any substantive state of 
equilibrium in nature. In Nietzsche’s iconoclastic attacks on scientific principles, it is this 
denial which justifies the appeal to the Eternal Return. The point is encapsulated in the 
following two quotations; 
The total character of the world, however, is in all eternity chaos. 10  
And: 
If the universe were capable of permanence and fixity, and if there were in its 
entire course a single moment of being in the strict sense it could no longer have 
anything to do with becoming. 11  
The first quotation occurs in context of a number of injunctions to the reader regarding 
natural order. Nietzsche warns us not to view the apparent uniformities in the world as 
tokens of a universal order; even the regularities of our neighbouring stars; ‘the astral 
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order in which we live,’ he says, ‘is misleading.’ We should be wary of believing there to be 
laws in nature. In the commentary, this quotation has been taken as a precursor to the 
thought of Eternal Return; it is a marker of the role which chaos plays in that idea. Chaos is 
the primordial fact; it is due to chaos that Zarathustra’s moonlit road stretches endlessly 
forward and backward to eternity, it is due to chaos that there are no laws in nature. The 
second quotation reveals why this should be so. The potential to achieve ‘permanence’ or 
‘fixity’ cannot be any part of nature’s ‘total character’, since, according to Zarathustra’s 
observations, that state of fixity, of equilibrium, must already have been reached in a 
universe which has endured from all eternity. All permutations of the cosmic fabric must 
already have been visited, yet still nature advances. Given these premises – the world as 
eternal, the passage of nature as ergodic – it is a matter of deduction for Nietzsche that no 
state of equilibrium, no heat death, is achievable in nature. For it would mark a terminal 
impasse from which nature could not escape. And yet it moves. Hence Deleuze’s claim that 
the Eternal Return is an answer to the ‘problem of passage’ (N&P p.45), the passing of one 
moment into the other. Nietzsche intends to establish that time cannot help but pass in a 
world without stasis, and that for this reason eternity is its condition.     
Nietzsche’s chaos is a denial of equilibrium, then, but the other aspect is no less important; 
a lack of law. Babette Babich expresses this neatly; 
The primordiality of the void, understood as raw possibility, that is as becoming 
recurs in Nietzsche’s notion of the world taken as chaos to, and thus in this wise: 
from all eternity. 12  
Raw possibility, radical chance, is the total character of the world. And this is so because 
there never has been and never will be, neither locally nor globally, any actual state of 
equilibrium. Babich’s characterisation is in the context of a discussion of Nietzsche’s debt to 
Greek cosmologies - chaos as the void - but Nietzsche’s standpoint on the matter is not 
confined to metaphysical reflections on the Eternal Return or cosmological origin. It is as 
much to do with the nature of energy, which he understands fundamentally as a conflict 
between forces, superior versus inferior. A conflict which can never be resolved, since 
competing forces are in their nature incommensurable; there is no common measure by 
which any given force can be quantified against any other, and this inequality guarantees a 
remainder in every least phenomenon, every quantum of action. Disequilibrium is a 
precondition for any event of any kind whatsoever. One of the main threads of Nietzsche’s 
critique of scientific reasoning (and of philosophy) is the tendency precisely to impose 
common measure, equalities, on phenomena which are fundamentally unequal; 
In our science, where the concept of cause and effect is reduced to the relationship 
of equivalence, with the object of proving that the same quantum of force is 
present on both sides, the driving force is lacking: we observe only results, and we 
consider them equivalent in content and force. 13 
Pierre Klossowski emphatically underlines this aspect of Nietzsche’s thinking in his 
monograph Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle; 
 The will to power appears essentially as a principle of disequilibrium. 14 
Deleuze marshals and foregrounds these often disparate elements of Nietzsche’s thought 
in ways which will serve his philosophy of difference; 
What is the body? We do not define it by saying that it is a field of forces, a 
nutrient medium fought over by a plurality of forces, for in fact there is no 
‘medium’, no field of forces or battle. There is no quantity of reality, all reality is 
already quantity of force in mutual ‘relations of tension’ (VP II 373). (N&P p.37) 
 
 
17 
 
This differential nature of energetic forces, this resistance to the notion of equilibrium, is of 
crucial importance to Deleuze. It informs his thinking of Disparity with Simondon, it is the 
‘remainder’ without which the Event is nothing, it is what forces the movement in The Ideal 
Game. It underpins Life. Disequilibrium, radical chance, is a positive, indispensable, internal 
motor of the Chaosmos; 
 The eternal return is not the effect of the Identical upon a world become similar, it 
is not an external order imposed upon the chaos of the world; on the contrary, the 
eternal return is the internal identity of the world and of chaos, the Chaosmos.  
(DR p.299) 
There are a number of problems this raises with respect to the concept of entropy, to 
which we will come presently, but first it will be useful to clarify the role of this positive 
disequilibrium in the ‘Superior Principle of Sufficient Reason’ which Deleuze requires for 
the philosophy of difference. He states on more than one occasion in the course of 
Difference and Repetition that the rationale is to investigate the possibility of formulating a 
superior form of Leibniz’ Principle of Sufficient Reason. He identifies the resources for such 
a formulation as belonging to the idea of the Eternal Return. This is striking not merely 
because Nietzsche is notoriously dismissive of the power of reason as such, and thus an 
unlikely substitute for the arch rationalist Leibniz, but more particularly in the very nature 
of the theatre played out in Nietzsche’s presentation of the idea to us; the overdetermined 
allegory seems irremediably removed from any claims to this intellectual principle. What is 
at stake in the translation? Where is the point of departure from Leibniz’ system? What it is 
about the Eternal Return which can provide a superior sufficient reason? It is a matter of a 
certain Nietzschean necessity which we shall see is ultimately played off against a certain 
Leibnizian necessity. 
   
The Eternal Return and the Disparity of Forces 
   
At first glance – or more accurately, on a reading of the first formulation of Nietzsche’s 
notion of the Eternal Return – there is not much to support Deleuze’s interpretation of this 
core notion. Moreover, there is much to contradict it; indeed, Deleuze’s philosophy of time 
and the role of difference therein seems directly at odds with the dramatized cosmogony 
that Nietzsche offers in The Gay Science; 
This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and 
innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and 
every joy and every thought and sight and everything unutterably small or great in 
your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence. 15  
If this passage were not (as of course it was not) written explicitly to refute any prospective 
alignment of Deleuzian ‘Repetition’ with Nietzschean ‘Recurrence’, it is nevertheless 
difficult to imagine one that could do so more definitively. Nietzsche’s claustrophobic 
‘nothing new’ seems to clash definitively with Deleuze’s central insistence on the world as 
creative, on the ineradicable newness of the lived present; Nietzsche’s ‘same succession 
and sequence’ stands against Deleuze’s extended philosophical project devoted to 
clarifying the mere epiphenomenal dependence of concepts such as ‘the same’ and 
‘identity’ on the operations of difference. 
This seems to derail the claim above that Deleuze’s ‘repetition’ belongs with Nietzsche’s 
‘return’. Is the scenario of the eternal return merely a conveniently allusive and suggestive 
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figure of cyclical temporality, sparse and austere enough for Deleuze to colour in as he 
requires? On one level, yes; the extent to which Nietzsche omits to flesh out the thought of 
the eternal return (an omission which Deleuze notes in Difference and Repetition) 16 is 
matched by the readiness of subsequent philosophers to lend their own apparatus – 
ethical, metaphysical, deconstructionist – to its interpretation – alongside Deleuze we can 
readily place any number in this vein; Vattimo, Klossowski et al. Yet as we have already 
seen, there are deep resources in Nietzsche on which Deleuze draws, and many 
Nietzschean tributaries to the Deleuze’s philosophy of difference. 
A more amenable place to start is with one of the famous passages dealing with the Eternal 
Return in Thus Spoke Zarathustra; the dialogue between Zarathustra and the dwarf in the 
section entitled ‘Of the Vision and the Riddle’. 
 ”Behold this moment!” I went on, “From this gateway Moment a long, eternal lane 
runs back: an eternity lies behind us.” 
 “Must not all things that can run have already run along this lane? Must not all 
things that can happen have already happened, been done, run past?” 17 
 
We encounter again the two principles on which the reasoning rests; that the world is 
eternal, and that nature as a whole proceeds ergodically through its possible repertoire. 
Yet it is the closely subsequent utterance which carries the real import and helps us to 
understand why for Deleuze the Eternal Return might offer an apt model for his difference 
and repetition, an image of becoming and creativity. 
”And are not all things bound fast together in in such a way that this moment 
draws after it all future things? Therefore – draws itself too?” 18 
This is the point in Nietzsche’s text where a certain necessity is attached to chance. The 
‘gateway Moment’ sits at the intersection of all that comes before and after, a pivot on 
which the development of all series rests, both backwards and forwards, yet it is destined 
to suffer the same redistributions at the very next moment as all other elements of nature. 
It is not contingently true that no pivot, no crux, no law persists; it is necessary. There is 
simply nothing in nature that could serve this function. It is this necessity to which Deleuze 
refers when he writes of ‘the necessity of chance’ in Nietzsche’s work.19 It is this necessity 
which secures the superiority of Nietzsche’s thought for Sufficient Reason. 
 
Ergodicity and Infinite Duration 
 
‘Everything which happens and everything which appears is correlated with orders 
of differences: differences of level, temperature, pressure, tension, potential, 
difference of intensity. Carnot’s principle says this in one way, Curie’s principle in 
another.’ 
Gilles Deleuze 20 
 
In a positive sense, the resistance to equilibrium affirms the ultimate irreducibility of 
differences in energetic potential between phenomena; those very phenomena which 
natural science takes as its object; temperature, pressure, tension et al. And the science of 
thermodynamics both classical and modern would agree without hesitation, would equally 
forcefully confirm that ‘everything that happens and everything which appears’ is a 
consequence of gradients of energy. The presence of an energy gradient is what constitutes 
free (as opposed to bound) energy in thermodynamic terminology. Without free energy no 
system will evolve, nothing will happen. The point of contention arises over the 
irreducibility in principle of those gradients. For classical thermodynamics, energy gradients 
within any closed system will always equalise; any action by definition requires some 
 
 
19 
 
expenditure of free energy, some cancellation of the difference in potential. And because 
this is true of each and every system without fail, it will ultimately be true of the universe 
as a whole. Our fate in the long term can only be the moribund state of maximum entropy, 
a final equilibrium. It is difficult to overstate how central a position the concept of entropy, 
the long-term tendency of all systems toward equilibrium, occupies in classical 
thermodynamics. Arthur Eddington, a pre-eminent contributor to the physics of relativity, 
is often quoted on this: 
 
If your theory is found to be against the Second Law of Thermodynamics, I can give 
you no hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation. 21 
 
The Second Law is the very one which states that the universe tends to maximum entropy. 
To this day, as if in deference to Eddington’s warning, it is not uncommon to find lines of 
argument in physics debunked because they contain some (usually unintended) 
consequence which transgresses the Second Law. No less a contemporary figure than 
Roger Penrose presents his theory of Conformal Cyclic Cosmology explicitly as a rebuttal of 
those cyclical cosmologies positing the birth of new universes from old without heed to the 
Second Law; this amounts, for him, to the illegitimate assumption of energy from 
nothing.22  
As a matter of the history of science, both the notions of the universe as ergodic and as 
eternal play their part in the classical formulations of entropy, for Boltzmann, for Maxwell, 
Kelvin and Poincaré, but in all cases in ways too nuanced to yield to Nietzsche’s 
metaphysical dismissal without supplement. In particular, the dead-stop of all becoming 
which Nietzsche attributes to thermodynamic cosmological theory is at least an insufficient 
reading. Nor does its denial alone furnish the necessity of chance which both Nietzsche and 
Deleuze champion.     
The Ergodic Principle rests on what is called The Principle of Indifference, which states that 
all relevant microstates are equally accessible to a system in evolution. The corollary is that 
all microstates stand an equal chance of expression during that evolution. The Ergodic 
Principle is an assertion on this basis that all microstates will eventually be occupied in the 
lifetime of a system if it endures long enough. To subscribe to The Ergodic Principle on a 
cosmic scale – to an ergodic universe – places us ostensibly on that same ground as 
Nietzsche illuminates with the allegory of The Eternal Return. First, he takes it as given that 
the universe endures infinitely both backward and forward in time, which would indeed (of 
course) secure the elapse required for an ergodic universe to cycle through the same states 
many times. Infinitely many. ‘Must not all things that can happen have already happened, 
been done, run past?’ asks Zarathustra. Which we might translate as, ‘Must the world not 
already have visited all its possible microstates?’ 
The reasoning appears the same. Nietzsche’s argument seems no less to require that all 
states are equally accessible, regardless of unlikelihood, in an evolution lasting long 
enough. Over sufficient time, what is impossible remains impossible, but what seems 
unlikely becomes inevitable.  
But the devil is in the detail. For Nietzsche, this line of argument dictates that no 
‘macrostate of the universe’ could ever be in equilibrium, whereas by the principles of 
classical statistical mechanics, most possible states of the universe, taken as an average 
over the course of its entire elapse, would be in equilibrium. It is probability which dictates 
the heat death of the universe; there are far fewer possible microstates corresponding to 
far-from-equilibrium macrostates than there are for equilibrial. This is often expressed in 
the form ‘there are far more ways to be disordered than ordered’ (far more ways for 
broken eggs to remain broken than to reassemble).23 Indeed, to the degree that both 
Nietzsche and classical thermodynamics subscribe to the Principle of Indifference, the 
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guarantor of an ergodic universe, they are equally subject to an apparent paradox, a 
‘paradox of ergodicity’. This paradox both heightens the stakes for Nietzsche’s position, and 
demands an account on the part of thermodynamic science. Briefly, if by far the most 
numerous microstates correspond to equilibrial macrostates, how does it come about that 
our observed universe is so far from equilibrium? The Principle of Indifference should 
guarantee that our present state lacks (precisely) the degree of differentiation, the 
structuration and complexity that we see, due to its overwhelming rarity. And if we are to 
acknowledge a universality to entropic processes which dictate a march to 
indifferentiation, how is it that a universe which has lasted for eternity is not already 
arrived at its heat death? Must its initial condition not have been a microstate so 
improbably ordered, so exquisitely rare, that cosmic history could suffer the 
encroachments of entropy to this day, yet still not have run aground on the infinitely more 
probable state of equilibrium? How, in short, could nature maintain itself so long in the 
margins of its manifest destiny? This paradox was not lost on the pioneers of 
thermodynamic theory – Maxwell, Gibbs, and Boltzmann himself – and has never yet been 
resolved to general satisfaction.  
Here then are the two factors separating Nietzsche’s Eternal Return from the ergodic 
universe of statistical mechanics: the distinction between microstate and macrostate which 
serves the latter as the index for probability; and consequently the nature of the ‘heat 
death’ assumed in each case.24 Whereas for Nietzsche, arrival at cosmic equilibrium can 
only entail the instantaneous dead-halt to the passage of nature, a definitive blackout in 
‘permanence and fixity’, this is not so for statistical mechanics. On the level of macrostate, 
in a state of heat death, nature is unlikely to change or evolve, while nevertheless free to 
run through all and every available permutation of microstates conforming to that same 
macrostate, much like shuffling a deck of blank cards, or the cycling of a disengaged 
flywheel. Nevertheless, the ergodic hypothesis, based as it is on probability, is inherently 
constrained from asserting the finality of heat death. 
  
I do not know if it has been remarked that the English kinetic theories can extract 
themselves from this contradiction. The world, according to them, tends at first to 
a state where it remains for a long time without apparent change; and this is 
consistent with experience; but it does not remain that way forever, if the theorem 
cited above is not violated; it merely stays that way for an enormously long time, a 
time which is longer the more numerous are the molecules. This state will not be 
the final death of the universe, but a sort of slumber, from which it will awake after 
millions of millions of centuries. According to this theory, to see heat pass from a 
cold body to a warm one, it will not be necessary to have the acute vision, the 
intelligence and dexterity of Maxwell’s Demon; it will suffice to have a little 
patience. 25 
 
This observation by Henri Poincaré serves to undermine the ‘contradiction’ of the paradox 
of ergodicity; the contradiction does not exist. His ‘recurrence theorem’ states that all self-
enclosed systems (of which we might take the universe to be one) will over the course of 
long enough time return arbitrarily close to initial conditions. This is to assert ergodicity, 
but in a way that, rather than underpinning the prima-facie implications of the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics, must rather be at odds with them. Enclosed systems must surely 
increase in entropy, but they must also just as surely exit from them. The recurrence 
theorem does not so much serve to contradict statistical mechanics as to extend its 
application, and in doing so reverse the long-term diagnosis.  
The classical thermodynamics which Nietzsche resists, refuses in turn to provide any simple 
foil, serving both to confirm and frustrate his metaphysical logic. While on the one hand, it 
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points to a moribund heat death, this is not definitive, no dead-halt. It both is and is not 
what Nietzsche requires. But this is so, it seems, precisely because of the key Nietzschean 
tenet which Deleuze brings so much to the fore; the necessity of chance, in the form of an 
irreducibly probabilistic direction for the passage of nature (although as we shall see, 
Deleuze does much to supersede this conception of chance in nature, through his notion of 
The Ideal Game). According to Poincaré, a form of eternal recurrence is implicit in the 
principles of classical thermodynamics, yet on maddeningly long time-scales mostly desert. 
This being so, we are deprived of another important facet of the Nietzschean-Deleuzian 
framework, the incessant nature of becoming, predicated on the perpetually out-of-kilter 
tension between incommensurable forces.  
Finally, in the context of meaningful dialogue between our metaphysics and contemporary 
cosmology, it is abundantly clear that the incommensurability of energetic phenomena, 
and the consequent necessity of chance, must be asserted against, not derived as an 
unacknowledged implication from (as Nietzsche has it), the overwhelming body of opinion. 
This is because Nietzsche’s second premise, the prior eternity of the universe (a premise 
shared by the classical theorists including Newton), has been definitively abandoned. Its 
last serious defence was put forward by astronomer Fred Hoyle (among others) in the 
1950s in resistance to what he dubbed derogatorily the Big Bang. His ‘Steady State’ 
cosmology has been taken to be definitively refuted by the discovery of Cosmic Microwave 
Background Radiation in 1976 by Penzias and Wilson. This background radiation had been a 
specific prediction of the Big Bang Hypothesis, serving to elevate it to an almost 
unanimously subscribed theory. Current estimates of the age of the universe place it at 
some 13.8 billion years. 26 Even in an outrightly ergodic universe, which may or may not be 
ours, this is a woefully inadequate timeframe to furnish the required demonstration of the 
Eternal Return. For Nietzsche, everything that can happen, must already have happened. If 
it has not, the permutations of the universe remain unexhausted, and among those 
permutations may lie the dead-stop of equilibrium which he wishes to refute. Only the 
circumstance of having survived a cycle (in truth, an infinite number of cycles) can 
guarantee the necessity of chaos and chance. 
If Deleuze were relying on the dramaturgical metaphysical arguments Nietzsche adopts 
with respect to the eternal return to underpin the principle of chaos, we should cede him 
somewhat less than a deductive status for them. Somewhat less than a necessity to 
chance. Yet to consign the promise of the Deleuzian cosmology so quickly to the same 
dustbin as classical physics would be to ignore the great suppleness and resourcefulness of 
his body of work; it is perfectly possible to make the case for the open-ended novelty which 
must belong to any cosmos we might call Deleuzian without reliance on the critique he 
borrows from Nietzsche. In making such a case, I shall not restrict myself to consideration 
of the physics contemporary to Deleuze’s own lifetime, much less to that science only 
about which he was demonstrably aware and made comment. Both physics and 
metaphysics are open-ended projects, and it would be remiss to pass over the wonderful 
and inspired variety of contemporary speculative theory; it would be to fail to recognize 
the same speculative spirit animating Deleuze’s work. What makes a metaphysics robust is 
its ability to engage with and throw light on even the most current strands in physics and 
science more broadly. The concomitant danger is of course that we force an application of 
our favoured metaphysics to areas and frameworks which could not be foreseen at time of 
writing. Deleuze never heard, could not possibly have heard, of Loop Quantum Gravity. Yet 
few if any new paradigms in science start completely afresh, with a whole new toolkit. Loop 
Quantum Gravity, just like any new contemporary proposal, must fashion itself in such a 
way as not to contradict the successes of either Relativity or Quantum theory. Like any new 
theory, it must align itself with respect to questions (among many others) of the 
continuous or discontinuous character of space, to questions regarding symmetry and the 
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role of symmetry-breaking in nature, of local action versus ‘spooky action at a distance’, to 
thermodynamic considerations. These questions are ‘written into the script’ for any 
modern physics, and the particularities of a given position will determine the fruitfulness or 
otherwise of any potential conversation with a given metaphysical schema. There are rich 
reflections on all these questions in Deleuze’s work, which will be addressed in detail in the 
chapters to come. For that reason, there is no inherent anachronism to a carefully 
evaluated dialogue on these matters between the science and the metaphysics. Indeed, in 
my opinion, it is on the terrain of speculation that metaphysics and science meet most 
naturally; there is no question which metaphysics would put in play that science does not 
also want to resolve. The distinction for me is that metaphysics lives in that plane above 
where the concepts are not tied specifically to one field, but remain free to mobilise the 
salient questions as they play out among several fields. As such, the implicit definition of 
metaphysics I employ here is rather loose and somewhat pragmatic, but in the sense that it 
entails a ‘continuity’ of sorts with science, and ultimately in the very long run must risk 
susceptibility to discreditation through empirical enquiry, it is not dissimilar to that 
‘naturalised metaphysics’ defended by Anjan Chakravarty.27 On the matter of general 
framing, a word is also due about the notion of ‘speculation’ here, to disambiguate any 
perhaps assumed association with the recent, somewhat diverse, philosophical movement 
called ‘speculative realism’ which engages with scientific frameworks. No such association 
is intended; indeed I take issue in the conclusion with the work of Quentin Meillassoux, 
whose work falls under that umbrella term. Equally, the work of the speculative realist 
Graham Harman it seems to me can bear only a tangential relationship with the material 
treated here. His ‘object orientated ontology’, while a useful corrective to the 
‘disappearance’ of the object from contemporary science and philosophy, nevertheless 
advocates a conception of the object (electron and positron included) in relative isolation, 
which is essentially at odds with what I see as most valuable in the work of Deleuze and 
Whitehead, and indeed is hard to square with the messages from quantum physics.28 
Rather, by ‘speculation’ I intend those areas of enquiry (metaphysics and physics alike) 
which are working to push the salient concepts to the limit; this is, if you like, a Deleuzian 
form of speculation.  
It remains, then, to frame the postclassical question for Deleuze; what are the prospects of 
bolstering Deleuze’s resistance to the question of entropy from among the paradigms 
which we encounter in the postclassical age? Which fields of physics speak most directly to 
his metaphysics? The following section attempts merely such an initial framing, with no 
claim to completeness; a more developed response will be proposed in the final chapter 
with respect to the more speculative strands of contemporary physics.                
 
Post-Classical Physics and the Question of Entropy 
 
There are implications of Chaos Theory which both marry well with a Deleuzian 
metaphysics and shine further light on the argument. As Isabelle Stengers points out, the 
presence in systems of sustained fluctuation, or resonances such as those which Poincaré 
identified, are inimical to the formalisation of entropy adopted by Boltzmann; 
 
We have to accept as only a partial truth the idea that chaos is inevitably subjected 
to the law of indifference and statistical compensation. Chaos can also, at what are 
called “second order phase-transitions,” become actual illegality, a chaos of 
fluctuations that no longer fluctuate around an average, because none can any 
longer be defined, but rather reverberate throughout the whole system, confusing 
that which the distinctions between microscopic and macroscopic had 
differentiated. 29 
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Whereas Boltzmann’s formulation rests upon an ideal ergodicity, underpinned by the 
principle of indifference, the synchronic mobilisations of systems in turbulence (which 
chaos theory brought so squarely to the fore) serve to problematise that framework. 
Boltzmann posits each atom in a system as essentially autonomous, with an attendant 
indifferent probability of occupying this or that position within its milieu. The sum total of 
those positions for a given large number of atoms defines its microstate, along with the 
properties of its macrostate. Chaotic, resonating phenomena problematize the distinction 
between microstate and macrostate, in that the micro-elements act in concert, far from 
indifferent to each other. The question of whether the universe as a whole is ergodic 
becomes entirely more complex, no longer amenable to the mathematics of simple 
distribution, no longer a straight road leading backward and forward in the moonlight: all 
the straight roads are made crooked.  Stated another way, Boltzmann’s equation is 
misleading in that it may serve perfectly well as an external index of a system, but will tend 
to mask any internal structuring principles such as turbulence. In this sense, while Chaos 
theory serves to loosen the foundations of the Nietzschean-Deleuzian metaphysics of 
Eternal Return, this focus on internal structuring principles can be read as an episode in the 
history of science belonging squarely to the spirit of Deleuzian natural philosophy. Again, 
the importance of this distinction between internal and external order for Deleuze’s 
philosophy of difference will come to the fore as the argument progresses. At this point, 
however, we might note that the insights driving the revolution that was Chaos Theory 
conjoin with Deleuze’s own. It is, strictly speaking, false, in light of Chaos Theory to assume 
of atomic phenomena that they are susceptible to a neutral, indifferent range of 
possibilities; in those circumstances where fluctuations and resonances propagate, in those 
states far-from equilibrium, the flat landscape of possible permutations are distinctly no 
longer so; systems act as populations, precluding indifferent distribution.30 This is nothing 
different than Deleuze’s assertion (after Bergson) that the possible is the ‘sterile double’ of 
the world; 
 
…[Every] possible is not realized, realization involves a limitation by which some 
possibles are supposed to be repulsed or thwarted, while other “pass” into the 
real. The virtual, on the other hand, does not have to be realized, but rather 
actualized; and the rules of actualization are not those of resemblance or 
limitation, but those of difference or divergence and of creation. (B p. 97) 
 
Chaos Theory’s unwillingness to neglect apparently negligible phenomena speaks to that 
same unwillingness on Deleuze’s part to trust to the indifferentiation of the possible. The 
patterns and capacities in nature are to be sought in the active fuse of process, not in the 
mere succession of states. And never indifferently, always internally; there is no such thing, 
Deleuze says, as ‘any multiplicity whatever’.31 The truth is consequently that, paradoxically, 
the realm of the virtual is a much less capacious tract, understood as a range of 
possibilities, than the realm of the possible. But it is not to be so understood, and for 
precisely that reason it is vital and open.   
   
As is well-known, Chaos and Complexity Theory offer many resources which place in doubt, 
we might say outrightly supersede, the ‘Newtonian Paradigm’ on which classical dynamics 
and thermodynamics is based. In essence, the Newtonian Paradigm entails the calculability 
of a system’s evolution given sufficient knowledge of that system in terms of salient 
variables. In the case of the trajectory of a projectile, this will include the angle of launch, 
speed, momentum, wind-resistance, relative strength of gravitational pull at the given 
location in the gravity well, etc. The body of Chaos Theory has resolutely problematized the 
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very possibility of determining initial conditions in sufficient detail to guarantee 
calculability. Indeed, perhaps its most signal message is that science should be conscious of 
the potential for even the slightest variation in initial conditions to produce wildly varying 
evolutions of a given system. Exact calculability in effect would depend on an infinite 
knowledge of those conditions, and is therefore in principle ruled out; what remains is the 
possibility of defining long-term tendencies of a system. Equally, Chaos Theory has 
upended the usefulness of extrapolating from the behaviour of closed systems to the 
behaviour of natural processes in general. The closed system had been taken as a paradigm 
for all systems, affording empirical scrutability and legitimating generalisations about the 
way systems as a whole could be expected to evolve. Now, it is held that open systems are 
vastly more prevalent in nature than closed, and are significantly different in kind to 
isolated systems, displaying a much greater elasticity of behaviour in contrast to the 
obedient tendency of closed systems to succumb to equilibrium in a predictable and timely 
manner. Indeed, another of the definitive lessons from Chaos Theory is that there is no 
such thing as a truly closed system; even where all other forms of energy are shielded, no 
system can be insulated finally from the effects of gravity. All systems are potentially 
subject to fluctuations which may amplify, deferring the route-march to equilibrium. All 
open systems have the potential to occupy states far-from equilibrium more or less 
indefinitely.  
We should be wary of assuming, however, that the Nietzschean-Deleuzian suspicion of 
classical thermodynamic principles is vindicated straightforwardly by the advent of the 
Post-Newtonian Paradigm. From the purview of Chaos Theory, it is not the 
incommensurability of energetic phenomena as such which underwrites deviations from 
equilibrium, but the fact of the open nature of all systems. The distinction is a critical one. It 
serves to clarify the capacity of given systems to maintain order against chaos, indeed, to 
adopt increasingly complex levels of structuration, but the recognition that the average 
progress of the universe tends to disorder remains intact. The tendency of certain systems 
to increase in complexity does not in and of itself contradict the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, if for every gain in local structuration there is a tithe of free energy to be 
paid in connected systems. The insistence that all systems are open amounts to a claim 
about the accounting system of nature with respect to the expenditure of free energy. 
Every phenomenon has associated with it both an endothermic and an exothermic, internal 
and external, entry in the cosmic ledger. If the system under scrutiny makes a gain in 
available free energy, there must be in the long term a consequent greater loss overall 
among the systems with which it is in contact. The structuration represented by convective 
cells in fluid require a focused, prolonged heat source , while its own resulting exothermic 
reaction will be radiative, unable to furnish work with anything like the same economy. The 
energy bound into the chemical bonds in food is freed by enzymes in our gut to maintain 
and prolong our own metastable order, but what we take, what we can possibly take out, is 
less than that gifted by the ecosystem in the first place. The cost of maintaining order, or 
increasing complexity, against the disorder of equilibrium, will routinely be miscalculated 
without some double-entry accounting of the local and the global, then. Charles 
Lineweaver expresses this neatly; 
 
To answer the question, “is complexity increasing?” we need to disambiguate it. 
Are we talking about the average complexity of the universe or about the 
complexity of the most complex object?32  
 
And Lee Smolin draws out the long-term consequences on a cosmic scale; 
 
 
 
25 
 
The second law is doing its best to drive the solar system to equilibrium, but as long 
as there’s a big star radiating hot photons into cold space, that equilibrium is 
postponed. While it’s postponed, molecules can ride the energy flow to greater 
and greater states of organization and complexity. And stars burn for billions of 
years, so there’s lots of time for complexity to proliferate.33  
 
In other words, while it is routinely acknowledged in contemporary physics that all systems 
are open, and that this allows an indefinite growth in relative order and complexity, away 
from disorder, it is illegitimate to conclude from this that the Second Law is superseded. It 
is true for certain systems under consideration, but because it is true for them, the reverse 
is true of those surrounding systems in contact. Indeed, we should bear in mind the 
principal criterion for defining an open system as such. An open system is one which enjoys 
a throughflow of energy (our Earth receives heat from the sun, absorbs, synthesises and 
radiates back out). This is another way of saying (as Deleuze does) that energy gradients 
are the precondition of any event at all, that order, structure and complexity are driven by 
that flow. Chaos Theory stands squarely behind the Deleuze who speaks of ‘flow’, and even 
the ‘liquid physics’ he calls for in A Thousand Plateaus, yet cannot finally underwrite the 
details of his resistance to the Second Law.34 Nor, as we shall see, does this definition of 
openness associated with chaos theory suffice for a Deleuzian Nature; a wider definition 
will be required. Chaos theory serves to chart the prevalent ways in which the route march 
to equilibrium is deferred, and in the process perhaps problematizes the Principle of Least 
Action, but finally must leave in the realm of conjecture whether this deferral can amount 
to anything more. Nevertheless, we shall have reason to explore the fruitful connections 
between the ‘deferred equilibrium’ of chaos theory and the concept of ‘retardation’ as it 
figures in Deleuze’s work.  
If Deleuze’s resistance to the second law cannot be straightforwardly underwritten by 
either classical dynamics or chaos theory, what of the field of quantum physics, which 
supersedes classical theory every bit as much as the latter, but in markedly distinct ways, 
on a profoundly different terrain? Writing in the latter half of the twentieth century, 
Deleuze is familiar with and puts to use concepts germane to the field, such as 
‘superposition’. Yet the same caution is required as in any attempt to evaluate the 
compatibility or otherwise of any philosopher’s work with the scientific-theoretical corpus. 
One passage where such caution is especially due concerns an argument Deleuze adopts, 
ostensibly from atomic theory, in support of his suspicion of the second law.  On the face of 
it, the argument seems a ready-made point of entry into the task of aligning the philosophy 
of difference with the domain of quantum physics; 
 
The values of implication are centres of envelopment. These centres are not the 
intensive individuating factors themselves, but they are their representatives 
within a complex whole in the process of explication. It is these which constitute 
the little islands and the local increases [remontées] of entropy which nevertheless 
conform overall to the principle of degradation: atoms taken individually, for 
example, even though they nonetheless confirm the law of increasing entropy 
when considered en masse in the order of explication of the system in which they 
are implicated. (DR p.256) 
 
At the atomic scale, Deleuze maintains, entities are immune to the processes of 
degradation which afflict macroscopic entities. It is necessary to forgive Deleuze a little 
looseness of expression here. ‘[R]emonter’ indicates a ‘re-ascending’, a sense faithfully 
preserved in the translation, rather than a descending (more typically, decreasing) of 
entropic values. In context, the latter (descending, decreasing) would seem to be required; 
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the decrease of entropy is inversely correlated to the decrease of order or complexity (or 
when entropy decreases, order increases and vice versa). Deleuze however intends to 
convey an opposition between the low entropy of ‘intensive individuating factors’ and the 
susceptibility to increasing entropy of macroscopic bodies (these bodies ‘nevertheless 
conform overall to the principle of degradation’). Deleuze is in effect referring to the 
process dubbed ‘negentropy’ after Erwin Schrödinger, which refers to the tendency of 
certain forms of organization, including principally those associated with life, to form local 
pockets or islands of increasing order in apparent contradiction to the mandate of 
entropy.35 Nevertheless, as Deleuze acknowledges, the concept of negative entropy does 
not violate the second law of thermodynamics; the gain in organization for isolated ‘islands’ 
is balanced by a corresponding loss in the environment of the system, or (as Deleuze would 
insist) ‘centre of envelopment’. The opposition is thus drawn between two scales; the 
macroscopic, which is susceptible to ‘degradation’, and the atomic, which is not. In this 
way, Deleuze is asserting that atoms, or more properly relations between atoms below the 
level of macroscopic assemblage, are exempt from the second law. He clearly intends to 
establish a correspondence between the intensive nature of the virtual (‘intensive 
individuating factors’), which he asserts is likewise immune to degradation, and the 
energetic regime of the atomic scale. The example of the atom, in other words, is intended 
as an illustration of the claim that entropy is a transcendental illusion, applying only to the 
explicate, to large numbers of atoms in combination. While the generally accepted 
reconceptualization of the atom away from the letter of atomist principles may offer some 
support here, this is not sufficient to make Deleuze’s case. Modern physics no longer 
supports the idea that atoms are enduring (‘eternal’) entities – indeed, it is misleading even 
to talk of the ‘path’ of a particle. Such a path is not the route of an identical particle 
through space; as David Bohm puts it, ‘The notion of continuity of existence is 
approximated by that of very rapid recurrence of similar forms, changing in a simple and 
regular way (rather as a rapidly spinning bicycle wheel gives the impression of a solid disc, 
rather than of a sequence of rotating spokes).’36 Although this picture affords some 
alignment with the notion of intensive unfolding or explication which Deleuze would favour 
(indeed, ‘unfolding’ is precisely the term Bohm adopts for the process described in the 
preceding quotation), it does not of itself secure the immunity from entropy Deleuze 
envisages on the terrain of quantum or atomic scale physics.  
The point of contention comes with respect to the well-known wave/particle duality which 
informs quantum theory. Every particle, particulate ensemble and indeed macroscopic 
object alike are lent form, we are to understand, through an associated wave-form or 
wave-forms, each with a signature frequency. Over time, and acutely so over cosmic time-
scales, all such frequencies will lengthen and hence weaken. This is an implication of the 
expansion of the universe, betokened by the red-shift of galaxies first observed by Hubble, 
which dilutes available energy, undoing structure, ultimately down to the atomic scale. 
Milič Čapek writes; 
 
If the law of dissipation of energy means a lengthening of the wave-length of every 
kind of energy, it must apply to matter itself, which means a gradual 
transformation of matter into radiation.37 
 
The association of the intensive with the sub-atomic scale is rendered more plausible, 
however, by the tendency of contemporary theories to reconceptualise the nature of the 
atom in terms of entities at scales below that of atoms and even below that of their 
constituent components (protons, neutrons, electrons and quarks). For string theory, it is 
the way in which minute strings are shaped and folded amongst themselves that result in 
the signature energies of particulate matter, while for Loop Quantum Gravity, these are the 
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result of unlocalised loops of energy. If Deleuzian metaphysics is to be attuned to the 
advances of modern physics, it may be a matter of recognizing that atomic and directly sub-
atomic entities are in fact explicate, in a different but just as real sense as are macroscopic 
entities. If the intensive is to be located at a given scale, as suggested (though the 
suggestion is far from consistently maintained) by Deleuze’s own example, that scale may 
be a level below the atomic. This line of argument, I believe a necessary corrective to the 
Deleuzian text, will be elaborated in the discussion of Bohm’s own work below. 
More generally, while the question of entropy does not typically occupy the foreground in 
quantum theorising, it would be untrue to say that it is generally contradicted or even 
unaccommodated in the history of the field. Von Neumann proposed, in an interesting 
parallel to Deleuze’s own standpoint, that entropy takes effect at that point where the 
wave-function collapses. Once again, the specifics of Deleuze’s resistance to the second law 
are required to see the connection fully. The colouring of entropy as a transcendental 
illusion rests on Deleuze’s claim that entropy takes effect in explicated, actualised 
phenomena, but could not apply to the intensive, energetically incommensurable 
phenomena of the virtual domain. Prima facie, Von Neumann’s formulation offers 
promising points of contact between the realm of the wavefunction and the (precisely) 
observed world after collapse. The first is outwith the second law, which extends only over 
the second. 
The concept of entropy has proven key to the intersection between quantum theory and 
cosmology, and in particular the high-energy physics of black holes. The Bekenstein-
Hawking conjecture posits a remarkably direct correspondence between the level of 
entropy represented by a given black hole and its ‘surface area’. This line of thinking has in 
turn been adopted to bolster a novel interpretation of quantum cosmology; the 
‘holographic’ universe. 
The preceding observations do not finally serve to establish Deleuze’s resistance to the 
second law as incorrect, nor is it assumed that any scientific position implying the long-
term heat death of the universe is ultimately correct (indeed, the empirical proof would 
require a perseverance equal to Poincaré’s ironic ‘patience’, which might be called upon for 
several times the duration of the universe to date). Moreover, I hope to demonstrate to 
the contrary that there are resources in the scientific literature which strongly resonate 
with the philosophy of difference on this issue.  Rather the exercise has been fourfold: to 
emphasize to what degree and in what senses the Nietzschean-Deleuzian resistance to the 
second law is iconoclastic; to demonstrate (pace Deleuze) the internal tensions of the 
argument from eternal return; the need to supplement that argument from other angles 
(and to give an initial indication of the ways in which Deleuze does this); and most 
importantly to interrogate the robustness of the Nietzschean superior principle of sufficient 
reason, which we can now see goes by the name of ‘the necessity of chance’. In truth, 
while a necessary tactic to bring to the fore the above points of contention, it has been 
somewhat misleading to present the argument from eternal return without detailing two 
crucially related elements of the Nietzschean-Deleuzian corpus. The singular conception of 
chance itself common to both thinkers (this is profoundly distinct from that employed by 
Boltzmann, for example), and the dual regimes to which energetic phenomena belong. The 
first will be addressed in the chapter on the Ideal Game, the second with reference to the 
themes of Limits and Explication. Both are necessary to an understanding of Order and 
Disorder in the Deleuzian sense.   
1 DeLanda, M., Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (UK: Continuum, 2002); Massumi, B., A 
User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari (US: MIT, 1992); 
Bonta, M. and Protevi, J., Deleuze and Geophilosophy (UK: OUP, 2004). 
2 Deleuze seems to borrow from Husserl the notion of the ‘anexact’ in use here. The term is coined 
to recognize that certain ideas contain a positive measure of inexactitude, and that any attempt to 
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substitute more accurate terms would deprive a given description of its intended effect. ‘The most 
perfect geometry and its most perfect practical control cannot help the descriptive student of nature 
to express (in exactly geometrical concepts) that which in so plain, so understanding and so entirely 
suitable a way he expresses in the words: notched, indented, lens-shaped, umbelliform, and the l ike 
– simple concepts which are essentially and not accidentally inexact, and which are therefore also 
unmathematical.’ Husserl, E., Ideas (UK: Routledge Classics, 2012), p.142. Such terms guarantee, 
therefore, a common ground between science, the arts and philosophy and render untenable the 
attempt to delimit each to its own sphere. Deleuze was to broaden this basic insight into a 
discussion of the interrelation of these disciplines in What is Philosophy? Each is examined for its 
relation to chaos; he adopts for them the collective coining ‘the chaoids’.  
3 Deleuze, G., Negotiations (US: Columbia University Press), pp.29-30. 
4 ATP, pp.486-7. 
5 It is worth reflecting how the region of bifurcation functions in Chaos Theory in much the same way 
as ‘zones of indiscernibility’ and the ‘object=x’ work for Deleuze, and hence how far it is plausible to 
read back and forth the tensions of equil ibrium and disequilibrium, symmetry and symmetry-
breaking between the physics and the metaphysics; these topics will  be investigated in detail  
throughout, though with less emphasis on the connection to Chaos Theory. 
6 From Deleuze’s 1987 Leibniz lectures, my translation. 
7 Deleuze and Geophilosophy, p.26. 
8 Ibid, p.27. 
9 Lawlor, L., ‘Phenomenology and Metaphysics and Chaos: On the Fragil ity of the Event in Deleuze’, 
in The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze, ed.s D.W. Smith and H. Somers-Hall  (UK: CUP, 2012), 
p.105). 
10 Nietzsche, F., The Gay Science with a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs (US: Vintage, 
1974), §109, p.168. 
11 Quoted in N&P p.44. 
12 Babich, B., Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground of Art and Life (US: 
SUNY, 1994), p.154. 
13 Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power (US: Vintage, 1968), §688, p.366. 
14 Klossowski, P., Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle (UK: Athlone, 2000), p.103. 
15 Nietzsche, F., The Gay Science with a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs (US: Vintage, 
1974), ‘The Greatest Weight’, p.273. 
16 ‘We know that Nietzsche gave no exposition of the eternal return, for reasons which pertain both 
to the simplest ‘objective criticism’ of the texts and to their most modest dramatic or poetic 
comprehension.’ (DR p.297) 
17 Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra (UK: Penguin, 1961), p.178. 
18 Ibid, p.179 
19 ‘[P]lay affirms chance and the necessity of chance.’ N&P p.183,  
20 DR p.222 
21 Eddington, A., The Gifford Lectures, 1927 
22 Penrose, R., Cycles of Time: An Extraordinary New View of the Universe (UK: Bodley Head, 2010), 
see esp. ch.1. 
23 Though see for instance, Sean Carroll  on the l imitations of this formulation. While the direction 
towards disorder as a result of entropic processes remains true as a broad generalisation, the simple 
identification of ‘entropy’ with ‘disorder’ is hard to square without exception; a salient example 
would be the tendency of an oil-in-water suspension to separate out into mutually exclusive layers, 
thereby furnishing a more ordered state than thorough miscegenation. This state nevertheless 
represents the least energetic, closest to equilibrium for such systems. Carroll, S., From Eternity to 
Here: The Quest for the Ultimate Theory of Time (UK: Oneworld, 2011), p.187. 
24 It should be acknowledged that not all  classical formulations countenance the distinction between 
microstate and macrostate. J. Willard Gibbs proposed a definition much in the spirit of information 
theory which hinged purely on the l ikelihood or unlikelihood of a given observed state, or more 
accurately, on the probability of that state with respect to the degree of knowledge we possess of 
the system in question. See Sean Carroll, From Eternity to Here, p.192. 
25 Poincaré, H., ‘Le mécanisme et l’expérience’, Revue de metaphysique et de morale 4 (1893), 
quoted in Sean Carroll, From Eternity to Here, p.234. 
 
 
29 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
26 See for instance, Gribbin, J., 13.8: The Quest to Find the True Age of the Universe and the Theory of 
Everything (UK: Icon Books, 2015). 
27 Chakravarty, A.,‘On the Prospects of Naturalised Metaphysics’, in Ross, D., Ladyman J., and 
Kincaid, H., ed.s, Scientific Metaphysics (UK: OUP, 2013), pp.27-50.  
28 See for instance, Gratton, P., Speculative Realism: Problems and Prospects (UK: Bloomsbury, 
2014), pp.85-107. 
29 Stengers, I., Power and Invention: Situating Science (US: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 
p.69. 
30 Ilya Prigogine insists on the importance of the word ‘population’ in characterising the elements of 
a system or ensemble; it is only from the perspective of atomic or molecular ‘populations’ that 
phase transition becomes a meaningful concept. It is interesting to note the similarity of terminology 
to A.N. Whitehead (whose work Prigogine was familiar with) on this point. Whitehead coined the 
term ‘societies’ to speak of systems or categories of atomic phenomena, to reflect much the same 
insight that systems and ensembles assume behaviours distinct from individuals at this scale. See 
Prigogine, I., The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos and the New Laws of Nature (US: The Free Press, 
1997), p.45, and Whitehead, A.N., Process and Reality (US: The Free Press, 1978), p.34.     
31 WP, p.152. 
32 Lineweaver, C., ‘A Simple Treatment of Complexity: Cosmological Boundary Conditions on 
Increasing Complexity’, in Complexity and the Arrow of Time, ed.s C.H. Lineweaver, P.W.C. Davies 
and M. Ruse (UK: CUP, 2013), p.59. 
33 Smolin, L., Time Reborn: From the Crisis of Physics to the Future of the Universe (UK: Allen Lane, 
2013), p.222. 
34  Deleuze’s call  for ‘l iquid physics’ is an acknowledged echo of the same exhortation issued by 
Michel Serres in his The Birth of Physics 
35 See Schrödinger, E., What Is Life? (UK: CUP, 1967), p.70. His original term is ‘negative entropy’, 
which quickly became ‘negentropy’ in the l iterature.  
36 Bohm, D., Wholeness and the Implicate Order (UK: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p.233. 
37 Čapek, M., Bergson and the Modern Physics (Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1971), p.383. 
 30 
 
 
Chapter Two: Entropy and the Complete Concept in Leibniz and Deleuze 
 
If Nietzschean necessity is ‘the necessity of chance’, allied to a superior sufficient reason 
and key to the concept of Chaosmos, I hope to have shown that certain caveats apply in the 
course of establishing a common rubric between our metaphysics (so far) and the evolving 
history of thermodynamics. Over the rest of this work, I would like to demonstrate (pace 
Deleuze) the various ways in which the Leibnizian strand of Deleuze’s metaphysics serves 
more productively to illuminate questions of order and disorder shared with scientific 
discourse. There are certain indispensable elements required of this Leibnizian reading: the 
primacy of divergence; disparity as the precondition of any event whatever; radical chance; 
a demonstrable relation to thermodynamics and the second law. The reading itself 
depends on a construal of Leibniz’ Principle of Sufficient Reason as a principle of 
dissymmetry, rather than one of symmetry. Its keystone is the novel form of a certain 
Leibnizian necessity, which governs the selection of events. The necessity in question is the 
necessary inclusion of all predicates pertaining to an individual in the complete concept of 
that individual.  
Dan Smith systematically and insightfully explores the nuances of Leibniz’ metaphysical 
logic and its relation to Deleuze’s own in his essay ‘Logic and Existence: Deleuze on the 
Conditions of the Real’. Of particular interest here is his demonstration that Leibniz’ turn 
away from Aristotelian formal subject-predicate logic transforms the territory from 
abstract categorial reasoning to a logic of the event.  He focuses on the formulation by 
Leibniz of the principle of sufficient reason as a reciprocal tenet to the principle of identity, 
often encapsulated in the shorthand example ‘A=A’. In its most common sense form, this 
principle states that a thing is what it is – a tautology that represents a necessary truth. A 
more developed form of the principle is that whenever a given predicate is applied to a 
given subject, the resulting statement will be found to be necessarily true when it is shown 
that the subject itself contains the predicate by definition. Thus we cannot deny that a 
triangle is a three-sided shape when ‘three-sidedness’ is shown to be inextricable from the 
idea of ‘triangle’. All we need do is analyse the notion of triangle to conclude the necessary 
truth of this statement; it is thus known as an analytic statement.  This reasoning singles 
out a necessary relation. Leibniz rehearses this classical (Aristotelian) logic in the 8th section 
of the Discourse on Metaphysics, but notes that the definition of identity involved is merely 
a nominal, and hence insufficient one. We might illustrate this point with the observation 
that the concept of a unicorn necessarily includes the predicate ‘horned animal’, and in this 
way (and any number of others) accommodates the principle of identity. This feature goes 
to show, however, that the principle has no essential connection to existence or existents 
as such; it is merely nominal. This for Leibniz will not serve a productive investigation of 
truth, and he concludes; 
Now it is evident that all true predication has some basis in the nature of things 
and that, when a proposition is not an identity, that is, when a predicate is not 
explicitly contained in a subject, it must be contained in it virtually.1  
Leibniz’ pragmatic requirement, that predicates have some basis in the nature of things, is 
in some ways simply one example of the familiar assertion that abstract logical relations 
(here, the ‘containment’ theory of meaning) cannot in themselves assert anything true of 
the contingent world, as any proposition should if it is to be truly meaningful. But it is much 
more than this, due to Leibniz’ very distinctive conception of ‘the nature of things’. What 
form of predication is required for a Leibnizian metaphysics? It is one which must answer to 
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the exigencies of some tightly dovetailed principles governing the nature of things. These 
include of course the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the Principle of the Identity of 
Indiscernibles and others, well-known elements of Leibniz’ philosophy. I will argue in 
addition that the Principle of Least Resistance, or Principle of Least Action belongs squarely 
among these with respect to the problematic to be addressed, in a way that is not 
immediately obvious, but which provides a bridge to the questions concerning 
thermodynamics treated here.2  
Leibniz’ proposal to ground predication in the nature of things is conveyed in the idea of 
‘the complete concept’. He illustrates his reasoning in correspondence with Antoine 
Arnauld, taking as an example of an individual the biblical figure of Adam; 
As if we should mean by Adam the first man, whom God set in a garden of pleasure 
whence he went out because of sin, and from whose side God fashioned a woman. 
All this would not sufficiently determine him and there may have been several 
Adams separately possible or several individuals to whom all that would apply. This 
is true, whatever finite number of predicates incapable of determining all the rest 
might be taken, but that which determines a certain Adam ought to involve 
absolutely all his predicates. And it is this complete concept which determines the 
particular individual.3  
It is clear from the phrasing that his thought is motivated by his Principle of the Identity of 
Indiscernibles here, which states that any two individuals that were wholly alike in every 
respect would in fact be the same individual. For Leibniz, this principle serves not so much 
to establish what it is for things to be identical, but to delineate an absurdity, since for him 
it is a necessary truth that all actually existing individuals are differentiable, however 
minimally. In the last analysis, this differentiability may be due only to the single final term 
of all applicable predicates, yet this would be enough to differentiate two individuals. Why 
necessary? On account of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which states that there must 
be a reason why things are thus and not otherwise. This principle is taken to govern even 
God’s selection from among the realm of possible candidates for existence; if there were 
no reason to choose between one possible entity and another, if they were wholly 
identical, God would lack sufficient reason to select one for actualisation rather than the 
other. The complete concept idea of predication is furnished to map faithfully onto these 
principles concerning the nature of things. It corresponds to the relationship which the 
possible bears to the actual; no definition for any individual can be complete until all its 
contingencies unfold, until all the reasons, both local and global, to which it is subject over 
the course of its existence are exhausted. In addition, these principles taken as a whole will 
furnish the basis for my claim that Leibniz’ metaphysics, and in particular the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason, grounds the world on a final, ineradicable dissymmetry. There can be no 
complete symmetry in a world where each existent is discernible.  
What of the particular necessity which belongs to the idea of the complete concept? 
Leibniz tells us; 
…we are able to say that this is the nature of an individual substance or of a 
complete being, namely, to afford a conception so complete that the concept shall 
be sufficient for the understanding of it and for the deduction of all the predicates 
of which the substance is or may become the subject.4  
In short, to know the complete concept is to know what predicates belong, have belonged 
and will belong to any individual whatever. Again, necessarily? Yes, Leibniz tells us, this is 
known a priori to God. As we might put it, there is a necessary fact of the matter whether 
we know it or not.5 This feature is brought to the fore in another sense belonging to 
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Leibniz’ rationale, which Smith highlights with the observation that the complete concept is 
a reciprocal principle to that of identity. The necessity belonging to the complete concept, 
that all predicates of an individual belong to it necessarily, is in a sense the inverse 
necessity of the principle of identity. And this is so because of the consonance of the 
complete concept with the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Smith comments; 
The principle of identity says that an analytic proposition is necessarily a true 
proposition, whereas the principle of sufficient reason says that a true proposition 
is necessarily an analytic proposition.6  
Taken at face value, as a statement about logical relations, this tenet has often been seen 
as a scandal at the heart of Leibniz’ system, for it implies nothing less than that everything 
pertaining to a given subject belongs to its definition, not incidentally, but necessarily; the 
fact of being hit by this raindrop as opposed to that one is characterised as a necessary 
truth. Indeed, this is nonsense if taken as a statement of logical necessity. Yet it is not 
intended as such; it is intended as a statement about action, divergence, selection. 
According to Leibniz’ complementary tenet that every action affects and is affected by the 
entire universe, the complete concept and its close correlate, the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason is an injunction to us to bear in mind that description in terms of isolatable 
essences, of differentiable species and genuses in the Aristotelian fashion will lead 
attention away from the interconnected web of series which are in constant process at a 
level below statements such as ‘the rain fell on me’. The rain is composed of individual 
raindrops, some of which were taken up and condensed within one particular cloud rather 
than another, each of which has its history in turn necessarily connected to the rest of the 
causal universe. Yet, as Smith points out, the corollary of this is that the understanding of 
what it is to predicate something of something else (‘I was soaked’) becomes not a matter 
of ‘predication’ – of the attribution of a quality to a thing, but of the event as such (‘there 
was a soaking’). The necessity in question is not one of the logic of identity or essence, but 
of the potentially infinite propagation of interconnected causes converging on the 
particular phenomena expressing themselves in and through a particular subject. At this 
point, we may ask what remains, what is lacking for Deleuze in the framework as presented 
by Leibniz; are we not in the realm of a temporal process of endless differentiation, 
presupposing not identity but constantly varying series which constitute difference as 
such? Is this not the basis on which to describe difference in itself? The answer is – almost. 
Deleuze does commit without reserve to the event as a constant exchange of virtual and 
actual series, and to this dynamic as a principle of selection, yet he is concerned to identify 
a form of difference which will escape completely and utterly from any prior supposition of 
identity, of any explication of difference as relying on the opposition between stable, pre-
given identities. His objection to Leibniz’ necessity, the ‘complete concept’ represented by 
intersecting series of events in the Leibnizian world is a measure of the radical nature of his 
own understanding of difference in itself, and serves to illuminate his stated rationale for 
seeking a superior sufficient reason in the eternal return. It is that Leibniz’ ‘complete 
concept’, reliant as it is on differentiation extended indefinitely, differs from the 
Aristotelian framing of essence in terms of division by opposition (both of these subjects 
belong to mankind, but one belongs to the ‘female’ category, while the other belongs to 
‘male’) only in one respect. While Aristotle maintains that at some level the division must 
end (or else we lose sight of meaningful differentiation), Leibniz effectively extends the 
process to infinity. For Deleuze, this is to reinstall identity at the outermost limit; to push 
individuation to its furthest reaches is nevertheless to retain identity as a precondition for 
differentiation. The superior sufficient reason he seeks must overcome this objection, and 
hence he turns to the radical open-endedness of the eternal return. This is the objection he 
offers to the Leibnizian metaphysics in Difference and Repetition. The non-essentialist 
 33 
 
account presented by Leibniz falls short of that required by the philosophy of difference, of 
the chaosmos. Yet here again, we might pause to parse the question differently. It is not 
finally the inadequacy of the complete concept idea which harbours the real incongruence, 
but Leibniz’ account of possible worlds. The neat dehiscence of the Best world moment by 
moment from those lesser possible worlds, consigning all but one to inexistence, is the root 
difference. It is what constitutes the validity of the principle of non-contradiction on which 
Leibniz relies; contradictory elements, the ‘incompossibles’ of the metaphysics are 
ontologically proscribed from actualisation within one world, but may occupy separate 
worlds indiscriminately, for they are outwith causal contact. It is that causal separation 
which ensures non-contradiction. The border between one possible world and another is 
the border at which the complete concept and the Principle of Sufficient Reason must stop. 
Without it, there is nothing to prevent both propagating endlessly, among the proliferating 
multiplicities of the virtual and the paradoxical causalities of the chaosmos. In this light, 
Deleuze’s argument misses its mark, for once the borders between incompossible worlds 
are relinquished, the complete concept is nomadically freed, just as is the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason. Indeed, it seems to be precisely such a liberation for those concepts that 
Deleuze intends when he insists in The Fold, against Leibniz, that there is a ‘vague Adam’, 
and when he describes Whitehead’s Process God, who ‘affirms incompossibilities and 
passes through them.’ (FLB p.81). Here it is not at all the notion of infinite predication 
which provides the source of contention with Leibniz. Quite the reverse; to insist on a 
vague Adam is to remove the borders between incompossible worlds, the borders at the 
edge of contradiction, and it is those very borders which prevent the truly infinite 
predication which Deleuze requires. For our purposes, and according to Deleuze’s later 
viewpoint, the complete concept remains not merely intact, but requisite, if God is truly to 
affirm incompossibilities, if nature is to be attuned to all its potential, both actual and 
virtual.    
 
Dissymmetry, Energy Gradients and ‘The Ultimate Origination of Things’ 
 
It remains to establish in what sense the triple principles of the complete concept, the 
identity of indiscernibles and sufficient reason can respond from within the Leibnizian 
corpus to the exigencies of the thermodynamic energy gradients which Deleuze places at 
the heart of his philosophy of difference. All are mobilised in his assertion; 
Disparity – in other words, difference or intensity (difference of intensity) – is the 
sufficient reason of all phenomena, the condition of all that appears. (DR p.222) 
The question is intimately tied to a reading of the Principle of Sufficient Reason as a 
principle of dissymmetry. In fact, there is one Leibnizian text which aligns these themes 
beautifully; ‘On the Ultimate Origination of Things’, where we find that the dissymmetry, 
the differential in question, is precisely that of energy gradient.  
Before proceeding, one significant obstacle to the proposed reading must be addressed. It 
is that Leibniz’ Principle of Sufficient Reason has been interpreted routinely in precisely the 
reverse sense; as an argument from symmetry. The classic example of an argument from 
symmetry might be taken from Anaximander, whose cosmology provides an account 
addressing the question; ‘if the earth is not supported by anything, why does it not fall 
through space?’ Aristotle reports in De Caelo; 
There are some who say that the earth remains in place because of similarity [or 
symmetry], as did Anaximander among the ancients; for a thing established in the 
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middle, with a similar relationship to the extremes, has no reason to move up 
rather than down or laterally; but since it cannot proceed in opposite directions at 
the same time, it will necessarily remain where it is.7 
Leibniz’ God would have no reason to choose one direction or the other to move this 
world, since the respective distances to the edge of the void (Anaximander’s word is 
apeiron) are indiscernible; in other words, symmetrical. Charles Kahn comments, ‘it is 
indeed the same reason which was glorified in modern times by Leibniz as his Principle of 
Sufficient Reason.’8   
Indeed, there are passages in Leibniz’ work which seem to settle once and for all, and in the 
affirmative, the question as to whether he viewed the Principle of Sufficient Reason as an 
argument from symmetry. When Leibniz wants to convey to Clarke the pedigree of his 
Principle, the example he gives is drawn from Archimedes’ De aequilibro, concerning the 
reason for the balance of weights; ‘’Tis because no reason can be given, why one side 
should weigh down, rather than the other,’ 9 clearly articulating one of the variants of this 
principle, known as The Principle of Insufficient Reason. Ian Hacking references a brief note 
from 1678 in the Leibniz archive entitled ‘De incerti aestimatione’, wherein Leibniz states 
the ‘Principle of Indifference’ holding that equipossible cases have the same probability 
(thereby reflecting a symmetry), and makes the claim that it may be justified 
metaphysically. Hacking concludes, as we might well, that this is an unspecified reference 
to the Principle of Sufficient Reason.10 The argument for sufficient-reason-as-dissymmetry 
would appear to falter at the gate. Notwithstanding Leibniz’ own recognition of these 
variants, it is my contention that by far the greater deal of the force and drive of Leibniz’ 
philosophy can best and most coherently be understood in terms of sufficient-reason-as-
dissymmetry. For what is the final lesson to be drawn from the principle but that in cases 
where complete symmetry pertains, nothing happens? More emphatically, with respect to 
the realm of potential, if all entities were in a relation of perfect symmetry, perfect identity, 
nothing would originate at all. And if, as we have seen, Leibniz’ motivation is to furnish a 
logic faithful to the ‘nature of things’, to the Event rather than to merely ‘nominal’ 
distinctions, then the Principle of Insufficient Reason provides no traction; it serves only to 
identify only a certain redundancy at the outer limit of phenomena. The incompossible 
symmetry which the Principle of Indifference identifies precludes any Event. As Deleuze has 
it, If God’s calculations rounded out, there would be no world.   
 
On the Ultimate Origination of Things 
 
In ‘On the Ultimate Origination of Things’, Leibniz broaches the idea of a ‘certain dominant 
unity’ which orders the world, or ‘the aggregate of finite things’. 
 For the dominant unity of the universe not only rules the world, but also 
constructs or makes it; and it is superior to the world and, so to speak, 
extramundane, and it is thus the ultimate reason of things. For a sufficient reason 
for existence cannot be found in any single thing alone, nor in the whole aggregate 
and series of things.11  
In pursuing the ultimate origination of things, then, we are indeed in search of sufficient 
reason. Leibniz sets out the task of God in terms of an analogy with a game with rules. The 
rules are extramundane, pertaining to the world of potential rather than the actual. The 
first is to do with essence; 
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We must first acknowledge from the fact that something exists rather than 
nothing, that there is in possible things, i.e. in possibility or essence itself, a certain 
demand for existence or (so to speak) a straining to exist…all possible things strain 
with equal right for existence.12 
The next consideration is the implications of this rule for maximising strategy (God’s); 
And the situation is like that in certain games where all the spaces on the board are 
to be filled according to certain rules, and where unless you use some skill, you will 
in the end be excluded from certain spaces and forced to leave more spaces empty 
than you would have wished.13 
The skills required bear on the most elegant translation possible from the conditions above 
to the constraints pertaining to the progress of the game below. The most efficacious move 
will be the one that does not inadvertently (through lack of forward thinking) cut the player 
off from the end goal, the one which preserves the most productive long-term outcome. 
Sufficient reason is not an abstractly applied principle, but one which is acutely sensitive to 
conditions pertaining at each instant in the passage of nature. Equally, in maximising 
strategy; 
Assuming that a move is to be made from one point to another, although nothing 
further determines the path between them, the easiest or shortest way will be 
chosen.14 
With this last step in the chain of reasoning, Leibniz is stopping little short of identifying the 
principle of least resistance, our principle of least action, with the principle of sufficient 
reason. This line of thought marries perfectly with the characterisation of entropy as a 
principle of selection; those phenomena will tend to be deselected which embody an 
energy state overreaching that readily available under local conditions, taking the balance 
sheet further than it ‘need be’ from equilibrium. ‘Moves’ (phenomena) which contradict 
this rule are not strictly forbidden, but will have to be paid back on the balance sheet by 
contributions of energy from elsewhere. Just as arbitrary or ill-thought-out choices made 
by God with respect to particular individual phenomena will produce distortions of the 
well-ordered fabric of the best world, so random fluctuations in energy state will ramify in 
the form of ‘unnecessary’ turbulence. 
We  always bear in mind of course, that in all of this, Leibniz is embellishing rather than 
moving away from the notion of actualisation as subject to God’s choice, but all the 
particulars of that embellishment are aligned to a rounded sense of physical causality 
which cannot help but remind the modern reader of our science of thermodynamics; 
From these considerations it is now wonderfully evident how a certain divine 
mathematics or metaphysical mechanics is employed in the very origination of 
things, and how a determination of the maximum holds good, just as, of all the 
angles, the right angle is the determinate angle in geometry, and as liquids placed 
in other liquids organize themselves into the most capacious shape, namely the 
spherical; but especially in common mechanics itself, when several heavy bodies 
are struggling against each other such a motion finally arises through which occurs 
the maximum descent on the whole.15 
The images Leibniz offers translate with some facility into the register of thermodynamics. 
His analogy of the ‘several heavy bodies’ suggests strongly a set of precariously-balanced 
boulders on the brink of collapse, whose potential energy will be converted into kinetic 
through the operation of gravity should their precarious balance fail. The exchange 
between potential and kinetic energy (and indeed all energetic exchange) is governed by 
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the first law of thermodynamics, which states that the total energy of the world is 
conserved, while the collapse of boulders toward a more stable plateau conforms to the 
second law, which requires that all systems seek their lowest energy state in the long term. 
At the same time, however, this image recalls the metaphysical ‘straining of essences’ for 
existence, as though compossibles were vying to fall through into the actual, to achieve 
‘maximum descent’, to adopt the path of least resistance.16 The model is metaphysical and 
it is not. More recent incorporations into the vocabulary of thermodynamic theory also 
allow us to recognize the image of the more viscous liquid immersed in the less, and 
adopting a spherical shape, as one example of the topological expressions for equilibral 
energy distribution we come across in complexity theory; the example of a bubble’s 
tendency to spherical shape is a close parallel (found in both Gleick and Delanda)17 
If Leibniz’ ‘compossibility’ bears such a close relation to the existence of energy gradients, 
then, and with such close association to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, it seems there is 
indeed much overlap with Deleuze’s concept of the virtual, whereby differences in intensity 
are the sufficient reason of all that appears. As we have seen, the ‘metaphysical mechanics’ 
of the compossible straddles the two domains of the potential and the actual, just as do 
Deleuze’s intensive relations; God’s choice requires a minimal difference at every turn in 
this world below and in the world above. Genesis is a perennial process manifest in two 
regimes.  Moreover, both the virtual and the compossible are construed not to entail any 
ultimate descent into disorder, or equilibrium. It would indeed require an aggressive 
psychoanalytic reading to confuse the final stasis to which Leibniz’ theodicy tends, the 
Harmony, with the scientists’ Heat Death. On both Leibniz’ and Deleuze’s part, it seems, the 
premises of thermodynamics are embraced, but not the conclusions.  
We know the formula for Leibniz; things are selected, chosen by God from among the 
compossible candidates with a view to overall best functional fit for progress toward the 
Best world. Leibniz’ text presents origination, or actualisation, by way of an extended 
analogy with dynamic processes: The reference to heavy bodies suggests a pile of 
precariously balanced boulders. The heavy bodies are seeking equilibrium, the world is 
seeking to collapse all gradients (of energy, of disharmony), to take the path of least 
resistance or steepest route. It is the world described by thermodynamics. 
Moreover, Leibniz’ Principle of Least Resistance circles in lockstep with the idea of the 
complete concept, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the Principle of the Identity of 
Indiscernibles, the breadth of his metaphysical system. A brief rehearsal demonstrates as 
much.   
God’s choice is not motivated between indiscernible entities;18 those essences which are 
indistinguishable, identical, will not enjoy transition from potential to actual,19 could not 
contribute to the progression of the world toward the Best. Yet should the essences 
considered by god differ in their complete concept by the merest scintilla, by any gradient 
whatever,20 there is sufficient reason to decide.21 
The dynamic model mirrors the metaphysical system. The precariously-balanced rock 
whose destiny it is to fall first, differs infinitesimally in balance from the others; if there 
were perfect symmetry of balance, there would be no sufficient reason to choose, nothing 
would happen. And that contingency is a function of its complete history, its complete 
concept; prior falls, angle, the relative proportion of minerals which cooled into its 
composition, future fractures. Any deviation from the history of the other boulders is a 
precondition for choice, discernibility. Nor will its complete concept, its ‘essence’ be 
exhausted until its history is over; for Leibniz, things accrue their own essence over a 
lifetime and all their contingencies belong to them necessarily. Essences strain for 
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existence just as heavy bodies fall toward their complete concept down the steepest route, 
subject to the Principle of Least Resistance. It is metaphysical and it is not, God’s choice 
requires a minimal deviation at every turn in this world below and in the world of potential 
above. The boulder will slip and fall at a new angle. Genesis, Origination is a perennial 
process devoted to coining a new world at each moment. 
 
From Many Worlds to Chaosmos 
 
When Deleuze comes to make a break from the Leibnizian form of sufficient reason, it 
centres on a rejection of the many possible worlds scenario that ultimately underpins 
Leibniz’ system. Deleuze insists rather on the existence of a single world which contains all 
compossibilities and incompossibilities within it; this one world he names the ‘chaosmos’. 
This rejection of the many worlds hypothesis is entangled with a standpoint on the nature 
of energy and entropy, and should be read off alongside an extended discussion thereof in 
chapter five of Difference and Repetition. 
Deleuze is conscious of the drastic distorting effect to Leibniz’ system represented by his 
insistence that the unactualised states of affairs remain in one cosmos, the chaosmos. To 
revisit at greater length the quotation above regarding divergent series:  
Each series tells a story: not different points of view on the same story, like the 
different points of view on the town we find in Leibniz, but completely distinct 
stories which unfold simultaneously. The basic series are divergent; not relatively, 
in the sense that one could retrace one’s path and find a point of convergence, but 
absolutely divergent in the sense that the point or horizon of convergence lies in a 
chaos or is constantly displaced within that chaos. (DR p.123) 
The point of contention centres on the nature of series, and as we have seen, more 
particularly on the property of convergence or divergence. The claim effectively is that the 
neat dehiscence of events in Leibniz’ cosmology reduces the radical displacements of 
chance, subordinating them to a linear flow of time. The series selected for actualisation 
cease to have any causal (or expressive) connection with those which remain unselected, 
due to incompossibility or incompatibility with the criterion of ‘the best’. In Leibniz’ 
scenario, divergent worlds are consigned to non-existence. At the end of the world, all 
troubling diversions have been left behind and all series converge to Harmony. 
This process belongs equally to another register, at once both mathematical and 
philosophical, furnished from Leibniz’ work and attended closely by Deleuze in all his 
discussions of Leibniz; differential calculus. The calculus as developed by Leibniz deals with 
the reciprocal determination of series in terms of the difference between two given values 
representing the degree of change in a given figure or system. No final value may be 
reached for the rate of change, or indeed the rate of change of change, except by 
identifying a limit toward which the values converge. This, as is well known, is 
mathematically straightforward for linear functions, offering an integral value 
corresponding to the relation between the two initial differentiated values. Reiterations of 
the process can offer greater and greater accuracy, converging ever closer to the identified 
limit. Leibniz was never to solve the problem of integrating non-linear functions, though he 
recognized the importance of finding some way to do so. It is a small step to draw the 
analogy between this state of mathematics and Leibniz’ metaphysics; the compossible is 
the actualisable, while the linear is the integrable; equally, the incompossible is 
unactualisable in this world, while the non-linear remains unsusceptible to integration. The 
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analogy is all the more apt given that the differential calculus depends finally on the 
differentiation between two points at ever more exquisitely proximate, infinitesimal 
remove, asymptotically approaching identity yet in the end theoretically discernible. The 
calculus seems poised precisely at the entry-gate to existence guarded by the principle of 
the identity of indiscernibles.22 If integration and actualisation go hand in hand, then in the 
mathematical register Deleuze’s point of departure from Leibniz effectively equates to an 
insistence that both linear and non-linear functions, both the ruly and the unruly, both the 
ordered and the disordered figure in the selection of events. When Deleuze insists that 
divergent series are primary, this is at once a prioritisation of the non-linear mathematical 
function and the turbulent phenomena which resist simple integration. The linear world is 
a series of small islands in the preponderantly chaotic ocean of nature. To banish to 
another world that which threatens disorder is to ignore its properly productive role in this. 
To follow the developments Deleuze makes from Leibniz’ differential philosophy to his own 
full-blown philosophy of difference, then, is first and foremost to recognize the 
accommodation of productive disorder within one world.  Leibniz’ isolated worlds render 
them amenable to integration, to the balance of harmony, just as classical physics isolates 
the system and takes the result, equilibrium, to be the purest expression of nature. In fact, 
both were hunting down and caging the rarest bird. Deleuze’s refusal of the particular form 
of disorder we call entropy stands squarely on the same ground as Chaos theory. 
Phenomena we cannot integrate, energy which escapes mathematical taming, is too 
quickly written off as random disorder.  This departure from the Leibnizian framework will 
come to be consolidated and embellished by the coining of the notion of disjunctive 
synthesis, and the substitution of the (Leibnizian) notion of ‘divergence’ for the more subtly 
nuanced interplay of complication, implication and explication. 
 
The Calculating God 
 
It is entirely in keeping with his project that Deleuze should begin the chapter following 
extended discussion of Leibnizian themes with a figurative image of cosmological entropy 
inspired by the nature of the mathematical continuum. 
God makes the world by calculating, but his calculations never work out exactly 
[juste], and this inexactitude or injustice in the result, this irreducible inequality, 
forms the condition of the world. (DR p.222) 
This complex image resonates throughout what is to follow in chapter five, encapsulating 
numerous aspects of the equally complex argument. Ultimately it is intended to serve as a 
marker on the way to the conceptual appropriation of Nietzsche’s Eternal Return as a 
superior sufficient reason. 
The image of God the calculator on a denotative level makes reference to the history of 
mathematics: specifically the serial invention of various different types of number, each 
intended to fill in a gap left by the preceding regime. Thus the Natural, or counting 
numbers are supplemented by the Whole numbers including zero, then the Rational 
numbers allowing us to express number values as fractional, followed by the Irrationals 
which are incapable of expression by fractions, the Complex numbers which are 
composites of imaginary and real numbers, and so on. In each case the type of number in 
question was conceived as a way of addressing complex problems which extended beyond 
the capacity of the existing range of types. Ultimately, the conjecture is that there is a 
‘space’ of number which may be smoothly and completely filled by a full range once this is 
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discovered – this space is known as ‘the continuum’. Deleuze’s God, then, on a denotative 
level, is working through the continuum. The crucial implication of this metaphor, though, 
is that for Deleuze, the continuum will never be exhausted; the space of number will always 
retain something of the incommensurable, the unequal, within itself inherently – if the 
intention of God the calculator is to equalize everything out once and for all, he may 
succeed provisionally on one level, but only at the expense of having to pursue this 
inequality, this disequilibrium, ever onward into the next regime of number. This is in 
contrast to Leibniz’ God, who supersedes the incommensurable, the incompossible, 
through consignment to nonexistence, and who finally resolves the disharmony of 
troublesome series. This extended metaphor is laid out with the conclusion; 
Finally, god has not defeated the unequal in itself, but only separated it from the 
divisible and enclosed it within an outer circle, kuklos exothen. He has equalised 
the divisible in this extension, which is the extension of the Soul of the world, but 
underneath, at the deepest layer of the divisible, the unequal still rumbles in 
intensity. (DR p.233) 
It is on the connotative level, though, that this image connects with physical action, and in 
particular with entropy; 
The world ‘happens’ while God calculates; if the calculation were exact, there 
would be no world. (DR p.222) 
The first half of this assertion (that the world ‘happens’ while God calculates) echoes a 
marginal note Leibniz made to himself on his own copy of the ‘Dialogus’.23 The second half 
is Deleuze’s own elaboration, in effect distancing the claim from the Principle of Indifferent 
Reason. What counts in the world is the unequal, the dissymmetrical, difference, which are 
always prior and resist any tendency to homogeneity; 
The world can be regarded as a ‘remainder’ and the real in the world understood in 
terms of fractional or even incommensurable numbers. Every phenomenon refers 
to an inequality by which it is conditioned. Every diversity and every change refers 
to a difference which is its sufficient reason. (DR p.222) 
We are to understand, then, that the nature of the physical world is such that action, just 
as with the domains of number, sweeps ever on past itself without attaining an ultimate 
fulfilment; the ‘remainder’ is no transitory inequivalence in God’s calculation, it is rather an 
ineradicable component of nature, without which existence itself would terminate. ‘[I]f the 
calculation were exact, there would be no world.’ We should note too, that diversity and 
indeed all change in the chaosmos which Deleuze is outlining has its own sufficient reason, 
inherent in an ineradicable inequality or heterogeneity, a disparity between forces. Further, 
for Deleuze, following Nietzsche, the very inequality of the remainder itself, of any given 
moment with itself, renders nonsense the idea that a terminus may be reached; 
‘permanence and fixity’ rule out becoming. 
In other words, any arrival at equivalence or equilibrium, or what amounts to the same 
thing, identity, is strictly out of the question, since this identity in itself is an 
epiphenomenon of the difference which underlies it. Deleuze goes on to develop God’s 
calculation in more explicitly physical terms through the course of chapter five; intensity 
and extensity are said to maintain just such a relation of calculation to remainder; intensive 
multiplicities express themselves in actualised occasions, in extensive quantities, but retain 
an irreducible tendency therein; 
Intensity is difference, but this difference tends to deny or cancel itself out in 
extensity and underneath quality. (DR p.223) 
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Yet; 
We cannot conclude from this that difference is cancelled out, or at least that it is 
cancelled in itself. It is cancelled insofar as it is drawn outside itself, in extensity and 
in the quality which fills that extensity. However, difference creates both this 
extensity and this quality. (DR p.228) 
In the transition from many worlds to chaosmos, then, there are a number of correlated 
distinctions arising between Deleuze’s position and Leibniz’, all of which bear on the 
character of the principle of sufficient reason. Differentiation assumes priority over 
integration, divergence over convergence; the status of ‘the remainder’ is turned on its 
head, transforming from the disharmony over which Leibniz’ God will ultimately prevail to 
the productive precondition of all that appears; compossibility and incompossibility remain 
imbricated within one chaosmos. Sufficient reason can no longer serve to balance the 
books; it is rather the law which ensures that no final balance could in principle be reached, 
just as the continuum will never be exhausted. In the end, however, it would be misleading 
to suggest that such a clean distinction can delineate the boundaries of Deleuze’s debt to 
Leibniz, or that the argument so far conveys the full ‘superiority’ of his sufficient reason; we 
shall return to these themes later with respect to the topics of symmetry and the identity 
of indiscernibles. 
  
Mathematical Thought, the Problem and the Cosmos 
 
As we have seen, mathematical thinking plays a productive role in philosophical thought for 
Deleuze; we commonly find the two intertwined in his work. This aspect of his philosophy 
donates its own contribution to the picture of an evolving cosmos which we are developing 
here, in ways that are not immediately obvious. Some elaboration at this point on the 
specific nature, value and creative potential of mathematics for Deleuze will serve to 
foreground why this is so, and provide an initial waymark toward a specific form of dialectic 
which is so important for Deleuzian natural philosophy; specifically a dialectic which 
circumvents any form of negation. This in turn will illuminate the key role of the concepts 
of ‘limit’ and ‘constant’ which are increasingly to come to the fore in the later stages of this 
cosmological reading of his work. 
From the start, let us identify three motivations which play no role in Deleuze’s adoption of 
mathematical concepts. Firstly, there is no subscription to mathematical truths as in any 
sense more rigorous than other claims , as somehow representing a closer approximation 
to Ideas in the Platonic sense, and thereby capable of underpinning any more sublunary, 
contingent truths which he may wish to treat. Indeed, if there is any ‘truth’ to mathematics 
at all for Deleuze, it belongs to the sense of mathematics rather than to particular 
statements or propositions, and that sense must enfold paradox, ambiguity, uncertainty 
and contradiction every bit as fully as the sense of spoken and written language; this much 
is evident for example from his paradoxical conception of ‘the ramifying series’ in The Logic 
of Sense, or the profoundly multivalent nature of singularities and multiplicities in his work, 
both ideas derived from mathematics and commandeered to speak of the world. Secondly, 
he does not require from mathematics any enduring, unchangeable objects or entities. For 
Deleuze, inspired by the work of the mathematician Albert Lautman, mathematics is an 
adapting, mutating and mobile field which expands through its own exigencies, its own self-
determination. Lastly, while mathematical concepts are frequently adopted to illuminate 
Deleuze’s argument, they should not be taken as metaphorically representative of 
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processes in the world; this would be to ignore the broadside and extended attack on 
representation as a mode of thinking as such which occupies so much of Difference and 
Repetition. Rather, they serve as a particularly direct example of the differential processes 
to which all phenomena, natural, social, psychological, are subject. In an unambiguous 
sense, it is eminently possible for problems prompting a mathematical response to express 
themselves in altogether different domains, natural social etc. The problem is so to speak a 
common root of all domains.     
Albert Lautman’s work provides a model of dynamic structuration which speaks at once to 
Deleuze’s sense of thought and to the passage of nature as he presents it in his own work. 
On the level of scientific thought, it provides the basis for him to parse between two basic 
approaches, the axiomatic and the problematic, and to valorise the latter over the former. 
The axiomatic method was first consolidated by Euclid, in his Elements, which deals with 
Plane Geometry. An axiom, or postulate, of a given mathematical system is understood to 
be a fundamental truth of the system from which further secure inferences may be 
elaborated, something akin to an a priori truth. Thus, armed with the axiom that the angles 
of any triangle add up to one hundred and eighty degrees, we are able to specify without 
measurement the magnitude of a third angle given the magnitudes of the two adjacent. 
Axiomatic method is essentially a method of deduction from a small set of postulates.  
The axiomatic method has its own inherent limitations, however. the axioms of plane 
geometry will not automatically generalise to encompass other geometrical systems. In the 
geometry of curved spaces, it is not true that angles of a triangle will sum to one hundred 
and eighty degrees. On a curved surface, the triangle figure is ‘inflated’ outward convexly 
or deflated concavely, augmenting or diminishing the degrees of the respective angles. The 
mathematician who is engaged in enlarging the descriptive (or perhaps functional) 
capacities of the discipline will serially encounter difficulties, whereby the axioms of one 
field (plane geometry) will fail to transfer to another (the geometry of curved surfaces). The 
problem encountered will force solutions, but in the course of arriving at those solutions 
the terms of the method may require transformation. The relative concavity or convexity of 
curved surfaces have no correlate in plane geometry, yet must clearly be factored in; the 
problem has (in this case) forced a bifurcation of possible solutions and a corresponding 
differentiation of approach. We encounter not only a previously inapplicable question – is 
the surface concave or convex (and hence the angle more oblique or more acute than for a 
triangle on a flat plane)? – but each case presents its own set of possible solutions, 
corresponding to the degree of concavity or convexity encountered. There are a set of 
solutions specifying the degree to which the angles are augmented, predicated on the 
degree of convex curvature of the given surface, another set ranging over the concave. The 
problem serves to redistribute the conditions dictating solubility. At the time the problem is 
discovered, the axioms already established for the simpler case of plane geometry will no 
longer serve, while those governing the more complex case are yet to be established. An 
enforced period of explanation and discovery is required at such junctures, which may lead 
to the adoption of a fresh set of axioms more adequate to the enlarged domain. There is a 
‘problematic’ phase. The example of projective geometry serves to illuminate this 
movement. Projective geometry can be understood as the study of three dimensional 
figures ‘projected’ onto a flat plane. A circular figure with a light behind it casts a shadow 
onto a flat surface. As we turn the circle perpendicularly to the light source, it casts 
increasingly truncated ellipses until, fully perpendicular, it becomes a straight line; the 
projection registers only the two-dimensional aspect of the circular body. As such, the 
axioms serving projective geometry must allow for the treatment of straight lines as special 
cases of curves or ellipses. More generally, projective geometry ‘…can be defined as the 
study of those properties of plane figures that are unchanged during central projection.’ 24  
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It serves as a bridge between plane geometry and more full-blown forms of curved surface 
geometry. Its axioms subsume those of plane geometry, but in the course of this 
generalisation a different perspective is conveyed on plane figures themselves; a physical 
meaning comes to underpin the treatment of the straight line as ‘merely’ a special case of 
the curve. The structural mutation between sets of axiomatics belonging to related fields is 
complex; it is a shift of sense, a reconfiguration more than simple addition. 
In the axiomatic and the problematic, then, we have two methods or modes. Daniel Smith 
characterises the distinction as follows; 
The fundamental difference between these two modes of formalisation can be 
seen in their differing methods of deduction: in axiomatics, a deduction moves 
from axioms to the theorems that are derived from it, whereas in problematics a 
deduction moves from the problem to the ideal accidents and events that 
condition the problem and from the cases that resolve it.’ 25  
The two modes relate to each other dialectically, a period of exploration followed by the 
resulting period of axiomatization. Deleuze recognizes both modes and their respective 
utility, but for his philosophy the problematic mode is by far the more important. 
Moreover, he is content to identify the tension between the two modes as dialectical, 
albeit in a sense which avoids any suspicion of the negative inherent in Hegelian-style 
dialectic. To recognize the motivation for valorising the problematic over the axiomatic, 
and to understand how this can contribute to framing the movement of evolutionary 
cosmology, it is useful to examine briefly Deleuze’s debt to Lautman and the profound 
connections to the Idea and the Event which Deleuze attributes to the mode of the 
Problematic. 
In ‘Introduction: On the Nature of the Real in Mathematics’, Lautman writes; 
Mathematics is constituted like physics: the facts to be explained were throughout 
history the paradoxes that the progress of reflection rendered intelligible by a 
constant renewal of the meaning of essential notions. Irrational numbers, the 
infinitely small, continuous functions without derivatives, the transcendence of e 
and of π, the transfinite had all been accepted by an incomprehensible necessity of 
fact before there was a deductive theory of them. 26 
For Lautman, then, the ‘real’ of mathematics (after Brunschvicg) is a kind of ‘matter’ which 
offers ‘resistance’ to those theoreticians who are engaged with it. He adds, 
This matter is neither simple nor uniform, it has its folds, its edges, its irregularities, 
and our conceptions are never more than a provisional arrangement that allows 
the mind to go further forward. 27  
The elements of the real which Lautman offers for example are not the well-regulated and 
simply deployed footsoldiers of the mathematical field such as the cardinals. They are each 
in some way intractable, enigmatic and paradoxical, existing seemingly beyond the world of 
biddable number in some eminent realm whose powers and nature we can only glimpse at 
one remove. The parallels with Platonic Ideas are more than suggestive; Lautman regularly 
and explicitly draws the connection. On the face of it, this Platonist aspect should place in 
question the appeal for Deleuze’s philosophy of Difference, when so often Platonic Ideas or 
Forms are read as the metaphysical guarantors of identity, sameness and resemblance; 
perfect eternal types to which sublunary tokens may only aspire. Indeed, Deleuze himself is 
concerned to ‘overturn’ Platonism on exactly those grounds, for instance in the first 
Appendix to The Logic of Sense, where he presents the argument that the only reality lies 
with the token, the simulacrum, rather than the type. Lautman’s own investment in 
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Platonism, however, is expressed in ways that circumvent this reading. For Lautman, the 
Ideas at the heart of mathematics, the ‘matter’ which resists, is not ‘simple nor uniform’, 
not selfsame, but rather has its ‘folds, edges and irregularities’, never more than 
‘provisional’ in form. He explicitly distances his reading of the Platonic Idea from the 
type/token model; 
By Ideas, we do not mean models whose mathematical entities would only be 
copies, but in the true Platonic sense of the term, the structural schemas according 
to which effective theories are organised. 28  
Not simple, not selfsame, not immutable, Ideas are rather expressed in structural 
schemata. Lautman elaborates; 
If qualitative distinctions exist in mathematics, they characterise the theories 
rather than the entities. 29  
In other words, then, the paradoxical, problematic elements of mathematics such as π and 
e remain as such, remain intractable, until they are situated within a given theory. We 
might think here of the notion of infinity, which remains chimeric until expressed within 
some relevant field such as Cantorian Set Theory. Here again, though, it is no small feature 
of Lautman’s vision that the paradoxical element comes to be expressed integrally within 
the structure of the explanatory framework, the structural schema: the Cantorian 
innovation which renders infinity tractable is the bifurcation of the concept into ‘countable’ 
and ‘uncountable’ forms of infinity, a function of the deduced viability of mapping the 
elements of one set (e.g., the natural numbers) onto another (say, the primes). It is the 
structural schema of the theory by which the Idea is to be understood, the distribution of 
the paradoxical elements within its own particular field. Without this structure, without the 
acceptance that exhaustive mapping between sets constitutes a form of ‘counting’, the 
mathematical entity remains intractable. One further aspect of Lautman’s thought should 
be noted if we are to appreciate its value for Deleuze; when Lautman asserts that effective 
theories are organised according to structural schemas, we should hear alongside this a 
corollary; the structural schemas are not arbitrarily conceived, but motivated to 
accommodate enduring paradoxical forms in ways as yet not foreseen. This is certainly the 
case with Cantorian Set theory; the problematic at hand, the imperative (in this case) to 
render infinite series amenable to mathematical procedure, informs the novel structural 
schema. Thus Lautman’s philosophy entails a dialectic; a dialectic comprised of the 
movement of Ideas. While a given theory may achieve the desired tractability of the 
paradoxical element in question, this can only be the provisional resolution of the problem. 
This does not imply that the paradoxical element is in itself resolved; it retains its disruptive 
powers, its ‘remainder’ within the explanatory framework, which will itself once again 
redistribute, redeploy in an inevitable encounter with the next explanatory framework. In 
this sense (a sense which Deleuze embellishes), the ‘problem’ and the ‘solution’ are 
profoundly different in kind to question and answer. Whereas an answer might be 
understood to put a question to rest, the solution cannot resolve the problem finally. The 
problem retains the power to force movement onward beyond the solution, any given 
solution remains merely one among a set of possible solutions. Lautman writes;  
…[F]acts consist of the discovery of new entities, these entities are organised into 
theories and the movement of these theories embodies the schema of the 
connections of certain Ideas. 30 
Hence, 
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Ideas are not immobile and irreducible essences of an intelligible world, but … are 
related to each other according to the schemas of a superior dialectic that presides 
over their arrival. 31 
It is this sense of the dynamic movement of mathematical structural schemas which 
Deleuze adopts and broadens into his own metaphysical real under the sign of the 
Problem. He specifies; 
… [T]rue problems are Ideas and … these Ideas do not disappear with ‘their’ 
solutions, since they are the indispensable conditions without which no solution 
would ever exist. (DR p.168) 
Just as Lautman likens the mathematical real to problems in physics, Deleuze does not 
restrict the paradoxical movement to the realm of mathematics; 
Problems are always dialectical; the dialectic has no other sense, nor do problems 
have any other sense. What is mathematical (or physical, biological, psychical or 
sociological) are the solutions. (DR p.179) 
As one aspect of the Event, Problems are ubiquitous and unceasing: 
The event by itself is problematic and problematizing. (LoS p.54) 
Differently put, the distribution of singularities and problematic elements pertaining to one 
event is the result of, informed by, the prior event from which it evolves, and equally serves 
to inform the event into which it will morph; 
The moment that the two series resonate and communicate, we pass from one 
distribution into another. The moment that the two series are traversed by the 
paradoxical agent, singularities are displaced, redistributed, transformed into one 
another, and change sets. (LoS p.53) 
In all that Deleuze writes of the problem, then, he is concerned to preserve the sense of 
structural movement and dynamic which Lautman attributes to the development of 
mathematics. This, the most signal characteristic of mathematical thought for Deleuze, is 
unrelated to any search for some superior rigour, much less an attempt to ground truth on 
the basis of eternal entities. Rather, we can see in outline in the mathematical model, and 
the Problem more generally, the same internal motor of evolution which governs the 
passage of nature in Deleuze’s philosophy. The tension between problem and solution is 
there in that same tension he names disparity. In light of Lautman’s analogy, the world 
itself, ‘matter’, offers its own ‘resistance’, its own retardation, complexification and folding. 
The world in effect is a dialectical movement between problems and solutions; in the 
constantly shifting redistributions of singularities in the event, the world endlessly raises 
problems and proposes solutions in response. The event is ‘by itself problematic and 
problematising’, it does not wait for judicious formulation in the mind of an engaged 
thinker; the problem determines itself, just as complex mathematical entities present their 
own particular intractabilities. ‘In fact,’ Deleuze asserts, ‘the domains of resolvability are 
relative to the process of the self-determination of the problem.’ (LoS p.122). All of this line 
of reasoning underwrites Deleuze’s metaphor of the calculating god on the cosmological 
scale. Deleuze’s cosmos is a problematic cosmos. In the end, the aspect of problematics 
which will prove to be most significant for the project of orientation to modern scientific 
cosmology and most illuminating in squaring the contentious circle of entropy is the 
following claim; 
The negative, under its double aspect of limitation and opposition, seemed to us in 
general secondary in relation to the instance of problems and questions. (DR p.106) 
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Among the complex values attributed to the Problem for Deleuze, the most valuable is its 
capacity to overcome the negative. This is its particular form of dialectic. As we shall see, 
this is due to a sense of ‘limit’ and ‘constant’ in nature as provisional and in constant 
deployment and redeployment, as caught up in perpetual evolutionary movement.             
   
 The Complete Concept and Disjunctive Synthesis in Sufficient Reason 
 
Leibniz’ consignment of less fit worlds to inexistence can be characterised as an exclusive 
disjunction. No element of a world so consigned may have causal influence on any element 
of the world selected in the line of progress toward the Best, nor even on its most adjacent 
partner in rejection. All are causally disjointed. The logical term ‘exclusive disjunction’ is for 
this reason inapplicable in the chaosmos Deleuze paints for us. All relata are for him rather 
expressively complicated; the unactualised state of affairs may be incompatible, 
counterfactual to the one which takes place, but it is not thereby excluded from the realm 
of expressive relations. It remains in the folds of the Eventum Tantum, as the secret power 
of the Event. This is the meaning of Deleuze’s term ‘complication’.  It is for this reason that 
Deleuze is brought to coin his most challenging concept; Disjunctive Synthesis, or Inclusive 
Disjunction. An inclusive disjunction, Deleuze claims, ‘does not close itself within its own 
terms. On the contrary, it is non-restrictive.’32 
François Zourabchivli, one of Deleuze’s most perceptive students, calls ‘Disjunctive 
Synthesis’, ‘the principal operator of Deleuze’s philosophy, his signature concept above all 
others.’33 At the same time he acknowledges its ‘monstrosity’ with respect to the history of 
philosophy. This monstrosity is firstly entailed by the disregard the concept implies for the 
mainstays of traditional logic; the law of excluded middle and principles of contradiction. If 
the chaosmos is to have its ‘superior sufficient reason’, then it must abandon these logical 
foundation stones. Indeed, as philosophical concept, Disjunctive Synthesis is proposed with 
the explicit intent of obviating these overly restrictive principles, as Deleuze sees it, reliant 
as they are on the exigencies of identity and sameness; equally, as philosophical concept, it 
is intended to overcome the mathematical shortcomings of the differential philosophy; the 
Leibnizian dependence (perforce) on integration and its correspondent principle of 
selection/actualisation. Moreover, with respect to Leibnizian philosophy more broadly, we 
need only note that Leibniz includes amongst his principle tenets that the first marker of 
incompossibility is the logical relation of non-contradiction, or excluded middle (this logical 
relation understood as a constraint on God, who may not act in a self-contradictory way), 
and that prior to any Leibnizian investigation of multiplicity as such is the belief that first to 
satisfy logic must be found an irreducible unity, albeit of a very singular kind – the monad.34 
The underpinnings of Deleuze’s ‘superior sufficient reason’ are different in terms of the 
principles of logical relation to those of Leibniz. To understand the import of Disjunctive 
Synthesis, then, we should begin with the formulation of the law of excluded middle; An 
individual A may not at the same time and in the same respect be not-A.35 This is a law of 
subject-predication, assigning the rule of ‘either-or’ to the valid application of predicates; a 
law of exclusive disjunction, in effect asserting a non-relation between the individual and 
the excluded term (A is a rational animal, and thus not a non-rational animal). Inclusive 
disjunction comprehends the set of possible relations in a markedly contrastive manner; 
‘the non-relation becomes a relation, disjunction becomes a relation.’36 Alongside this 
transposition, we should note that the predicative function of the law becomes merely 
secondary; the inclusive disjunction is no longer intended to preside over subject-predicate 
logic, but represents a causative, or rather, expressive relation. Deleuze’s chaosmos knows 
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no either-or; contradictory phenomena remain linked through the complexities of 
expression.  
To appreciate this more fully, we should note the parallels between this formulation and 
Leibniz’ term ‘the complete concept’. Leibniz’ term is equally scandalous in context of the 
history of logic, since it too represents a reversal of subject-predicate logic. Leibniz’ 
argument was that all predicates associated with the lifetime and context of a given 
individual should be included as ‘necessarily’ belonging to the complete concept of that 
individual; all contingencies in effect becoming necessary. This is a direct result of his tenet 
that all phenomena in any given moment are causally connected to all others, more or less 
distinctly, just as is true for Deleuze. But as we are now in a position to see, the need to 
found this principle on the law of excluded middle disappears with the removal of 
boundaries between the actual and virtual worlds. It was the law of excluded middle that 
kept the gate between worlds, without which the complete concept may propagate 
indefinitely; to assert that all phenomena in the chaosmos are related, whether actual or 
virtual, compatible or not, is the precise meaning of Zourabchivli’s phrase, ‘disjunction 
becomes a relation.’ 
Let us recall that when Deleuze wishes to give a positive example of the momenta he seeks 
to set free from Leibniz, it is to Whitehead he turns, whose God ‘affirms incompossibilities’. 
No reader of the two thinkers can fail to be struck by the correspondences between them 
(we shall focus on several), and it is certainly true that Whitehead’s nature offers strong 
parallels with Deleuze’s chaosmos. And while Whitehead famously characterised the whole 
of philosophy as ‘footnotes to Plato’ (his own included), there is nevertheless a significant 
common root for Deleuze and Whitehead in their reading of Leibniz. Indeed, Whitehead’s 
arrival at this ‘affirmation of incompossibilities’ should be read less as a schism with Leibniz 
than an astute development of his metaphysics. For Whitehead, the route to ‘inclusive 
disjunction’ is through an extension, rather than a contradiction of Leibniz’ logic. The key is 
his refinement of the Leibnizian term ‘appetition’, which refers to the tendency of the 
monad to seize its own future, to shape its own composition from among the phenomena 
in its world. An appetite or desire for self-organization, understood without necessary 
reference to conscious decision. The body of water breaching the damn and flowing to 
lower ground will serve as an example of appetition equally well as the animal seeking food 
or social reinforcement.   
The word ‘appetition’ occurs not infrequently in Whitehead’s work, though his own coining 
is ‘prehension’. Both words convey essentially the same import. All individuals ‘prehend’ all 
others – the entire universe is expressed through the relations pertaining to any given 
individual therein.37 Prehension belongs equally to the event rather than the conscious 
decision. The ‘nexus’ or ‘actual occasion’ is the outcome of prior appetitive or prehensive 
enfolding for Whitehead as it is for Leibniz, and the aggregate of past prehensions shape 
the future of the individual. The crucial refinement comes with the term ‘negative 
prehension’.  
For Whitehead, accepting those same tenets that characterise Leibniz’ metaphysics; the 
interconnection of all things and the tendency of systems to enfold elements from their 
total situation, negative prehension is a necessary corollary to positive appetition. It 
belongs to the ‘principle of limitation’ which Whitehead saw as a necessary supplement to 
Spinozist metaphysics, and which we shall encounter in some detail in following chapters. It 
is that form of prehension which annuls the influence of a given phenomenon from within 
the individuated nexus under consideration, due to distance or causal neutrality the one 
with respect to the other. In a very real sense, in coining this term, Whitehead is 
recognizing the need for a certain reversal of viewpoint demanded by Leibniz’ conception 
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of nature. Instead of ‘How is it that all things are interconnected?’ the question becomes, 
‘Given that all things are interconnected, how is it that individuation is possible?’ In a more 
Leibnizian vein, ‘How is it that the mirror universe prevents itself from becoming an infinite 
hall of mirrors without point of view?’  Our account must comprehend not merely the 
selection of adjacent possibilities incrementally through the appetition of the given monad 
(or nexus), but the affirmative refusal of others. This affirmative refusal of necessity 
embraces all phenomena which are of no significance to the nexus in its evolution, and 
counts with as much weight as those phenomena positively prehended. Indeed, infinitely 
more so, since all phenomena at whatever remove throughout the universe figure in this 
exchange more or less distinctly, more or less obscurely; all may come to figure more 
clearly for the nexus in question through positive prehension, or be demoted to obscurity 
through negative prehension. In this way, Whitehead is free to agree with Leibniz that, 
‘Every present state of a simple substance is a natural consequence of its preceding state, 
in such a way that its present is big with its future,’38 while insisting that that future is a 
reciprocal exchange between what is adopted and what is refused. In a sense, Whitehead 
displaces the God governing Leibniz’ selection of compossibles to the scale of individual 
systems; prehension at once selects the elements to combine and those to relinquish. Each 
nexus at each moment is a world adopted from a myriad of others left unactualised.39 
We have taken a step toward Deleuze’s Chaosmos, along a more ostensibly Leibnizian path, 
but other factors in Whitehead’s metaphysics are required to bring the full correlation into 
view. Most importantly, prehension is not to be conceived as a (dual) relation pertaining 
solely between actualised phenomena. Both the actual and the non-actual shape the 
landscape of prehension; 
… [I]n the becoming of an actual entity, the potential unity of many entities in 
disjunctive diversity – actual and non-actual – acquires the real unity of the one 
actual entity; so that the actual entity is the real concrescence of many potentials. 
(PR p.22)  
Potential in the Whiteheadian passage of nature is a real factor in its evolution. Systems, 
nexūs, work through disjunctive diversity. Counterfactuals figure in the total situation, just 
as they do for Deleuze in a much-quoted passage: 
A stranger knocks on the door. Fang makes up his mind to kill him. Naturally there 
are various possible outcomes. In T’sui Pen’s work, all possible solutions occur, 
each one being the point of departure for other bifurcations. (LoS p.114)  
The garden is full of forking paths. For Whitehead, incompatibility and contradiction have 
their place in logic, but, he says, ‘It will be observed that logical notions must themselves 
find their places in the scheme of philosophical notions.’40 In fact, he claims, contradictions 
and incompatibilities are not only rare in nature, and most merely apparent, but it is part 
and parcel of the work of prehension to transform and overcome such negation: 
…[T]he heightening of intensity arises from order such that the multiplicity of 
components in the nexus can enter explicit feeling as contrasts, and are not 
dismissed into negative prehensions as incompatibilities. (PR p.83)  
Here, the idea shares much with Deleuze’s centres of envelopment; the channelling of 
heterogeneous series more or less stably into attunement. Finally, Whitehead does not 
stop short of relegating the status of logical contradiction, of negation in light of these 
insights; 
A physical pole is in its own nature exclusive, bounded by contradiction: a 
conceptual pole is in its own nature all-embracing, unbounded by contradiction. 
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The former derives its share of infinity from the infinity of appetition; the latter 
derives its limitation from the exclusiveness of enjoyment. Thus, by reason of his 
priority of appetition, there can be but one primordial nature for God; and by 
reason of their priority of enjoyment, there must be one history of many actualities 
in the physical world. (PR p.348) 
We are doing no violence to the respective thought to substitute ‘explicate’ for ‘physical 
pole’ and ‘implicate’ for ‘mental pole’.41 It is only in extension, the explicate domain, says 
Deleuze, that negation supervenes on the difference in itself of the implicate. Only the 
physical pole, claims Whitehead, knows contradiction. The implicate and the mental pole 
are blind to the distinction between factual and counterfactual, to contradiction. For both, 
disjunctive diversity, disjunctive synthesis, is the vibrant signature of natural process.  
Each philosopher finds a productive bifurcation from Leibniz’ metaphysics, both for the 
sake of overcoming negation, the excluded middle, the traditional bedrock of identity. 
Deleuze erases the barriers between possible counterfactual worlds, at the furthest 
reaches, while Whitehead locates the movement of those worlds in the prehensive 
appetites of nexūs in process, at the least physical scale. Cosmology is at once a micro- and 
a macro- phenomenon. Scientific cosmologists themselves would assert the same. To 
estimate the total mass of the universe we first need to evaluate the relative mass and 
relative preponderance of each natural kind within it, the weight of the proton and the 
electron. To understand the characteristics of the early cosmos, we must understand the 
characteristics of plasma fields. The quantum nature of vacuum energy must be factored 
into estimates of the capacity of the universe to expand.  The local and the global are 
entwined. Whitehead’s evolutionary cosmology takes pains to adhere to this tenet. 
Evolution is ingrained in each sub-whole, each Blakean grain of sand.   
Thus to the picture of the chaosmos we have developed so far, we may add the co-
presence of contradictory logical elements, understood in terms of the relations of 
contingent phenomena, alongside a commitment to the world and physical action as at 
root based on the play of incommensurable forces. Disjunction becomes a relation. 
Deleuze’s adoption of the term disjunctive synthesis can be seen in this light as a key 
conceptual tool underpinning the superior sufficient reason he seeks. The logical relation 
outlined in the law of excluded middle cannot apply in the philosophy of difference, which 
must define itself independently of the concept of identity. The same must be true of the 
superior form of sufficient reason. Deleuze favours a certain Leibniz; not the Leibniz who 
claims of the monad that it secures for the world an isolatable point, unsusceptible to 
infinite division as are all merely spatial points (and thereby the Leibniz who champions the 
law of excluded middle), but the Leibniz who shows us that the world is multiplicitously 
enfolded within each monad. As for the interrelation of the local to the global, Deleuze 
explores this theme through the work of Gilbert Simondon. 
 
Physical Systems, Disparity and disjunctive Synthesis 
 
A sizeable proportion of the fifth chapter of Difference and Repetition is devoted to 
discussion of physical processes; biological individuation, speciation and evolution in 
particular, but the important figure of Gilbert Simondon for Deleuze, and the interpretation 
he offers of both organic and inorganic processes within the same framework is decisive in 
developing Deleuze’s line of argument with respect to disjunctive synthesis; Deleuze also 
draws on Simondon’s work in The Logic of Sense and much later in What is Philosophy?. 
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Energy gradients and thermodynamic processes, intimately associated with the principle of 
sufficient reason, remain central to the argument. 
First and foremost, Simondon’s work in the natural sciences – an attempt to provide an 
account of the genesis of individuals without recourse to pre-existing forms – reflects a 
concern that motivates Deleuze explicitly and underlies his treatment across the corpus of 
memory, identity, time, extension etc. The goal is to find a form of immanence which is not 
‘immanent to’ anything.  
As such, Simondon’s critique of Aristotelean ‘hylomorphism’, an account which is 
formulated in terms of the union of matter (hyle) with form (morph) is entirely consonant 
with Deleuze’s own. The association with Chaos theory is unmistakeable here too, since 
Simondon is unmistakeably furnishing an account of self-organization, a factor in natural 
systems which has, according to Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, greater explanatory 
power than previous paradigms; 
We are tempted to go so far as to say that once the conditions for self-organization 
are satisfied, life becomes as predictable [in terms of its emergence from the 
inanimate] as the Bénard Instability or a falling stone.42 
Deleuze adopts or adapts terms from Simondon’s work to illuminate the business of 
genetic explanation. Simondon’s ‘Disparity’ is in effect the intensive form of intersecting 
heterogeneous series with respect to the operation of forces, while Simondon’s ‘pre-
individual singularities’ remains with Deleuze those elements in a given system which 
catalyse individuation. Sean Bowden defines the shared confluence of ideas between 
Deleuze and Simondon with reference to a quotation from Simondon’s doctorat; 
As he puts it, “the individual is the reality of a constitutive relation”, a constitutive 
relation which does not depend for its existence upon already given terms, but 
rather refers only to other relations. Granting primacy to relations over individuals 
‘all the way down’ is a consequence of Simondon’s commitment to an anti-
substantialist approach to individuation.43 
Indeed, when Deleuze introduces the term ‘disparity’ in Difference and Repetition, it is in 
context of an insistence on the infinitely regressive nature of differential intensities in 
relation: 
[T]he expression “difference of intensity” is a tautology. Intensity is the form of 
difference in so far as this is the reason of the sensible. Every intensity is 
differential, by itself a difference. Every intensity is E-E’, where E itself refers to an 
e-e’, and e to an ɛ-ɛ’ etc.: each intensity is already a coupling (in which each 
element of the couple refers in turn to couples of elements of another order), 
thereby revealing the properly qualitative content of quantity. We call this state of 
infinitely doubled difference, which resonates to infinity disparity. (DR p.222) 
And it is at this point too, that we are referred back to the engagement with Leibniz; we are 
being offered a key to the nature of the ‘superior sufficient reason’ which must be 
adequate to the chaosmos: 
Disparity – in other words, difference or intensity (difference of intensity) – is the 
sufficient reason of all phenomena, the condition of all that which appears.  
(DR p.222) 
Our understanding of the principle of sufficient reason, then, is directed toward, if not 
identified with, the operations and processes associated with intensity; intensity as ‘the 
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condition of all that which appears’ is the chaosmotic version of the ‘reason why things are 
thus and not otherwise’. This is evident too in the visible parallel between Leibniz’ 
insistence that the difference between analytic truths and contingent is that the perceived 
necessity of contingent truth entails following an infinitely regressive chain from the 
phenomenon under consideration to its furthermost conditions in the state of the entire 
cosmos. Here, the infinite regression in question is that pertaining to intensity, closely 
identified with difference; it is the asymmetrical, non-equilibrial intersections and 
divergences of intensive series which will lead us by series on series of reasons to infinity. 
Two things are equally clear; the functional fit for the argument of the notion of intensity 
with the refusal of equilibrium, since intensive infinite regression admits of no quantitative 
final balance between forces; and the consequent co-existence in one chaosmos of the 
compossible and the incompossible, of the convergent and the divergent. 
If thus far the Simondonian notion of ‘disparity’ is consonant with Deleuze’s direction of 
argument, there is one further factor which clarifies the signal importance of the term; it is 
that, like Deleuze, Simondon explicitly construes forces and their interaction as 
incommensurable, non-equilibrial and beyond quantification as such, locating rather the 
capacity for novelty in the world as issuing from the realm of the ‘metastable’, far-from 
equilibrium. As Brian Massumi points out, discussing the term in the register of 
‘information’: 
What differentiates Simondon in general from the cybernetic and information-
theory traditions out of which Bateson was working (in particular, what 
differentiates him from Wiener and Shannon/Weaver) is that, for Simondon, this 
differencing process can in no way be understood in quantitative terms and is not 
susceptible to any kind of stable formalization.44  
Moreover, the term as used by Simondon is within a distinctly thermodynamic register, 
connoting first and foremost the energetic differential between forces inhering within a 
milieu, an energy gradient. Just as did his mentor Georges Canguilhem before him, 
Simondon placed emphasis on the reciprocal determination of individual and milieu in the 
process of individuation.45 Prior to the emergence of any given individual, there is a matrix 
of unco-ordinated differential heterogeneous forces inherent in the chemical and 
thermodynamic make-up of this ‘mother-liquor’, as Anne Sauvagnargues expresses it.46 The 
mother-liquor is in an initial (and continuing) meta-stable state in which the forces are 
brought to bear on one another by the introduction of a singularity. In the case of a crystal, 
that singularity is a ‘seed’, an impurity akin to the grit which initiates the growth of a pearl 
in an oyster. The forces de-phase around the singularity and converge on a threshold by 
dint of which they enter into communication; they achieve ‘disparity’ or disparition, and 
their initial incoherent heterogeneity ‘concresces’ into a system with its attendant ‘regime 
of functioning’. The important feature of such processes is that they emphasize the 
reciprocally determinative relations between the individuating entity and the milieu. As 
Brian Massumi points out, addressing a common misinterpretation of Simondon: 
The associated milieu is often wrongly understood to be synonymous with 
‘environment.’ It is interpreted as referring to the space surrounding the boundary 
of the technical object (or the membrane of an organism), considered from the 
point of view of the elements contained in that space that are liable to fuel the 
technical object’s functioning. In fact, the associated milieu is not fundamentally a 
spatial concept. Simondon defines it as the ‘regime’ of energy transfer between the 
technical object and its environment, across the boundary.47 
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For artefact (‘technical object’) and naturally occurring individual (membrane or crystal) 
alike, this ‘regime of energy transfer’ is subsumed under the title ‘transduction’, which 
serves to name the ongoing process of reciprocal determination between milieu and 
emergent individual. For every incremental ‘concrescence’ (Deleuze’s term is ‘enfolding’) in 
the formation of the individual itself, there is a correlative variation of the constitution of 
the milieu; while series of salts and minerals accrue, converge at the surface of the crystal, 
and are subsumed into the depths, other series of elements are rejected, diverge; the 
consequent chemical and energetic variation of the crystal is matched by the variations in 
the milieu. Individuation is improperly understood for Simondon, without taking into 
account the transductive, reciprocally determinative nature of all physical processes. Nor 
can we fail to recognize the deep correlation of this account with the Whiteheadian 
account of positive and negative prehension detailed above.  
What Simondon offers, then, is a mechanism of individuation which must be pictured from 
another point of view than that of the individual coming-to-be (conjunctive synthesis); the 
‘deselection’ of the other elements which remain outside (or more accurately, are thereby 
constituted as ‘outside’) the individual are equally important in the process as a whole. The 
synthesis is disjunctive. The process must be recognized as reciprocal; the chemical 
constitution of the milieu, too, is coherently altered, along with its overall population of 
‘pre-individual singularities’, the tenor of its intensities. What happens, happens between, 
diverging as well as converging, as Deleuze reflects, echoing the Simondonian notion of 
disparity as communication; 
Every phenomenon flashes in a signal-sign system. In so far as a system is 
constituted or bounded by at least two heterogeneous series, two disparate orders 
capable of entering into communication, we call it a signal. The phenomenon that 
flashes across this system, bringing about the communication between disparate 
series, is a sign. (DR p.222) 
And we are to understand the importance of the notion in its wider context for Deleuze 
when he writes; 
There is indeed a unity of divergent series insofar as they are divergent, but it is 
always a chaos perpetually thrown off centre which becomes one only in the Great 
Work. This unformed chaos, the great letter of Finnegan’s Wake, is not just any 
chaos. It is the power of affirmation, the power to affirm all the heterogeneous 
series. (LoS p.298) 
The key notion here is that of affirmation; in this light, Simondon’s account of individuation 
offers precisely that affirmation which is demanded en passant throughout Difference and 
Repetition and in Nietzsche and Philosophy – a demand for affirmation of divergence, of 
chance, of chaos – a form of affirmation which does not presuppose a pre-existing subject 
to affirm, a form of immanent affirmation which does not presuppose anything to which it 
is immanent. 
Simondon’s vocabulary is placed firmly within this context once again in The Logic of Sense, 
when Deleuze analyses the synthetic relationship of divergent and convergent series 
together in terms of ontological genesis, though in this case the term ‘singularity’ conveys 
at one and the same time the connotations it possesses in calculus and geometry’; 
A world already envelops an infinite system of singularities selected through 
convergence. Within this world, however, individuals are constituted which select 
and envelop a finite number of the singularities of the system. They combine them 
with the singularities that their own body incarnates. They spread them out over 
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their own ordinary lines, and are even capable of forming them again on the 
membranes which bring the outside and the inside in contact with each other. 
Leibniz then was right to say that the individual monad expresses a world according 
to the relation of other bodies to its own, as much as it expresses this relation 
according to the relation of the parts of its own body. (LoS p.126) 
Here then is Simondon’s individuation as ‘the prolongation of a singularity’ made to march 
in tune with a conceptual distinction in geometry. A geometrical figure is said to possess 
both ordinary and singular points; the difference between the two is that the singular point 
is ambiguous with respect to the surrounding series with which it is in contact. An example 
Deleuze discusses is that of the apex of a pyramid, which is a singular point for several 
ordinary lines; those forming the vertices which converge upon it. 
The two very different senses of ‘singularity’ – the Simondonian catalytic element (the grit 
in the pearl) which brings series into communication and the mathematically ambiguous 
sign are reconciled here in a very complex act of conceptual synthesis intended to 
characterise the process of selection and individuation. The point at the apex of the 
pyramid is at one and the same time the final point in a series of points belonging to 
several lines; so to speak, it puts them into communication just as does the grit in the pearl.  
Equally Deleuze is reconciling Leibniz’ divergent sense of the compossible and the 
incompossible with his own chaosmotic disjunctive synthesis; the world is expressed 
through each individual, in accord with Leibniz’ monadic world, yet in a very different 
sense. Each local system is in contact with its neighbours through lines of convergence, 
which it expresses clearly through contiguity, as do Leibniz’ monads, yet these lines extend 
up to and beyond those points where they diverge, the singular points. Each individual is in 
contact with, expresses, all individuals in the world, but obscurely, again, as with Leibniz, 
through infinitely ramifying lines of divergence. For Deleuze, all series intersect and diverge 
in communication with other series. Ultimately, no given point is simply selfsame with 
respect to its identity within any given series, all are singular, belonging to a multiplicity of 
series. No longer is the Leibnizian distinction between compossibility and incompossibility 
put into communication through a God operating as a telephone exchange, a centrepoint 
ensuring harmonious exchange, but through aleatory points and ambiguous signs 
extending off indefinitely. Each individual, then, remains necessarily the sum of all its 
predicates, but in that same sense as a singularity contains its own power of expressing 
innumerable contradictions; here is Deleuze’s ‘object=x’, the concept which overcomes the 
idea of world understood merely as the circle of convergence. 
We are now faced with the aleatory point of singular points, with the ambiguous 
sign of singularities, or rather, that which represents this sign, and which holds 
good for many of these worlds, or, in the last analysis, for all worlds, despite their 
divergences and the individuals which occupy them. There is thus a “vague Adam,” 
that is, a vagabond, a nomad, an Adam=x common to several worlds. (LoS p.131) 
Nor does Deleuze fail to acknowledge the resonance of this picture with Whitehead’s work; 
For Leibniz, as we have seen, bifurcations and divergences of series are genuine 
borders between incompossible worlds…For Whitehead (and for many modern 
philosophers), on the contrary, bifurcations, divergences, incompossibilities and 
discord belong to the same motley world. (FLB p.81) 
The discussion above goes some way to establishing that for Deleuze processes such as 
those exemplified in the work of Simondon at the scale of individuating (partially isolated) 
systems are to be understood also at the scale of the chaosmos as a whole; that the 
chaosmos is a non-totalising aggregate of endlessly ramifying convergent and divergent 
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series. This speaks of an attunement of the local with the global. Undoubtedly both 
Deleuze and Whitehead subscribe to such an attunement, but it would be wrong to 
conclude that the global is simply the aggregate of systems such as those described by 
Simondon. For both philosophers, it would be wrong to say that nature begins with the 
local and propagates out from myriad local centres like the countless interacting ripples in 
a lake under rainfall. The Event operates also through non-local means; modern science 
tells us this no less than our philosophers. This aspect will be treated in detail in a 
subsequent chapter. 
In terms, then, paradoxically, the chaos Deleuze seeks to identify, chance as the only 
necessity, is in utero within the well-ordered harmony of Leibniz’ system. Leibniz’ short, 
dense essay on ‘Origination’ (one of which Deleuze was aware; he cites it in Difference and 
Repetition) seems to allow for such a development, in a way which avoids, perhaps, the 
difficulties of orientation attached to the argument from eternal return. We find the 
elements required: the primacy of divergence is of one piece with the principle of the 
identity of indiscernibles; the disparity of energy gradients is underwritten by the 
dissymmetrical nature of the principle of sufficient reason; the Principle of Least Resistance 
entails direct dialogue with the field of thermodynamics. And the necessity of chance is the 
same necessity that belongs to the complete concept, conjoined as it is with these tightly-
interrelated principles. A complete concept adapted to include the vague Adam of the 
virtual chaosmos, accruing to each individual with every breaking of symmetry (the boulder 
falls toward its complete concept), but sweeping ever on past itself along both diverging 
and converging series, unchained from essence or identity, toward the Eventum Tantum.48 
The foregoing serves not so much to restore to the displaced prince Leibniz the crown of 
superior sufficient reason, as to foreground features of Deleuze’s chaos which allow a great 
deal more traction (I don’t say agreement) with the discourse of physics. To champion this 
Leibniz is to champion a principle of dissymmetry. Ultimately, I will argue, it allows us to 
specify what it is that constitutes an open universe for a philosophy of difference. 
Deleuze resists both the lessons of thermodynamics and the faith in symmetry which is 
prevalent in much of the history of physics. These are connected elements; disparity is 
dissymmetry. While it is possible to recast questions relating to the former in terms of the 
latter, this in itself cannot remove genuine difficulties in orientating the metaphysics to the 
physics. Firstly, let us make a brief examination of symmetry and its importance to modern 
physics, then address a telling question; ‘can the Leibnizian-Deleuzian philosophy of 
difference coherently dismiss the heat-death of the universe?’ 
 
Chaosmos as Cosmology  
 
If energy gradients are the sufficient reason of all that appears for thermodynamics, 
symmetry is to most intents and purposes the sufficient reason from which modern physics 
draws its rationale. Mathematical relations of symmetry have come to take the place of 
‘law’ in classical physics; where there is symmetry, science identifies an underlying order. 
As we shall see, however, the point of contention between Deleuze and the prevailing 
scientific consensus is by no means so black and white, and far from universally upheld 
among the scientific community. Once again, it is in the particularities of this tension that 
productive exchange may be found. 
Let us return to the paradigm image Deleuze offers for physical action at the beginning of 
chapter five of Difference and Repetition; the image of the calculating God. If the internal 
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disequilibrium, incommensurability (and dissymmetry) of the regimes of numbers through 
which God passes is first and foremost cast in terms of number theory, fated to advance 
toward a completion of the continuum which will ever and again recede, remaining 
‘problematic’ in Deleuze’s terminology, we should nevertheless not forget that ultimately 
we are being offered a metaphor for physical causation/expression. Moreover, there is a 
dual aspect to this image; it is in play on the scale of individual systems such as those 
treated in Simondon’s work, which redistribute ever anew the internal and external (‘pre-
individual’) singularities in transductive exchange, just as the Lautmanian structural 
schemata reconfigure in the transition from one regime of umber to another.  It is also 
unmistakeably to be taken as applicable (metaphorically) on the level of the cosmos; if 
God’s calculations were exact there would be no world; the very terminology chosen to 
designate this ever-unfolding continuum, the ‘chaosmos’ is in itself calculated to connote a 
(non-) totality on a cosmological scale; Nietzsche’s concept of the Eternal Return, which 
Deleuze adapts to underpin the temporality of God’s calculations remains in Deleuze’s 
hands a tableau of cosmic dimensions, of eternity. Dissymmetry and disequilibrium are to 
be understood as universally applicable. Disparity is intensity. To grapple adequately with 
the cosmological scale, and tensions remaining between Deleuze and scientific discourse, it 
is first necessary to outline the universal application of symmetry in key scientific 
frameworks and the ways in which Deleuze’s philosophy points in other directions. 
There are clear instances in the history of science and mathematics where the notion of 
symmetry plays a fundamental part. It represents an unequivocal cornerstone in the 
conceptual apparatus of special relativity, in the form of the group theory established by 
Evariste Galois; group theory is intended to identify invariants under transformation of a 
given group of elements, and its use by Einstein represented a radical new conception of 
what it was to solve a problem relating to physical action.49  
In the formulation of the Standard Model of particle physics, the equation which bears the 
name of Dirac is an iconic case in point. According to Nicholas Mee, symmetry lay at the 
heart of Paul Dirac’s intuitions of nature. The Dirac equation was an attempt to address an 
anomaly which had arisen by 1928 between the nascent disciplines of Relativity and 
Quantum theory; for quantum theory, the behaviour of wave-like forms, specifically 
electricity and magnetism, grew intractable at speeds approaching the velocity of light, 
disagreeing with the formulations of Relativity. In an effort to reconcile the two theories, 
Dirac found a solution in the form of an equation which contained within it a singular 
implication; that there was a ‘previously unsuspected symmetry at the heart of matter’.50 
Specifically, this was subsequently to serve as the prediction of the existence of a 
symmetric counterpart of the electron, the positron. More generally, the Dirac equation 
predicts that for every given kind of particle there must be a mirror-image particle; for the 
proton, the anti-proton, for the neutron the anti-neutron.  As a mark of the equation’s 
prodigious influence too, later developments in the Standard Model have generalised this 
initial insight into a ‘zoo’ of particles, including among them such exotic pairings as the 
quark and the squark, an increasing range of which have been confirmed to exist under 
experimental conditions (the anti-proton confirmed in 1955, the anti-neutron in 1965; the 
Higgs Boson most recently in July 2012).  
In 1979, the Nobel Prize was awarded to Weinberg, Glashow and Salam, following the 
example of Dirac, for positing a resolution to the unification of the electromagnetic force 
and the weak atomic force in terms of a fundamental symmetry between them, under 
conditions achievable only under extreme high-energy states; 
Just as the magnetization of a piece of iron can be wiped out and the symmetry 
between different directions restored by raising the temperature of the iron above 
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770 degrees, so also the symmetry between the weak and electromagnetic forces 
could be restored if we could raise the temperature of our laboratory above a few 
million billion degrees.51  
Peter Woit, in Not Even Wrong, considers at length the extent to which mathematical 
formulations of symmetry have been incorporated into physical theories, citing not least 
the influence of the mathematician Hermann Weyl in this history, with respect to the 
mathematical underpinnings of quantum mechanics represented by Group Theory and the 
Lie Groups in particular. For quantum mechanics (and less directly so for classical 
mechanics) when there are transformations of a physical system which do not change the 
physical regularities governing the system, these transformations are said to be 
‘symmetries’ of the system; 
Some of the most basic aspects of physics follow from looking at symmetries. The 
symmetry under translations in space implies the conservation of momentum, 
symmetry under translation in time implies the conservation of energy.52 
Weyl himself wrote a monograph on symmetry, in which he makes clear just how 
fundamental the concept is to his philosophy; ‘As far as I can see, all a priori statements in 
physics have their origin in symmetry.’53 Bernard d’Espagnat sums up the significance of 
symmetry and invariance in twentieth century physics as follows; 
…we must emphasize how right Largeault was in stressing the importance present-
day physicists attribute to symmetries. To claim that this concept (and perhaps 
even more its “offspring,” the notion of the symmetry-break) dominated the whole 
of twentieth-century physics would hardly constitute an overstatement.54  
It is with respect to two factors here that we can bring into focus the potential conflict 
between Deleuze’s philosophy of difference and the conceptual foundations of physics. 
Firstly, we note that ‘symmetry’ for physics denotes more than mere spatial relationships; 
translations in time (for which we might read ‘evolutions’ or ‘phases’ of a system), for 
instance, are understood to be of equal significance. Each is understood to capture the 
‘invariants’ of a given system; an invariant is simply that which remains constant under 
translation; the simple translation of rotation in a two-dimensional plane, for instance, can 
be characterised as that translation which preserves the distances of all elements on the 
plane from the centre of rotation. Secondly, we note that symmetry bears a close 
conceptual relationship to physical principles of conservation; the conservation of 
momentum inherited from Newton and the Conservation of Energy as formulated in 
classical thermodynamics by Clausius are prime examples. Richard Feynman draws this 
connection; 
It is extremely interesting that there seems to be a deep connection between the 
conservation laws and the symmetry laws. This connection has its proper 
interpretation, at least as we understand it today, only in the knowledge of 
quantum mechanics.55 
This association of symmetry with conservation laws was ultimately to be codified by Emmy 
Noether into a series of equations which effectively represent the translation of the idea of 
‘law’ in classical physics into the idea of symmetry for modern physics. Symmetry is Law.  
Deleuze on the other hand, could not be more clear on his resistance to the idea of 
symmetry; 
The negative expression “lack of symmetry” should not mislead us: it indicates the 
origin and positivity of the causal process. (DR p.20) 
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And, 
Curie commented that it was useful but misleading to speak of symmetry in 
negative terms, as though it were the absence of symmetry, without inventing 
positive terms capable of designating the infinite number of operations with 
unmatched outcomes. (DR p.234) 
The translations by now are apparent. We can equate Deleuze’s ‘origin and positivity of the 
causal process’ arising from ‘lack of symmetry’ with the notion of disparity, or 
disequilibrium, which he calls the ‘sufficient reason of all that which appears’; dissymmetry 
and disequilibrium are cognate terms. It is interesting to note, however, that Deleuze cites 
a scientist, Pierre Curie, for support on this line; an initial suggestion, which I shall develop 
later, that the contrasting viewpoints here may be as much a matter internal to science as a 
point of contention between the philosophy of difference and scientific discourse as a 
whole. Differences of opinion internal to scientific discourse notwithstanding, in context of 
the connections between symmetry and equilibrium, and the parallel between symmetry 
and conservation laws more generally, it is clear that any serious treatment of Deleuze’s 
philosophy and its relation to science must address the detail and the implications of his 
resistance to the idea. 
 Finally, it would be misleading to claim that Deleuze’s emphasis on disparity, 
incommensurability and dissymmetry amounts to a complete dismissal of the concept and 
indeed the value of symmetry as such. As with the concept of entropy, there are caveats to 
observe. For in truth, the concept of symmetry has had many different instantiations in the 
history of science and mathematics; the transformations and symmetries with which Group 
Theory deals can in no way be likened straightforwardly to simple spatial or geometrical 
symmetries, subsuming as they do non-commutative relationships and vectorial 
transformations. Moreover, as Manuel DeLanda points out, Deleuze was quite aware of the 
role of symmetry in Group Theory, and quite prepared to embrace the tenets thereof for 
the greater explanatory potential in terms of a genetic rather than axiomatic account.56  
 
Absolute Zero, Limits and the Infinite 
 
To work through what is at stake, let us take a salient example; an example at once of 
symmetry and equilibrium, underpinned, as all things are in physics, by conservation laws. 
The concept of Absolute Zero. This state is an implication of the third law of 
thermodynamics, most familiarly described in terms of final equilibrium for an isolated 
system, a system lacking any differential energy gradients, any free energy. On a 
cosmological scale, this is Heat Death. Walther Nernst, an experimental chemist who 
helped clarify the law, proposed in 1905 a specific physical meaning for the notion; 
absolute zero is that temperature at which the entropy of a perfect crystal is exactly equal 
to zero. Why might only a crystal attain this state, and a perfect one at that? It is a 
requirement of symmetry. Of all forms in nature, crystals enjoy the highest order of 
symmetry due to their lattice structure. Any deviation from perfect symmetry by definition 
introduces an energy gradient. Surface tension, for example, or frangibility within the 
crystal body (as with flaws in a diamond), and on a big enough scale, gravitational 
differentials. The balance of the properties of a material body depend on its measure of 
symmetry.  
Deleuze is aware of the entailments involved in resisting symmetry and equilibrium; he 
does not flinch from denying the scientific concept of Absolute Zero. This refusal is itself 
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nested within a further context; his rejection of conservation laws and natural constants. 
Deleuze’s rejection of the concept of absolute zero and its bearing on the nature of 
symmetry and equilibrium are intertwined themes; at its broadest, the question for him is 
one of the nature of Limits. Discussion of these broader themes will be taken up again in a 
subsequent chapter, in conjunction with the thought of A.N. Whitehead and David Bohm. 
To focus on our example, the assignment of the value of absolute zero is woven into an 
order of discourse that is imbricated throughout the modern scientific corpus. Absolute 
Zero is calibrated with respect to Planck’s Constant, which as a corollary to assigning a least 
quantum of energy, furnishes the calculation of a ‘ground state’ for a system under which 
no exchange of free energy may be possible. This explicitly rules out material or energetic 
phenomena of any kind below this scale.57 This is rendered in quantum mechanics by the 
concept of ‘zero point energy’, or ‘zero-point motion’ which describes not the total arrest 
of movement, but a state of minimum motion from which no further energy can be 
removed. Nernst’s formulation of the Third Law contains within it the implication that no 
amount of cooling of any body will achieve absolute zero in a finite number of steps. It is a 
graphic demonstration of the degree to which questions of symmetry are intertwined with 
questions of energy gradient in thermodynamics.  
The value of the constant absolute zero is significant for the fate of the cosmos with 
respect to another constant identified initially by Einstein, known as The Cosmological 
Constant, which represents the ratio between the speed of expansion of the universe and 
the sum total of mass therein; the exact value of the ratio (the subject of some sharp 
debate and equivocation, even on Einstein’s part, from the very first, and especially since 
the discovery of dark matter and energy) is taken to determine the long-term tendency of 
the cosmos toward endless expansion or potential for re-contraction. If there is sufficient 
mass in the universe, the reasoning goes, gravity will in the long term prevail over 
expansion, in which case the universe will recontract, whereas the reverse will be true 
should overall mass fall short. In other words, the cosmological constant is taken to 
determine whether the cosmos will end up in a ‘Big Freeze’ near absolute zero, or a ‘Big 
Crunch’. Consequently, there are far reaching consequences for any attempt to find the 
productive exchange between the philosophy of difference and scientific frameworks with 
respect to this question; absolute zero may be a number, but it is not dismissably ‘simply’ 
so, as Deleuze claims in What Is Philosophy?; it is arrived at through deliberation, 
experimentation and intertwined theoretical necessity. So much is also true for other 
constants, limits and conservation laws. 
We have arrived at a similar juncture to the one outlined with respect to the argument 
from eternal return above. It seems that in order to subscribe to the philosophy of 
difference, our reading of Leibnizian Sufficient Reason as dissymmetry is left with no choice 
but to affirm that dissymmetry against the scientific corpus. In the long run, there is no 
inherent reason why such a bold move should be illegitimate; in the history of science, 
after all, we have seen the earth unhinged to circle the sun, and the force of gravity recast 
as the warping of space-time. And it may prove equally fruitful to recast constants, limits 
and conservation laws in terms of the dissymmetry favoured here. This is in fact the 
conclusion I will defend. But as with the argument from eternal return, it is no 
straightforward matter for the Leibnizian variant of the philosophy of difference to 
contradict the well-established tenets of science; it is legitimate to question whether it can 
coherently uphold such a contradiction in its own terms, whether Deleuze’s philosophy 
succeeds in giving us the necessary vantage point to critique the science wedded to the 
closed, sterile, moribund universe of maximum entropy.    
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I would contend that there are potential inconsistencies within the philosophy of difference 
as a whole which might give us pause here. It is deployed in favour of a fundamentally 
creative nature, of an open universe. And prima facie, the condition called Heat Death 
represents the very antithesis of that creativity. Yet the very principles adopted to support 
this characterisation of nature introduce a tension. Is the philosophy of difference able 
coherently to dismiss the physicists’ Heat Death as uncreative?  
The questions above abut on two closely related tenets of Deleuze’s philosophy of 
difference; the relational nature of time, and the refusal of difference to vanish between 
even the most closely related terms. Both tenets maintain us on Leibnizian territory. 
Briefly, relational accounts of time hold that there is no elapse independently of events; the 
passage of time is a function of what happens, each event with its own characteristic time-
signature, which may vary substantially from one type of episode to another. The modern 
statement of this idea belongs to Leibniz, in his anti-Newtonian confrontation with Clarke. 
The refusal of difference to vanish may be seen as a consequence of our trio of Leibniz’ 
principles; the identity of indiscernibles, essence as ‘complete concept’, and sufficient 
reason. 
It is part and parcel of Leibniz’ philosophy that no two existents may be identical; if two 
things are found to be indiscernible, we can only conclude that they are one and the same 
thing. We note as a corollary, that the difference between any two given individuals may be 
as small as imaginable in Leibniz’ world, since what distinguishes the individuals ultimately 
is the ‘complete concept’, which includes the entire contingent history of that individual. 
Deleuze formulates his own version of this principle in Difference and Repetition, in context 
of a discussion of ‘the dark precursor’; 
It is well known that in certain cases (in certain systems), the difference between 
the differences brought into play may be “very large”; in other systems it must be 
“very small”. It would be wrong, however, to see in this second case the pure 
expression of a prior requirement of resemblance…For example, it is insisted that 
disparate series must necessarily be almost similar, or that the frequencies be 
neighbouring (w neighbour of w0) – in short, that the difference be small. If, 
however, the identity of the agent which causes the different things to 
communicate is presupposed, then there are no differences which will not be 
“small”, even on the world scale. (DR p.120) 
However, it is precisely the ‘identity of the agent’ (here ‘the dark precursor’) which is 
contested. Deleuze continues; 
We have seen that small and large apply badly to difference, because they judge it 
according to the criteria of the Same and the similar. If difference is related to its 
differenciator, and if we refrain from attributing to the differenciator an identity 
which it cannot and does not have, then the difference will be small or large 
according to its possibilities of fractionation – that is, according to the 
displacements and disguise of the differenciator…The important thing is not that a 
difference be small or large, and ultimately always small in relation to a greater 
resemblance. The important thing, for the in-itself, is that the difference, whether 
small or large, be internal. (DR p.121) 
What is at stake here is a notion of difference in itself, which knows no prior measure or 
metric, but which produces its own in the very process of differentiation.58 In the footnote 
to this passage, Deleuze enlists the work of Léon Selme to round off his point; 
 59 
 
Léon Selme showed that the illusion of an annulment of difference must be all the 
greater the smaller the differences realised within a system (and therefore in 
thermal machines), in his Principe de carnot contre formule empirique de Clausius. 
(DR p.318, fn25) 
Deleuze later returns to Selme in chapter five of Difference and Repetition to reinforce this 
tenet; in sum, we might say for Deleuze that any difference at all between series or 
phenomena is all that is ‘required’; any difference is all the difference in the world, since 
there is no pre-set scale by which to measure series, phenomena, events. To assume there 
were would be in some measure to accept essence at a fundamental level, strictly out of 
keeping with Deleuze’s anti-hylomorphic stance. It is this strand of thought which explains 
Deleuze’s preference for non-metric forms of mathematics (as found for example in 
Riemannian multiplicity) as more adequate to the realities of the event. The general 
principle here of difference in itself, is moreover directly in tune with the rejection of 
predicative logic on Leibniz’ part in favour of ‘the complete concept’. All things are 
discernible ultimately only by reference to the sum total of events which comprise their 
entire history. In the end, for Deleuze, even particles of the same spin, weight, element 
etc., may be discerned by reference to the series to which they have belonged in their 
individual histories; even the least quanta of being are differentiable not by quality but by 
the nature of the event. 
The two principles addressed above; that of the relational nature of time and the full 
existence of difference in itself regardless of qualitative similarity, may be put into the 
cosmological context of The Big Freeze, in which all matter approaches Absolute Zero. 
Martin Rees, illustrates these themes; 
The interval between 10-15 seconds and 10-14 seconds is likely to have been just as 
eventful as that between 10-14 seconds and 10-13 seconds, even though the former 
is 10 times briefer (and likewise for even earlier intervals). It is therefore more 
realistic to give equal weight to each power of 10. In this perspective there is plenty 
of action even at earlier stages – to ignore these early eras is a severe omission 
indeed.59 
We might gloss the above insight in terms of ‘epochs’ – for any given epoch it is the 
passage of nature – at root the sum total of energetic interactions – which provides the 
better yardstick for appraising the passage of time, rather than the grid of a given 
mathematical metric, here fractions of a second expressed in powers of minus ten. Time is 
relational. As a corollary, we might insist as a broad principle that each epoch is to be 
distinguished by a characteristic number, large as it may be, of energetic interactions. Thus, 
apparently even minimal temporal divisions may in themselves count as epochs, given the 
vastly ‘greater rate’ of interaction pertaining to one epoch in comparison to another. This 
‘greater rate’ deserves quotation marks in this context, since it is precisely the interactions 
themselves, which constitute ‘rate’ and ‘speed’ of elapse as a function of the vastly greater 
levels of free energy available at even minimally earlier epochs. To imagine an observer 
notionally transported from the cooled down era of the universe which we occupy (an era 
formidably longer in terms of seconds elapsed, dating arguably from 38,000 years into the 
history of the 13-billion-year-old universe) to the very early conditions of the nascent 
universe, is to confront the impossibility of transporting a clock regulated by our own 
regime to that very different one. Any clock we might furnish, any yardstick of time, any 
conscious appraisal of the passage of time, would be subject to the ‘greater rate’ of the 
passage of nature. Such a scenario illustrating the relational nature of time is explicitly at 
the heart of the account furnished by General Relativity. All things being equal, the passage 
of a unit of time, however defined, is indistinguishable under the initial conditions to those 
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pertaining under later. The challenge is to conceptualise for ourselves a passing of time 
which genuinely (subjectively?) corresponds to this equivalence over such vastly different 
scales, or ‘rates’; to imagine the virtually instant (for us) elapse of 10-15 seconds as if it were 
equivalent to the epoch, with its own attendant regime, through which we are passing on 
the scale of billions of years. It is a challenge which applies alike to the cosmological 
physicist and to all those who subscribe to the relational nature of time.60   
So much must be true, then, for the scenario pertaining to the Big Freeze; in the moribund 
state, whereby free energy is close to minimum, the presumably final epoch, we are once 
again challenged to conceive the sheer difference in scale which would allow the 
equivalent number of energetic interactions to characterise the epoch; trillions of years 
certainly rather than billions.  
Moreover, in the sense in which I am using the term here (whereby the transition from an 
early cosmos composed of plasma, in which protons and electrons remain too energetic to 
combine, to a cosmos of atomic natural kinds, should be considered to mark two distinct 
regimes), there is a potential change in the regime of nature conjectured in speculative 
physics which bears on the range of possible complexity ‘reachable’ at the Big Freeze. That 
epoch may count as qualitatively distinct from our own, over and above the quantitative 
distinction in terms of the flat numerical counting of energetic interactions. Rees outlines 
the implications of eternal expansion, the motor of the freeze for the Big Freeze scenario; 
Most of the atoms that went into the making of galaxies will eventually get trapped 
in black holes or inert stellar remnants; each galaxy will become just a dark swarm 
of cooled white dwarfs, neutron stars and black holes. But eventually the atoms 
will themselves decay; if the baryons of which they are made were absolutely 
immutable (as we believe the amount of charge in our universe is), the excess of 
matter over anti-matter would never have emerged in the ultra-early universe. The 
eventual decay of protons restores the symmetry between matter and anti-matter 
with which our universe began. 
…If even the heaviest black holes eventually evaporated too, nothing would be left 
but radiation, and electrons and positrons. A direct hit is highly improbable; 
electrons and positrons could nevertheless be brought together by forming a 
bound pair, orbiting around each other, and then spiralling together. So immensely 
dilute does everything become that there would eventually, on average, be less 
than one electron in a volume as large as our present observable universe. 
Immensely wide binary pairs could form; an electron’s motion could be controlled 
by the electric field of a single positron ten billion light years away, and after 
enough aeons had passed the radiation drag would have brought them closer 
together.61 
This is precisely the moribund state which Deleuze is refusing, a minimum state of order or 
complexity. Yet I would argue that there is nothing in the letter of the Deleuzian law which 
cannot at least countenance such a scenario. The objection takes its source rather from the 
spirit of Deleuze’s work.  
We may ask, ‘what novelty remains in the cosmos at the Big Freeze?’ And start by noting 
that in the picture Rees paints for us, the energy gradient, Deleuze’s disparity and intensity, 
impoverished as it is, remains the motor of physical action, the asymmetry of which 
provides the ‘origin and positivity’ of all causal processes. Nor yet in the lights of this 
scenario do we attain the universal equilibrium which would mark the disappearance of the 
world as such. In subscribing to the relational nature of time, we might insist on the 
implication for Deleuze’s philosophy of difference that the sheer scale of time required for 
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any sufficient number of energetic interactions to take place would not mark out this epoch 
as in any sense essentially different than those preceding; the principle behind the notion 
of difference in itself, that any difference at all is all the difference required, renders it 
illegitimate to refuse the moribund picture of the Big Freeze as simply too exhausted to 
constitute novelty.  Finally, the incommensurability of energy, in the form of energy 
gradient, remains not merely de facto, but in principle in the canonical book of physics, in 
the shape of Nernst’s Third Law of Thermodynamics; 
We saw that the coefficient of performance of a refrigerator depends on the 
temperature of the body we are seeking to cool and that of the surroundings…the 
coefficient of the performance falls to zero as the temperature of the cooled body 
approaches zero. That is, we need to do an ever-increasing, and ultimately infinite, 
amount of work to remove energy from the body as heat as its temperature 
approaches absolute zero.62  
The message is clear in Peter Atkins’ discussion of the Third Law above, that the absolute 
inactivity, a ground state applying to the universe as a whole, cannot be reached in a finite 
number of steps, since by definition a superior amount of energy would be required from 
the environment to extract energy from the body in question than is contained in that 
body. Technically, absolute zero is an asymptotic limit. And of course, the notion of an 
environment in which the universe is placed is at best problematic and perhaps self-
contradictory.63 Consequently, the expanding universe of the Big Freeze scenario would be 
fated to expand forever, unable to cease, just as is true for the Event in Deleuze’s 
philosophy. The existence of a differential which constitutes the path by which the actual 
and the virtual is exchanged persists ad infinitum. 
The particular necessity we have identified as belonging to the Leibniz-Deleuze Principle of 
Sufficient Reason and the complete concept goes some way to displacing the argument 
from eternal return, then. It broadens the enquiry outward from the key idea of the 
incommensurability of forces to the notion of symmetry (or rather, dissymmetry) more 
generally. And in doing so, brings the points of connection and contention between the 
philosophy of difference and the corpus of physics into sharper focus. Yet in both cases, 
there is genuine aporia in the attempt to square the circle. The problem turns out not to be 
that the philosophy is in too great an antagonism to the thermodynamics, but rather too 
much in agreement, too little able to place distance. If we take seriously both the principle 
that time, the rate of elapse, is a function of what happens, and the principle that any 
difference in the world makes all the difference in the world, then we cannot consistently 
dismiss the scenario of a high-entropy, moribund universe as devoid of creativity. Rather, 
we are forced to grant that creativity acquires its own time-signature dependent on 
whatever conditions prevail, however massive the difference in scale. Defence for 
Deleuze’s position on the second law requires support from elsewhere, which will be 
proposed in the final chapter; a certain kind of ‘openness’ is required for a Deleuzian 
cosmos.  We are, however, in a position to recognize from the above discussion just how 
indispensable is the continuous nature of the event to Deleuzian metaphysics. It is not 
amenable to hibernation, nor to exquisite attenuation, nor indeed to the punctuation of 
phase shifts. A certain indispensable level of order, complexity and creativity must be true 
of Deleuzian nature, or it cannot count as such. Martin Rees’ moribund universe cannot 
count as such. This is as much as to identify a tension between the letter and the spirit of 
the Deleuzian text. A mismatch between the inexhaustible creativity of nature to which 
Deleuze subscribes, and the limit case at the edge of his metaphysics. When he speaks of 
the world as a plenum, devoid of negativity, or a continuum, or a ceaseless Eventum 
Tantum (by lights of which the exhausted cosmos may be found wanting, and ruled out), 
when he evokes the sublime force of volcanic pressure to characterise the creative power 
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of nature, this is the spirit investing the Deleuzian philosophy of nature, endlessly self-
renewing, eternally returning. It may be that he countenances only the productive 
potential inherent in the complexities of our own epoch, with its own calibrative time-
signatures, neglecting the extent to which the two principles in question are interlinked. If 
time is in principle relational, if it lacks the absolute universal measure of which Newton 
speaks, then the only way to judge the fullness and vigour of nature is by reference to 
some clock naturally arising within the epoch in question (rotation of the earth, revolutions 
of the caesium atom, the dissipation of a black hole through Hawking radiation). But 
equally, if in principle the difference in play at any step in the passage of nature may not be 
thought of as large or small in itself, then what is to distinguish in novelty between the 
incremental pull between electron and positron billions of miles distant in the far future 
and a flash of lightning today? Yet there seems something inherently unequal between 
these two phenomena; the lightning flash, let’s say, depends on a greater range of 
energetic factors than the electron path. It depends on the relative density of conducting 
humidity in the atmosphere, and the relative height of the nearest earthing structure to 
determine its path, it conjoins at once the activity and exchanges of a whole population of 
electrons and ions. We might say, then, that for sake of comparison, we should rather take 
as many ‘electron-positron’ exchanges in the far future, ever further flung though they may 
be, as it takes to equate to the lightning flash. Even then, we have nothing by the principle 
of internal difference (which is neither great nor small) to distinguish the greater or lesser 
rate of activity in the two scenarios, since that rate is itself a consequence not of relatively 
confined location nor of absolute duration, but of what happens, of the principle of 
relational time. The two principles are interlinked. Moreover, in the attempt to balance out 
more equitably the scenarios under consideration, we are falling foul of the Deleuzian-
Nietzschean tenet which assigns incommensurability to energetic phenomena; all forces 
are multiple forces in tension, disparity is the sufficient condition of all that appears.      
Yet for all the difficulties revealed for the philosophy of difference at this cosmological 
scale, we are not yet forced to any final capitulation on the issue of the second law. These 
difficulties serve rather to identify underlying points of contention which will be addressed 
with resources from elsewhere in Deleuze’s work. If a certain minimum level of order is the 
key, what is it that constitutes order in the Deleuzian philosophy of nature? And what is 
there to assure us that that minimum will pertain without fail?   
 
Simple Order 
 
Gregg Lambert offers a treatment of the notion of order as it pertains to Deleuze’s 
philosophy in his work The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. 64 He seeks to show that order 
for Deleuze is an inextricable part of the passage of nature, which at first sight seems to be 
what is required; a certain minimum level of order or complexity. It conforms to the 
Deleuzian tenet ‘order without law’ and it draws as Deleuze himself so often does, on the 
philosophical fiction of Jorge Luis Borges.  
The Borges piece in question is the famous short story The Library of Babel from the 
collection Labyrinths. For Lambert, the ‘order without law’ represented by this library is 
pertinent to a particular period of questioning for Deleuze; one which lasted from the 
publication of Difference and Repetition to the publication of The Fold. He encapsulates 
Deleuze’s problematic in the following way: 
How does one live in a world in which all principles have been shattered to bits?65  
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I will argue, against Lambert, that Deleuze is best understood precisely to be adhering to an 
overarching principle in his natural philosophy, rather than purely divining the grain of each 
phenomenon as it is encountered. The Borgesian library is a claustrophobic yet infinite 
world formed from interlinking identical cells containing the same number of volumes, on 
the pages of which are found works of dizzying variety in no apparent order, and in varying 
stages of completion. The protagonist spends his life attempting to make his way through 
this world, trying to glean anything of its sense or overall pattern, to converge on the 
original principles of its constitution which seem irreparably to have degraded in sense and 
organization, the original principles of which have been ‘shattered to bits’. Ultimately, 
Borges divulges that; 
If an eternal traveller were to cross it in any direction, after centuries he would see 
that the same volumes were repeated in the same disorder (which, thus repeated, 
would be an order: the Order) 66  
Lambert fixes on the analogical similarities in Borges’ remarks here to Deleuze’s own 
concept of the fold; the fact of the library’s unlimited and cyclical nature implies that it 
might be compressed into one volume containing an infinite number of infinitely thin 
leaves, whereby each page folds into the next. As such, Borges’ work prefigures, claims 
Lambert, the solution which Deleuze draws from Leibniz in answer to the loss of principles, 
citing from The Fold; 
The Baroque solution is the following: we shall multiply principles – we can always 
slip a new one out from under the cuff – and in this way we will change their use. 
We will not have to ask what available object corresponds to a given luminous 
principle, but what hidden principle corresponds to whatever object is ‘given,’ that 
is to say, to this or that ‘perplexing case’… a case being given, we shall invent its 
principle. (FLB p.67) 
So, Lambert concludes,  
[T]he principle of the fold becomes inseparable from the species of repetition that 
is deployed by a process of reading…67 
The analogy is a neat and developed one, rallying together common themes in Deleuze and 
Borges respectively; the ‘principle’ becomes a function of the ‘reading’ of cases, a mobile 
and adaptable process responding to the passage of nature, to the state of progress 
through the permuting library. It thus joins hands with Deleuze’s figure of the ‘reading’ or 
‘calculating’ God who reads through all the diverging series of the world, whose selection 
of a path through the library creates fresh principles ever anew, a new set of salient 
divergent paths. While Deleuze is acknowledging here the human condition, so to speak, 
whereby to properly appreciate newly-encountered phenomena, we must resist the 
impulse merely to appropriate them sub specie aeternitatis, nevertheless, there is a 
prevailing principle which subsists beneath this attitude, whose existence is signalled by the 
word ‘perplexing’ in the above quotation; ‘folding’ with its multiple cognates includes 
‘perplication’ or problematisation, which in itself governs the attitude to nature which 
Deleuze insists necessary; the potential for explication, implication or complication is 
inexhaustible for nature as a whole, together comprising its essential form of order, 
complexity, yet provisional for any creature confined to a point of view, any of nature’s 
monads, seekers in the labyrinth and the library. As Nicholas of Cusa would have it, the 
world explicates God, while God implicates the world. In short, the Baroque, proliferative 
solution to a world in which ‘all principles are shattered’ in truth rests on the situated 
nature of the observer; any ‘reading’ of phenomena is external, we may at best exhaust as 
much of the library’s contents as time permits, seeking patterns, recurrences, repetitions. 
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In the explicated world only the external order is accessible. Yet just as surely there is the 
other, internal principle suggested in the analogy of the Baroque; the proliferation and 
thirst for exhaustion of form is creative; the ‘baroque solution’ which Deleuze valorises 
does not seek to remain faithful to the proliferative forms of nature so much as to apply 
nature’s own tactics, seeking its internal order. Which is to identify the overarching 
principle in question; novelty, or creation. For purposes of the present argument, I will 
favour  the word ‘evolution’, since this will serve to bring the thought more directly into 
orientation with Whitehead, and this in turn gives more directly onto developments in the 
physics of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  
The essential point of contention here rests in the characterisation by Borges-Lambert of 
order from repetition; 
… after centuries he would see that the same volumes were repeated in the same 
disorder (which, thus repeated, would be an order: the Order.) 68  
In a sense, this is a refusal of disorder.69 Yet of course not all demurrals from the notion of 
disorder are equivalent. While in my opinion Lambert is absolutely correct to say that for 
Deleuze there is nothing but order in the world, nevertheless the order that counts does 
not rest on any simple index of contingently discovered consistencies; his 'order without 
law’ is rather generative and evolutionary in nature. This distinction between indexical and 
generative order will be taken up again later, in connection with the work of the quantum 
physicist David Bohm, whose work presents a universe in evolution.  
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Chapter Three: Order 
 
‘Chaos appears there, spontaneously, in the order, order appears there in the 
midst of disorder. We will assuredly some day have to abandon this so negative 
label, which implies that we are thinking only in terms of an order.’  
Michel Serres1 
 
In his work Creative Evolution, Henri Bergson was concerned to establish a distinction 
intended to definitively dispel an illusion relating to order, and its inverse, disorder. An 
illusion which bore directly on the remit of science as it had developed over the long course 
of its history since the Greeks, an illusion fostered by the mathematisation of physical 
processes and the concomitant spatialisation of time. The distinction intended to dispel this 
illusion was to be understood as subtending all other criteria for differentiating order from 
disorder, and indeed to collapse that very distinction itself. 
So there arises the problem how order is imposed on disorder, form on matter. In 
analysing the idea of disorder thus subtilized, we shall see that it represents 
nothing at all, and at the same time the problems that have been raised around it 
vanish. (CE p. 23) 
His contention was that disorder possesses no substantive existence in nature, and that all 
we may ever encounter are instances of two distinct yet related forms of order. He 
acknowledges, however, that we are nonetheless habitually given to posit the existence of 
disorder and indeed to recognize instances thereof in the phenomena of nature. Moreover, 
he notes the presence of sophisticated conceptions of disorder in science; a key example is 
the tendency to ‘degradation’ represented by entropy, which he dates from Clausius and 
Carnot.  
The source of this illusion, according to Bergson, is simultaneously a conflation and a 
misrecognition. 
Now it is only order that is real; but, as order can take two forms, and as the 
presence of the one may be said to consist in the absence of the other, we speak of 
disorder whenever we have before us that one of the two orders for which we are 
not looking. The idea of disorder is then entirely practical. It corresponds to the 
disappointment of a certain expectation, and it does not denote the absence of all 
order, but only the presence of that order which does not offer us actual interest. 
(CE p.289) 
While we recognize the two forms of order as distinct in everyday life, Bergson claims – the 
examples offered are those of the mathematical ordering of astronomical bodies and the 
originality of order in a Beethoven symphony – we nevertheless are led to conflate the two 
by superficial similarity; broadly speaking, both are taken to consist essentially of similar 
structures which repeat, likenesses which lead to possible generalisation, and hence a 
‘general order of nature’ (CE p. 239, italics in original). With this conflation inured in our 
habits of thought, we habitually misrecognize and indeed fail to understand our true object 
in searching out order within phenomena in any given instance; to identify the presence or 
absence of either one of these two kinds. The failure to encounter the one expected leads 
to the misguided conclusion that order tout court is absent. For Bergson this failure is in 
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reality of a converse kind; the failure to recognize that we are in fact in the presence of the 
other sort of order. The apprehension of disorder can only ever be illusory. As we shall see, 
Deleuze accepts and endorses this diagnosis, yet not in its given formulation. We shall 
examine the detail of Deleuze’s development of this line of argument below, but for the 
meantime let us note the affinity between the two thinkers on this matter; 
Instead of starting out from a difference in kind between two orders, from a 
difference in kind between two beings, a general idea of order or being is created, 
which can no longer be thought except in opposition to a numbering in general, a 
disorder in general, or else which can be posited as the starting-point for a 
deterioration that leads us to disorder in general or nonbeing in general. In any 
case, the question of difference in kind – “what” order? “what” being? Has been 
neglected. (B p.47) 
We note the intimate connection between ‘disorder’ in general and ‘nonbeing in general’ 
maintained here as they are in Bergson’s text; Deleuze goes on to link these aspects with 
an overarching theme in Bergson; the critique of negation; 
We see, therefore, how all the critical aspects of Bergsonian philosophy are part of 
a single theme: a critique of the negative of limitation, of the negative of 
opposition, of general ideas. (B p.47) 
These associations (of order and being intertwined at root) do not merely represent 
Deleuze’s gloss of Bergson’s work, however; they reappear elsewhere; 
Chaos does not exist; it is an abstraction because it is inseparable from a screen 
that makes something – something rather than nothing – emerge from it.  
(FLB p.76-7) 
‘Disorder’ is illusory, ‘nonbeing’’ is illusory, each in turn because of their common 
dependence on negation as such. It is this essential insight which furnishes the basis of 
Deleuze’s claim that entropy is a ‘transcendental illusion’. I will argue that to fully 
appreciate the significance of the issues at stake, it is important to spotlight a certain 
reading of Deleuze’s notions of temporality, a reading once again deriving from Bergson; 
time as retardation. In turn this reading leads to intriguing questions about the relationship 
of order to complexity in the Deleuzian corpus. 
 
Mechanism and Vitalism, Order and Complexity 
 
Bergson maintains a resistance to the idea of substantive disorder, based on the assertion 
that only order pertains, in two forms. What is the nature of these two forms, and how are 
they to be distinguished? In short, for Bergson, there is a ‘mechanistic’ order and a 
‘vitalistic’. Much of Creative Evolution is devoted to laying out the distinctions between the 
two.  
Mechanistic order governs the operation of inert matter. If much of what Bergson has to 
say of it echoes well-known critiques of the Newtonian clockwork universe, there is no 
accident here; Bergson firmly identifies the object of science with this type (and this type 
only) of order. This affords him a critique which is intended to demonstrate the 
shortcomings of the scientific enterprise as such; 
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[The mechanistic order] may be defined as geometry, which is its extreme limit; 
more generally, it is that kind of order that is concerned, whenever a relation of 
necessary determination is found between causes and effects. (CE p.236) 
In Bergson’s account, the tendency of human thought to encounter mechanistic order first 
and foremost is an anthropological (indeed evolutionary) one – our first relation to the 
world is pragmatic, identifying things, patterns or states of affairs which are useful and 
which may be manipulated predictably to our advantage, hence a tendency to orientate to 
a spatial order.2 Ultimately this tendency becomes hyperstasised or reified into increasingly 
sophisticated concepts and frameworks exceeding the exigencies of bodily necessity or 
want, but retaining the same essential root; it is in this sense that ‘geometry’ (or spatial 
order) is the extreme limit of this tendency. In essence, for Bergson, all that science fails to 
address in its approach to nature (and this is a great deal) is a function of its focus on the 
mechanistic order and the misplaced assumption that this form of order can and does 
furnish an exhaustive description of material action; a description that is for this reason 
incapable of transcending determinism. 
Most tellingly, and in retrospect most influentially, he maintains that a unique focus on the 
mechanistic order elides the very notion of time.3 Bergson demonstrates that this elision is 
a consequence of a certain form of scientism, which effectively rules out of court any sense 
of the open-ended nature of time; 
 What does it mean to say that the state of an artificial system depends on what it 
was at the moment immediately before? There is no instant immediately before 
any other instant; there could not be, any more than there could be one 
mathematical point touching another. The instant “immediately before” is, in 
reality, that which is connected with the present instant by the interval dt. All that 
you mean to say, therefore, is that the present state of the system is defined by 
equations into which differential coefficients enter, such as ds/dt, dv/dt, that is to 
say, at bottom, present velocities and present accelerations. You are therefore 
really speaking only of the present – a present, it is true, considered along with its 
tendency. (CE p.23) 
The scientific account, therefore, for Bergson, ruled out any genuine understanding of 
duration as becoming; 
When the mathematician calculates the future state of a system at the end of time 
t, there is nothing to prevent him from supposing that the universe vanishes from 
this moment till that, and suddenly reappears. It is the t-th moment only that 
counts – and that will be a mere instant. What will flow in the interval – that is to 
say, real time – does not count, and cannot enter into the calculation. (CE p.23) 
It is evident, then, that science is to be condemned when it subscribes to absolute time in 
the Newtonian manner; ‘All motions may be accelerated and retarded, but the true, or 
equable, progress of absolute time is liable to no change.’4  
It is well acknowledged, not least by Deleuze himself, that Deleuze’s position on the nature 
of time and duration is drawn heavily from that of Bergson.5 In short, as for Bergson, 
Deleuze subscribes to a relational account of time; the passage of time is captured in 
reciprocally determinative relations in action. Moreover, any virtue attached to the calculus 
must be insofar as it is able to encompass precisely the reciprocally determinative nature of 
systems. For Deleuze, the event has no existence outwith the exchange between virtual 
and actual, just as the rate of change indicated by the calculus has no existence outwith its 
differential terms. 
 
 
72 
 
For Bergson, this line of thought is pursued to its ultimate, cosmological implications, in a 
section entitled ‘Modern Science’. Because it is ‘of the essence’ of science to handle signs, 
it is therefore ‘tied down to the very condition of the sign, which is to denote a fixed aspect 
of reality under an arrested form.’ (CE p.347). In other words, the representations of 
science amount to a ‘virtual stop’ in the continuous passage of nature. 
To each virtual stop of the moving body T at the points of division T1, T2, T3… we 
make correspond a virtual stop of all the other mobiles at the points where they 
are passing. And when we say that a movement or any other change has occupied 
a time t, we mean by it that we have noted a number t of correspondences of this 
kind. We have therefore counted simultaneities; we have not concerned ourselves 
with the flux that goes from one to the other. The proof of this is that I can, at 
discretion, vary the rapidity of the flux of the universe in regard to a consciousness 
that is independent of it and that would perceive the variation by the quite 
qualitative feeling that it would have of it: whatever the variation had been, since 
the movement of T would participate in this variation, I should have nothing to 
change in my equations, nor in the numbers that figure in them. (CE p.356) 6 
Nor does Bergson shy away from pursuing the final ramifications; 
Let us go further. Suppose that the rapidity of the flux becomes infinite. Imagine, as 
we said in the first pages of this book, that the trajectory of the mobile T is given at 
once, and that the whole history, past, present and future, of the material universe 
is spread out instantaneously in space. The same mathematical correspondences 
will subsist between the moments of the history of the world unfolded like a fan, so 
to speak, and the divisions T1, T2, T3, … of the line which will be called, by definition, 
“the course of time.” (CE p.357) 
Thus; 
[Science] takes account neither of succession in what of it is specific nor of time in 
what is of it that is fluent. (CE p.357) 
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that this critique, associated as it is here with 
‘signs’ as merely one example of the oft-maintained objection that an unbreachable 
disparity pertains between logical entities and the physical world, whereby logical entities 
exist outwith time and cannot therefore be taken to characterise its movement. On the 
contrary, for Bergson there is a substantive mechanistic order in matter; science does truly 
treat of this aspect and is able to capture its correspondences, its translations. It is merely 
that by definition any universe in which this were the only form of order would exhaust its 
‘course of time’ instantaneously. 
The second form of order is ‘the vital’ and it is the relationship, the dynamic, between this 
form and the mechanistic that is responsible for the observed fact of duration, of the 
passage of nature. On its first introduction in Creative Evolution, Bergson characterises ‘the 
vital’ in the following fashion; 
…[I]t is with the vital that we have to do, and the whole present study strives to 
prove that the vital is in the direction of the voluntary. We may say then that this … 
kind of order is that of the vital or of the willed, in opposition to [the mechanistic], 
which is that of the inert and the automatic. (CE p.236) 
It is precisely with respect to this strand of thought, elaborated throughout the work, that 
Bergson encountered robust objection from the philosophical and scientific community; 
vitalism was seen to imply that nature itself possesses an innate form of sentience, the very 
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term ‘will’ employed to characterise the vital seemed to impart an anthropocentric 
viewpoint into this account of physical action, distinguished by orientation to final cause, 
purpose, teleology. As such, it could not be but at loggerheads with the paradigm of natural 
selection which had taken root and held sway since the time of Darwin and Huxley. For 
many, vitalism was tantamount to a form of mysticism. It is not my intention here to 
pursue the niceties of this matter of contention; Bergson does much to delimit these 
implications in Creative Evolution. The ‘willed’ character of the vital, finally, bears more 
relation to Nietzschean Will, devoid of sentience, than to any form of pan-psychism, and I 
would submit that at the very least that there is no violence done, and perhaps a great deal 
of clarity to be gained, in taking Bergson’’s ‘vital’ to signify ‘complexity’.7  
Of far greater significance to the argument at hand is the nature of the dynamic relation 
which holds according to Bergson between the two forms of order. Frequently he asserts 
that it is of the essence of the vital to introduce an ‘interruption’ into the irrevocable 
onward rush of the mechanistic order, to delay this rush through ‘hesitation’ and more 
particularly through ‘retardation’. This aspect is central to the reading to be offered here of 
‘the vital’ as ‘complexity’ and merits a number of citations from Creative Evolution. Firstly, 
‘hesitation’ is most clearly linked to consciousness and thus life as such, and appears in 
context of a discussion of the distinction between instinct and consciousness, serving as the 
distinguishing moment between the two. While unconscious actions are taken to be merely 
those wherein consciousness is nullified (as opposed to the action of a falling stone, where 
consciousness is absent), it is hesitation which serves to introduce a gap between the 
automatic action and the performance thereof. While ‘the representation of the act is held 
in check by the performance of the act itself’, consciousness resumes when the automatic 
action is interrupted; 
If we examine this point more closely, we shall find that consciousness is the light 
that plays around the zone of possible actions or potential activity which surrounds 
the action really performed by the living being. It signifies hesitation or choice.  
(CE p.152) 
We encounter this same line of argument again in the first chapter of Matter and Memory; 
Bergson likens the neuronal centre of the brain to a (now obsolete) kind of telephone 
exchange, wherein the progress of a message is interrupted by the process, conscious on 
the part of the operator, of allocating its proper channel. The essential element here is that 
the ‘automatic’ or the ‘mechanistic’ is interrupted or retarded by ‘the vital’. 8 As with 
consciousness, so with ‘life’ more generally; 
All our analyses show us, in life, an effort to remount the incline that matter 
descends. In that, they reveal to us the possibility, the necessity, even of a process 
the inverse of materiality, creative of matter by its interruption alone. (CE p.259) 
Here, as throughout Creative Evolution, the phrasing and terminology reveals a certain 
ontological primacy attached to life or the vital for Bergson; ‘life’ is identified at root with 
the interruption which retards the ‘descent’ of inert matter – moreover, this interruption 
associated with life is accorded a strikingly preconditional role in the genesis of matter 
itself. 
The life that evolves on the surface of our planet is indeed attached to matter. 
…But everything happens as if it were doing its utmost to set itself free from those 
laws. It has not the power to reverse the direction of physical changes, such as the 
principle of Carnot determines it. It does, however, behave absolutely as a force 
would behave which, left to itself, would work in the inverse direction. (CE p.259) 
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It is a descent linked explicitly to the cosmic regime of order and entropy, then, as the 
reference to Carnot reveals, and the quote below consolidates; 
Incapable of stopping the course of material changes downwards, it succeeds in 
retarding it.’ (CE p.259)  
Hesitation, interruption and retardation are part and parcel of this dual interpenetrating 
order. Nor is this notion confined to Creative Evolution and Matter and Memory; it 
reappears in Duration and Simultaneity, wherein Bergson claims, ‘[There is] a certain 
hesitation or indetermination inherent in a certain part of things’.9 We cannot help but 
note that the great Bergsonian themes revolve intimately around this nexus of terms, not 
least in that ‘hesitation’ takes its place alongside ‘indetermination’, or the possibility of the 
new in this last citation. But the notion achieves its most distilled formulation, the one 
most integral to the Bergsonian project, in an essay from 1920 entitled ‘The Possible and 
the Real’, later included in The Creative Mind; 
Some fifty years ago I was very much attracted to the philosophy of Spencer. I 
perceived one fine day that, in it, time served no purpose, did nothing. 
Nevertheless, I said to myself, time is something. Therefore it acts. What can it be 
doing? Plain common sense answered: time is what hinders everything from being 
given at once. It retards, or rather, it is retardation.10  
We are in the presence of that self-same vital principle here, ‘hindering everything from 
being given at once’, or in other words preventing the mechanistic order from 
instantaneous exhaustion of its every possibility, which would constitute the collapse of 
‘the course of time’. Correlatively, retardation is revealed in its most fundamental 
manifestation; time itself. Finally, then, this line of reasoning arrives at a paradoxical and 
counter-intuitive sense of what time or duration must be; whereas we typically associate 
the movement of time with an onward march, in Bergson this notion is reversed, precisely 
in terms of the dynamic between the two forms of order (this dynamic to be heard with our 
provisional gloss under the term ‘complexity’, to be developed) whose mutual implication 
leaves no room for substantive disorder. To be more precise, the onward march of 
mechanistic time, were it unhindered by vitalistic duration, would result in a null universe. 
Far from representing the idiosyncrasies of a particular terminology, I will maintain that this 
insight allows us to identify an important underground channel feeding paradigms of 
physical action and order across the history of philosophy and science, and in particular in 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries; a channel that brings together the thought of 
Bergson, Michel Serres, Gilles Deleuze, advocates of supersymmetry such as Steven 
Weinberg, and of the cosmology of Lee Smolin. The nexus of terms ‘hesitation’, 
‘interruption’ and ‘retardation’ alone will not serve to locate the starting point; we will 
need to take account of the link Bergson furnishes between these and ‘descent’. 
For the present, though, we should first note that Deleuze’s own philosophy of difference is 
attuned to the Bergsonian insights above. Like Bergson, Deleuze takes disorder to be 
illusory, an abstraction, chaos, he tells us, ‘does not exist’. He takes up and glosses the 
notion of retardation or hesitation in Bergsonism; 
But the fact that real space has only three dimensions, that Time is not a dimension 
of space, really means this: there is an efficacity, a positivity of time that is identical 
to a “hesitation” of things and, in this way, to creation in the world. (B p.105) 
And puts it to use in What Is Philosophy?; 
Philosophy proceeds with a plane of immanence or consistency; science with a 
plane of reference. In the case of science it is like a freeze-frame. It is a fantastic 
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slowing down, and it is by slowing down that matter, as well as the scientific 
thought able to penetrate it with propositions, is actualised. (WP p.118) 
For both thinkers, then, retardation or slowing down is inextricable from the very process 
of material becoming – for Deleuze, as for Bergson, tied to the novel, the new, and 
creation. 
But in what way does this throw light on the critique of limits? In particular, the ‘limit of 
opposition’ and the ‘limit of negation’ which Deleuze valorises in Bergson? As we shall see, 
the key here is the link which Bergson established between the ubiquity of this dual order, 
the illusion pertaining to disorder and the illusion of non-being. We are approaching the 
central Deleuzian theme of immanence. 
Bergson rejects as a badly-posed question the philosophical conundrum, ‘why is there 
something rather than nothing?’ It is based on an illusion; an illusion at once due to 
negation as such and constituting the direct corollary of the illusion of disorder; 
Thus the problem of knowledge is complicated, and perhaps made insoluble, by the 
idea that order fills a void and that its actual presence is superposed on its virtual 
absence. We go from absence to presence, from the void to the full, in virtue of the 
fundamental illusion of our understanding. (CE p.289) 
Bergson is not merely aware of the implications of the line of reasoning here; he has left no 
other route to arrive at the conception of the void other than as a negation of the given; 
this is moreover the selfsame negation by which the idea of disorder is furnished from that 
of order. Each is a different aspect of the same illusion: 
[E]xistence appears to me like a conquest over nought…In short, I cannot get rid of 
the idea that the full is an embroidery on the canvas of the void, that being is 
superimposed on nothing, and that in the idea of “nothing” there is less than that 
of “something”. (CE p.291) 
It is precisely this idea that Bergson is concerned to reverse, for in truth he maintains, the 
idea of nothingness cannot be a kind of default over which all that exists is draped. Rather, 
the default, the more basic idea is the given, from which we conjecture its negation, 
nothingness. There is a certain parsimony of thought which Bergson urges on us here; to 
opt for the idea which presumes less, which entails least, is to privilege order over disorder. 
He devotes some space to outlining the character of this illusion, invoking the thought 
experiment necessary to approach a conception of the void; ‘I am going to close my eyes, 
stop my ears, extinguish one by one the sensations that come to me from the outer world.’ 
Nevertheless, this approach, according to Bergson, is destined to undermine itself; 
When I no longer know anything of external objects, it is because I have taken 
refuge in the consciousness that I have of myself. If I abolish this inner self, its very 
abolition becomes an object for an imaginary self which now perceives as an 
external object the self that is dying away. (CE p.294) 
It is clear from the above line of reasoning that Bergson leaves no possible gap between the 
fact of existence and the fact of order. Any mere existence entails automatically the 
expression of some order, and the illusion that it may be otherwise is the by-product of our 
innate tendency to grasp the world pragmatically.11 And for Deleuze, once again, we may 
read off the persistence of these interconnected themes of order and being in the late 
work on Leibniz, The Fold; disorder does not exist because the screen brings about 
something rather than nothing. 12 
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Deleuze’s valorisation of Bergson’s resistance to negation (negation of ‘limits’, negation of 
‘opposition’) speaks of an intuition of becoming which is indissociable from an affirmation 
of order. If to limit is to negate, we find some grounds for Deleuze’s later resistance to the 
constants of nature, indeed to principles of conservation as such in What is Philosophy? 
Yet this excavation of Deleuze’s debt to Bergson raises in its turn a number of productive 
questions. 
1) Is there not some high level of caution due in response to this close association of 
being and order; after all, is it not much more customary to consider material 
nature as distinct from its organization? Whitehead, a close philosophical spirit to 
Deleuze as we have seen, nevertheless holds open at least some minimal 
distinction of this type; ‘Now the correlative of “order” is “disorder”. There can be 
no meaning in the notion of “order” unless this contrast holds. Apart from it, order 
must be a synonym for “givenness”. But order means more than “givenness”, 
though it presupposes “givenness”, and each totality of “givenness” attains its 
measure of order.’ (PR p.83). In short, can we allow that Deleuze does enough to 
warrant skipping the step from Whitehead’s ‘givenness’ to ‘order’ by way of 
‘attainment’, however inevitable and summary? In what way is this to be squared 
with Deleuze’s commitment to ‘genetic’ accounts in preference to all others? 
Ultimately, I shall suggest, it is more productive to read Deleuze in a way which 
prioritises complexity rather than any simple notion of order as such.  
2) If we are to understand Deleuze’s characterisation of entropy in terms of 
‘transcendental illusion’ as a corollary to Bergson’s refusal of substantive disorder, 
equally on the grounds of ‘illusion’, this leaves in question what is at stake in 
Deleuze’s use of the term ‘transcendental’ in this context, left underdetermined by 
the Bergsonian text. Is Bergson’s association of being with order a transcendental 
deduction or empirical induction? In light of Bergson’s suspicion of Kant’s 
philosophy, we may conclude the latter – but are we not forcibly reminded of 
Kant’s dove in section five of the A deduction in The Critique of Pure Reason, 
illustrating those for Kant who remain subject to a transcendental illusion; the 
illusion that flight remains possible outwith its conditions of possibility, that our 
wings will carry us beyond the stratosphere? Is not Bergson’s diagnosis of the 
illusion of disorder attendant on our ignorance of the conditions by which the given 
is given (that insofar as this form of order pertains, it is due to the absence of the 
other form, or if they comingle, the comingling is at once a co-exclusion?) Or by 
another reading, can it be an empirical matter? A matter of recognizing just what 
kind of order is given in the phenomena confronting us here and now? What 
bearing might these questions have on Deleuze’s scandalous synthesis of these two 
irreconcilable strains of philosophical method? Transcendental empiricism.   
To attempt an answer to these questions, to bring into focus nuances underlying the 
question of order, and to convey their pertinence to the Deleuzian concept of immanence, 
it will be useful to examine the analogy of the game. Ultimately, our focus will be on the 
Ideal Game Deleuze describes in The Logic of Sense, but this in itself is best understood 
through comparing and contrasting a number of texts in our orbit which employ their own 
game analogies.  
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The Game Analogy #1: Leibniz and Kant 
 
First, let us recall the terms in which Leibniz lays out the game of nature in ‘On the Ultimate 
Origination of Things’. Selection is cast as a decision from among possible moves. Each 
selection leaves indeterminate the possibilities for each player for the rest of the course of 
the game, and indeed the permutations of relations between the pieces as a whole, the 
possible states of the ensemble.13 Needless to say, each move is constrained by the past 
evolution of the game, whereby the relative strategic importance of each piece has 
differentiated from its mere nominal character. The pawn which blocks a knight’s 
progression is no longer merely the pawn it was at the game’s commencement, the initial 
conditions. The game is thus a branching process; successively predicating all future ranges 
of possibilities on the degrees of freedom remaining after those moves already taken have 
reduced the maximum. In medias res it is no longer a matter of free choice; the 
particularities of each move are potentially a matter of sacrifice, victory or defeat. One can 
only do the Best given the state of evolution of the game; each next move is predicated on 
those that have gone before, and a function of the last most of all. For Leibniz’ game-
playing deity, a complex state of affairs evolves from a relatively minimal set of constraints. 
Logical contradiction, the excluded middle, is the constraint Leibniz uses to illustrate God’s 
limitations, and indeed for all intents and purposes, the Best is a logical (in the sense of 
definitional) constraint, since God is unable to act counter to his own excellence, though 
Leibniz does not rule out contingent constraints on God’s action. We might add on Leibniz’ 
behalf that each piece is (or mirrors) the entire game from its own point of view. We have 
already examined the close affinities the game as Leibniz presents it bears to the notion of 
entropy and the associated principle of least action. 
 Firstly, let us mark out what is put in play by the metaphor as Leibniz presents it. There are 
on the face of it two fundamental elements in the organization of the game: the pieces, the 
stuff, the matter; then there are laws, rules, translations. On the face of it, these two 
elements enjoy ontologically distinct, albeit interdependent, forms of existence. Matter 
may be subject to the laws, may translate or transmute according to their dictates, but the 
laws themselves remain independent of such mutability. On the other hand, the laws 
themselves are effectively null, would enjoy no purchase, without the stuff on which they 
operate. As Leibniz would have it, constraint is what ‘comes from the outside’, the 
‘extramundane’; laws and matter are external one to the other. If we were to accept 
Whitehead’s assertion that ‘order’ means more than ‘givenness’, with respect to this 
reading, then we would have to stipulate that the order in question may refer only to the 
‘attainment’ inherent in the evolution of a specific game; there is unquestionably already a 
form of order implicit in the design of the game itself, in the valencies of each piece and the 
initial setup on the board, its own ‘givenness’. No less of course, does this apply to the 
valencies of matter and initial distribution, a cosmological ‘givenness’. All of which is to 
broach the issue of Platonism, and perhaps by the perils of metaphor to import into our 
paradigm of physical action the unwelcome division of nature into the timeless, ideal form 
and the individual particular (the design of the game, in which each particular game 
participates, the forms of basic matter along with the immutable laws which govern them). 
No less is it to countenance the Newtonian Paradigm, for which time flows equably and for 
which space abstractly locates matter.  
The readings of the game metaphor offered both by Michel Serres and Deleuze are 
explicitly fashioned to avoid this implication; I would argue that for both the crucial 
distinction is the degree to which Leibniz’ own principle of reciprocal determination is 
applied. 
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There is a certain impasse, a certain reduction to absurdity to which the division in principle 
between ‘law’ and ‘matter’ leads, exemplified in the work of Immanuel Kant. In both The 
Critique of Pure Reason and the introduction to The Critique of Judgement, Kant broaches a 
fundamental difficulty with respect to the very possibility of transcendental reasoning, and 
moreover the transcendental unity of apperception; 
Appearances might very well be so constituted that the understanding should not 
find them to be in accordance with the conditions of its unity. Everything might be 
in such confusion that, for instance, in the series of appearances, nothing 
presented itself which might yield a rule of synthesis and so answer to the concept 
of cause and effect.14  
This, for Kant, bears on the question of the relationship between the intuition and the 
understanding, between appearances presenting in the manifold and the a priori categories 
themselves. For, he says, even in that case where grounds for synthesis in thought were 
lacking (i.e., where the manifold lacks any structure), nevertheless, the role of intuition 
continues unfettered; ‘But since intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the functions of 
thought, appearances would none the less present objects to our intuition.’ 15 There is 
nothing, in other words, in things-in-themselves, in the noumenon, to guarantee any 
conformity between the manifold and results of synthesis. There is, on the face of it, the 
possibility that the manifold is subject to no law but that of accident, and that any 
repetition, pattern or correspondence emerging from phenomena in synthesis may carry 
none of the weight of necessity which Kant insists belongs to the causal relation proper. 
Thus, for Kant, the question is essentially, how conditions of thought can have an ‘objective 
ground’.16 His answer, which sets the transcendental apart from the empirical, is ‘affinity’. 
In short, it is not only necessary (as a condition of cognition) that we associate elements of 
the manifold, but that they be inherently associable, that they bear some prior affinity. 
Alastair Welchman remarks; 
It appears that “affinity” is Kant’s name for the capacity of the manifold to undergo 
synthesis, and be unified in a single consciousness. This capacity – that 
appearances be assoziabel – is however, not a function of any formal properties 
that might be introduced by the subject. It is not a result of synthesis, but rather a 
property of the content of the manifold…17  
He proceeds to draw out the dangerous entailment behind this thought for transcendental 
reasoning, and indeed Kant’s critical philosophy as a whole. Citing the introduction to The 
Critique of Judgement, where Kant acknowledges that ‘the manifoldness and 
heterogeneity’ of empirical laws may ultimately be so ‘infinitely great’ as to present only a 
‘raw, chaotic aggregate’, Welchman spells out the consequences; 
Kant comes to acknowledge that the arguments of the first Critique do not prove 
the necessity for any particular causal law. Every event could therefore be in 
principle deemed to have a cause, in fact necessarily to have the cause that it in 
fact has. But this is compatible with every instance of causation being the unique 
representative of its own law: that there could be as many laws as there are 
events.18 
While we cannot but recognise the paradox presented under the phrase, ‘unique 
representative of a law’ (which while not Kant’s own, plausibly translates his inference) and 
recall Aristotle’s warning over the descriptive opacity of the singular event, it is 
nevertheless just such a paradox around which the third Critique revolves. Indeed, it is the 
insistence on Kant’s part in the Critique of Pure Reason that the sole object of the 
understanding is such laws of genera, without which there would be no understanding, 
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which renders the plausibility of Welchman’s glossing formulation.19 This conjecture, of 
course, does not commit Kant to anything other than a particular conception of what might 
constitute disorder. He proceeds to identify the transcendental condition which rules out 
the substantive existence of this form of disorder; since those very conditions which are 
required to produce a coherent cognitive experience are the selfsame conditions which he 
has dubbed ‘affinity’, pertaining to the manifold itself, then the manifest experience of 
coherent cognition establishes its substantive correlate in the manifold. Welchman goes on 
to problematize the distinction Kant introduces to finesse the argument here - the 
distinction between ‘constitutive’ (and even with respect to this line of reasoning replayed 
in the third Critique, ‘regulative’) judgement and ‘reflective’ judgement – arguing that the 
distinction can only collapse through the logic of Kant’s own architectonic. 20 We might 
conclude with Westphal, nevertheless, that the positive thrust of Kant’s argument 
establishes at most the caveat that ‘if there is experience, then nature must have whatever 
regularity it takes to constitute experience’.21 Thus far, Deleuze asserts his agreement with 
Kant; there must be a prior order which allows cognition. 
Let us align the Kantian deliberations above with the analogy of the game. The speculative 
diminishment of the applicability of rules as such to the bare domain of the singular 
instance in each case amounts to a kind of atomisation of the playing board, whereby no 
‘move’ has any further potential latitude than the very ground it occupies – no ‘rule’ 
instantiated in any given phenomenon bears any meaningful collocation with the rule 
instantiated in any other singular phenomenon. As we shall see, there is a paradoxical 
adjacency to Deleuze’s own version of the game analogy here, whereby each move is 
irreducibly singular. In the Kantian schema, therefore, we seem to have encountered that 
limit case which strays closest to the Deleuzian tenet, frequently brandished against 
Kantian transcendentalism itself, that ‘the conditioned should be no bigger than what it 
conditions’. For the latter, Kant, of course, this notion of disorder is branded with a 
negative sign, while on the Deleuzian side of the fence between this abutting territory, the 
sign is wholly positive; chaos is to be affirmed. And it could be argued that the various 
engagements Deleuze undertakes with Kant consist in a series of disarticulations of this 
boundary; the status of genera, the categories, the nature of conditions, etc.  For Kant, the 
specific form of disorder envisaged here is in truth the final remnants of a powdered 
necessity, there where the minimal reduction of the antagonism between the 
transcendental and empirical methods subsists (for, as Welchman points out, Kant’s aim in 
the above line of reasoning, the rationale for positing the affinity of the manifold, is to 
establish a fatal insufficiency of Humean ‘association’, which admits no prior affinity in 
things). As such, it may be subject to the critique offered by Bergson encountered earlier 
with respect to the very prospect of conceiving disorder; a critique which is levelled against 
just such phenomenal pulverisation; ‘First we think of the physical universe as we know it, 
with the effects and causes well proportioned to each other; then, by a series of arbitrary 
decrees, we augment, diminish, suppress, so as to obtain what we call disorder.’ 22 
Moreover, we find motivating the Kantian argument a division maintained in extremis and 
expressed in its most stark form, which by implication disallows the operation of reciprocal 
determination between the two regimes of the game as set out above; the division 
between law and the manifold, necessity and material phenomena, the rule and the piece. 
For Kant, these two levels may never determine each other in kind. Even when the rules 
are powder, each a singular instance, they are rules nevertheless. 
The following two versions of the game analogy are counterposed in significant and 
illuminating ways with respect to this division. 
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The Game Analogy #2: Claude Shannon and Michel Serres 
 
Michel Serres, in the first volume of his ambitious Hermès series, La communication, 
introduces the book, and the series as a whole, with a paradigm of order intended to serve 
as a model both for physical action and all entities of any degree of structure whatever; 
mythology, biology, human knowledge included. ‘Communication’ is understood here to 
encompass much more than meaningful exchange; all phenomena ‘communicate’. As such, 
Serres construes physical action and the promulgation of ideas alike, under the extended 
analogy of the network, or ‘reseau’. Serres’ paradigm can be seen in the context, then, of 
the wave of structuralist thought which had gained ascendence in the academy by the early 
sixties, but equally may be situated within the increasing purchase of Information Theory. 
Above all, however, as so often in Serres’ work, the debt is most directly to Leibniz; the 
analogy of the network is modelled in the image of Leibniz’ game in ‘Ultimate Origination’. 
Its importance for the present argument is its broadening of the remit for reciprocal 
determination; as such it instructively throws light on the application of this principle in 
Deleuze’s own thought, and indeed his own interpretation of ‘the game’as paradigm of 
physical action. Before examining the detail of Serres’ extended analogy, we should 
recognize that the contribution of Information Theory itself motivates toward a greater 
emphasis on reciprocal determination, if not couched explicitly in those terms by its 
founders, Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver.  
Claude Shannon’s paper ‘A Mathematical Theory of Communication’ was published in 1948 
as a result of his technical work on maximising capacity for transmission over the Bell 
telephone networks; the theoretical breakthrough far exceeded its ostensible target and is 
now generally recognized to represent the single-handed creation of an entire scientific 
discipline. This discipline enjoys a breadth of application in the physical sciences, and 
indeed theoretical physics, by dint of the adoption of entropy as an index of information, 
content and capacity. It forms the basis of subsequent theoretical work such as the 
Hawking-Penrose Conjecture and Richard Tegmark’s ‘Holographic Universe’. 
As such, it is clear that ‘information’ for the purposes of this discipline connotes at a much 
more physically profound level than, say, ‘data’, just as does ‘communication’ for Serres. 
Weaver explicitly makes this clear in his ‘Introductory Note’; ‘communication’ is to 
connote, ‘the procedures by which one mechanism…affects another mechanism.’ 23 He 
notes; 
In particular, information must not be confused with meaning. In fact, two 
messages, one of which is heavily loaded with meaning and the other of which is 
pure nonsense, can be exactly equivalent from the present viewpoint, as regards 
information.24  
Shannon and Weaver partition the elements of any communication into an information 
source, a transmitter, a channel along which a signal is sent (and which is subject to 
potential interfering sources of noise), receiver and destination. A key parameter of the 
capacity of any such assemblage to convey information, and the one which renders the 
theory so amenable to incorporation in accounts of physical action, is that any significance 
derivable from information received can only be indexed in relation to the possible degrees 
of freedom available to the source, and against the degree of noise the channel may suffer. 
Theoretically, then, these aspects are closely analogous to the Hamiltonian or Lagrangian 
functions in physics, which map the degrees of freedom enjoyed by a particular system or 
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ensemble into a representative state space. Universally, any such system is subject to 
entropy, or ‘noise’. Indeed, entropy as such, and the associated mathematical formulae is 
an index of the degrees of freedom available to the system; a system of a highly entropic 
state enjoys fewer degrees of freedom than those in lower entropic states.  
An illustration of this close collusion of physical event with ‘information’ may be taken from 
the history of cosmology in the form of the classification of the ‘cepheid variable’ type of 
star; a crucial discovery in mapping out the size of the universe. Prior to this breakthrough, 
an inherent ambiguity had dogged cosmology; brighter stars may be so because they are 
close but less massive than equivalently bright stars, which in turn may be further away yet 
more massive. This obstacle represented a barrier to any realistic approximation of the size 
of the universe. Since this ambiguity pertained to all solar objects, no fixed point of 
triangulation could be established; what was required was a way of establishing mass (and 
hence distance) of some particular star or set of stars. Cepheid variables send out strengths 
of light which vary regularly between set intensities, correlated to a significantly high speed 
of rotation around their axes. Calculations showed that this characteristic could be true 
only of stars which had collapsed to a mass and size within a given narrow range; had their 
mass been greater, the collapse would have been more severe, beyond the point at which 
the regular variation of intensity was possible (in the extreme case, resulting in a black 
hole). Cepheid variables are at a threshold in the relative strength of nuclear reaction 
versus gravitational force, alternating between the collapse ensured by the latter and the 
outward resistance offered by the former; each collapse renders the mass denser, thereby 
intensifying the nuclear process long enough to expand the star back close to its initial size, 
where gravity once again can reassert itself. This expansion and contraction massively 
enhances angular momentum and creates the characteristic variable signal given off by this 
form of star. This energetic signature, or signal, served to specify mass, and thus 
disambiguate distance.25 In information-theoretical terms, then, the star is the source, 
electro-magnetic fields are the channel, and most importantly, it is the reduction of the 
degrees of freedom pertaining to the system, the star, as its capacity for outwardly 
expanding nuclear reaction subsides and becomes unable to resist the drag of gravity, 
which makes it possible to index the information it transmits against its significance. We 
determine its mass and its distance. 
Of most interest in the development of the game analogy here is the assertion regarding 
the interrelation of ‘rules’ and ‘pieces’ implied in this framework. Weaver’s introduction 
identifies three levels of salient action, associated with three sets of problems; 
Level A. How accurately can the symbols of communication be transmitted? (the 
technical problem) 
Level B. How precisely do the transmitted symbols convey the desired meaning? 
(the semantic problem) 
Level C. How effectively does the received meaning affect conduct in the desired 
way? (the effectiveness problem).26 
With respect to the analogy of the game thus far, it would be natural to associate ‘Level A’, 
the technical aspect, with ‘the rules’, while Level B and C might more naturally equate to 
‘the pieces’ – to the individual symbols. On this reading, the individual elements of Level B 
are those individuals to which the ‘rules’ of Level A apply. Level C, it may be assumed, 
belongs ‘merely’ to the cultural realm, to the level of coded human behaviour. This would 
be to oversimplify, however, for at least three reasons. Firstly, information is not to be 
confused with ‘content’ here, except in the extended sense dealing with conditions of its 
transmission (‘channel’, signal’ etc.). Secondly, what is transmitted (Symbols) may not be 
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straightforwardly identified with discrete units of meaning as such, but must also 
encompass continuously varying signals (such as those emitted by the Cepheid Variable, 
but also by television or telephone transmission). Thirdly, Weaver explicitly puts the reader 
on guard against this oversimplification; 
So stated, one would be inclined to think that Level A is a relatively superficial one, 
involving only the engineering details of good design of a communication system…. 
[But] part of the significance of the new theory comes from the fact that Levels B 
and C, above, can make use only of those signal accuracies which turn out to be 
possible at Level A.27  
In short, Weaver is claiming here that the ‘rules’ do not stand apart from the ‘pieces’. There 
is no Platonic form of order governing the essence of ‘signal’, much less ‘symbol’, but 
rather the capacity of each system to display order, to transmit meaning, is irreducibly a 
function of the individuals in which it is instantiated. More particularly, it is a matter of 
degrees of freedom pertaining to the system in question, which will vary over time (for 
example, as a star reaches the point of collapse), and between different systems 
considered; gases near equilibrium have a different, lesser capacity for the new, the 
unexpected, the signal, than do gases far from equilibrium. 
In terms of understanding the implications for interpretation of physical systems, there are 
certain significant principles here, which bear on reciprocal determination; 
1. The rules may change, develop, or in the appropriate vocabulary, the degrees of 
freedom may alter 
2. There must be sufficient repetition, a threshold so to speak, for the unexpected 
divergence therefrom to stand out, to count as signal; there must be redundancy 
3. The nature of the channel is as important as the nature of the source; nor indeed 
should the nature of the receiver be neglected – a consideration which is at its 
most starkly evident when we consider the role of recording devices in quantum 
experiment 
The rules are reciprocally determined by the state of the system and vice versa; the signal is 
not in itself significant until distinguished against the background redundancy; the source 
itself cannot be known other than by the channel through which its information 
propagates; the star which emits the signature via electromagnetic radiation will 
potentially suffer the noise of lensing as the photons make their way across the intervening 
gap to the receiver.28 At root in all these considerations lies an irreducible tenet of 
Information Theory; that information, and physical action, may be understood only in 
terms specific to the systems in which it is instantiated. Determinations are to be 
understood as singular in this respect, inextricable from a given phenomenon as a whole, 
‘rules’ and ‘pieces’ alike. The Levels which Weaver identifies are not self-contained, a 
significance which does not escape him; 
But a larger part of the significance [of the theory] comes from the fact that the 
analyses at Level A discloses that this level overlaps the other levels, more than one 
could possibly naively suspect.29  
From the very beginning of his ambitious series of books under the title Hermès, Michel 
Serres advances a model of communication which at once rallies the conceptual resources 
of Information Theory and Cybernetics and couples these to a post-Leibnizian programme 
recognizable from its scope; a mathesis universalis of networks. Unequivocally, too, he 
fashions the model under the regime of reciprocal determination, in a manner much more 
emphatic than Shannon and Weaver. 
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The influence of Information Theory is evident both explicitly and implicitly in the 
formulation of the model; Shannon and Weaver are cited, as is Norbert Wiener, who 
collaborated with Shannon in the development of his work, 30 while precursors of 
Information Theory such as Brillouin and Fechner receive acknowledgement in the second 
volume. The preface at once conjoins Serres’ programme with the founding problematic of 
Information Theory (the ideal conditions for communication), marries this with the 
Leibnizian system, and gestures toward the overarching explanatory power this marriage 
promises; he intends to demonstrate; 
… [T]he rigour of the principal Leibnizian organization: the communication of 
substances. The highest abstraction is born from the acute necessity for the best 
communication possible.’31  
The model is to accommodate not merely the nature of physical action, but the sum total 
of knowledge (Serres’ adopted shorthand is ‘l’Encyclopédie’), the interrelation of 
disciplines, the enduring power (à la Bachelard) of mythology. Serres adopts the vocabulary 
of Information Theory – the central concept, ‘réseau’, can both mean ‘channel’ and 
‘network’; problematic ‘noise’ (the loss of information through the channel) is granted its 
own volume in the series under the title L’interférence. 
What, then, are the features of the network Serres proposes, and in what ways does it 
represent a more wide-ranging deployment of the principle of reciprocal determination 
than Weaver claims for Information Theory? Once again, as with Leibniz’ analogy in 
‘Ultimate Origination’, Serres takes pains to illustrate the dynamics of his model by analogy 
to a board game. He invites us to imagine the diagram of a network, comprised of nodes 
(‘sommets’) and channels (‘chemins’), each point representing say a proposition (‘une 
thèse’) or a ‘definable element of a determined empirical ensemble.’ The channels are to 
represent the liaison between two or several elements. No point is to be considered 
inherently subordinate to any other, though each has a contingent zone of influence, just 
as the developing strategies of a game allot relative powers to pieces. 
For Serres, this model implies at once a principle of reciprocal determination and a kind of 
duality between nodes and channels; 
…[T]wo nodes may in fact share between them relations of reciprocal causality, of 
reversible influence, of equivalent action and reaction, or even simultaneous effect 
(‘action en retour’) (the feedback of the cyberneticists)’32 
 This ‘reciprocal causality’ is identified more closely with ‘reciprocal determination’ as such 
in a footnote; ‘When we say determination, we mean relation or action in general.’33 Serres 
makes clear that the model is intended to overcome the simplifications of both linear and 
dialectic reasoning in favour of the order he dubs ‘tabular’. This form of reciprocal causality 
is not in itself so distinct from the territory of Information Theory. Nevertheless it is in the 
movement from Shannon’s single channel to Serres’ network model that the potential 
explanatory reach expands exponentially; networks express complex interaction, while 
single channels invite constant recursion to linear accounts, treating non-linearity (an 
excellent case in point being feedback) as an anomaly to be tamed. As such, Serres is 
pointing forward to the nascent discipline of Chaos Theory; we may interpret the network 
model versus Shannon’s focus on the channel as the difference between systems 
considered ultimately in terms of their interconnections in contrast to those considered in 
isolation. 
Linearity has no final pre-eminent place in a network which sustains feedback, which 
escapes integration, where ‘any flux whatever’ may enjoy any speed of propagation. Nor 
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on this level of reciprocal determination does Serres fail to draw implications which place 
us once again in touch with the theme of retardation or delay; 
Let’s consider any subsystem whatever of our network: we see immediately that 
any flux whatever over one (or several) channel(s) whatever is able to go from any 
node whatever to any other (or from several to several) in any time whatever: that 
depends on the delays [retards] encountered.34  
The concept of retardation is reinforced in the footnote; 
 This notion of delay in communication is a capital notion which will be developed 
independently elsewhere.35  
The formulation is markedly close to that of Bergson; if action may be instantaneous, then 
what prevents everything from happening at once is retardation. We shall return to this 
line of reasoning in a discussion of Serres’ later work The Birth of Physics, yet in order first 
to establish the extent and nature of reciprocal determination inherent in this model, and 
to further raise salient connections with Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, let us note first 
the ‘duality’ of nodes and channels written into Serres’ account.  
Serres is specific; the reciprocal determinations of which he speaks are not confined to the 
‘pieces’ alone; 
[F]inally there exists a profound reciprocity between the nodes and the channels, 
or, if you like, a duality.36  
This duality is to be understood aspectually; 
A node can be regarded as the intersection of two or several channels (a 
proposition may be constituted as the intersection of a multiplicity of relations or a 
situational element appearing all at once from the confluence of several 
determinations); correspondingly, a channel can be regarded as a determination 
constituted by the coming into correspondence of two preconceived nodes. 37  
This profound reciprocity or duality underlying the order Serres is laying out here already 
carries strong resonances with the ‘singular’ and ‘ordinary’ points in topology and the 
differential calculus on which Deleuze places so much emphasis; what is constitutive of the 
individual (object=x) for Deleuze are the series which converge and diverge around it. 
Further, the network of the board varies globally over the course of time; its regular 
Cartesian lines denatured to ‘scalene’ form in keeping with its faithfulness to the relations 
between pieces and channels rather than mere position as such. What is more, it is apt to 
reconfigure momentarily; 
For example [when] a point or node of the network abruptly changes place (like a 
piece of relative importance – king, queen, knight, etc. – on a chess board), and the 
network ensemble transforms itself into a new network.38  
For James Williams, in gilles deleuze’s philosophy of time, this sort of instantaneous 
restructuring is the key to understanding Deleuze’s syntheses of time. When Deleuze 
claims that everything returns anew, that what returns is difference itself, we are to 
understand this in terms of the novel ways in which the event of each ‘instant’ palpably 
refigures the distribution of potential, virtual relations; the past, without changing its 
pastness, becomes what it was for this present now, in the way long-term tendencies vary, 
bringing elements to the fore which were previously of less central importance. These 
processes are subject to ever further reconfiguration as novel elements, novel instants 
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contribute to this continuous variation. Tellingly, Williams adopts the analogy of the game 
to illustrate this point; 
Deleuze is not referring to instants but to plays, to a process more like a move in a 
game. These do not take place in an instant, like the crossing of a threshold on a 
line, but rather spread through a structure and a system immediately.39  
Clearly for both, what is at stake is a form of immanence that escapes the underlying 
presupposition of a static causality which operates undeviatingly from the past to the 
future in favour of a more supple, ‘expressive’ understanding of action and temporality; a 
precondition in both cases is the radical contingency attached to events; the network at 
each instant is a new network, the event recasts everything anew; further, for Deleuze, 
there is a certain reciprocal determination of the past, present and future. Williams writes; 
 … [A] variation in intensity changes past and future relations through all series 
stretching out from the living present. For instance, when a wine creates a singular 
delight or disgust, this novel intensity carries through all the series coming together 
in the present singularity expressed on the palate of the taster.’ 40 
It should be noted, however, that while Serres embraces this notion of instantaneous 
universal reconfiguration, he does not infer from this any reciprocal determination of past, 
present and future per se. This distinction between the two will be further pursued in the 
discussion of Deleuze’s analogy of the game below, but for now I wish to mark only that for 
both thinkers, what is significant in the evolution of a given system is not that which 
registers as continuous, nor persistent, but the process of continual reconfiguration, 
continuous variation itself.41 
We are in a position to see now in what ways the respective frameworks of Deleuze and 
Serres mark a step beyond the reciprocal influence between ‘Levels’ of 
communication/action envisioned by Shannon. It is the insistence of focus on continuous 
variation itself and the dual aspect of the ‘rules’ and ‘pieces’ which so dramatically extends 
the scope of the principle of reciprocal determination. The ‘levels’ themselves disappear, 
are only aspectual. Rules determine the distribution of pieces, yet the distribution of pieces 
determine the rules; a flat ontology. 
 
Game #2.1: Michel Serres’ The Birth of Physics 
 
‘Now nothing is exterior to things themselves, a physics of immanence. The governance of 
the rudder is enough.’  
Michel Serres42 
 
We have seen what importance Serres attributes to the notion of ‘delay’ or retardation in 
physical systems; here I would like to explore the way this notion contributes to the 
principle of reciprocal determination in his work The Birth of Physics, and in turn to 
examine the contrastive ways in which this trope plays out in the development of Deleuze’s 
own philosophy of immanence.  
Michel Serres, in his work of 1977, The Birth of Physics, investigates the work of the Roman 
atomist Lucretius (Titus Lucretius Carus), De rerum natura, The Nature of Things, thought to 
have been written around the fifties of the first century BCE. Serres uses the text as a locus 
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to explore a wide-ranging account both chronologically and conceptually of the emergence 
of complexity or turbulence from the natural order. He performs a post-facto synthesis of 
the mathematical resources offered by Archimedes with the atomist model to outline a 
nascent physics ingeniously allied to a proto-calculus. In the process he valorises the power 
of Lucretius’ model to prefigure the paradigm shift in recent physics from accounts centring 
solely on carefully isolated linear systems to those which encompass the non-linear. In 
Serresian terms this represents the shift from the dynamics of the ‘solid’ to fluid dynamics, 
the flux of turbulence which figures so prevalently and strikingly in Lucretius’ imagery 
throughout, and which represents the real explicandum to which science should aspire. 
In the beginning, according to Lucretian cosmology, there was the void through which 
atoms fell in perfect parallel, an ideal laminar flow, unable to interact or combine, until the 
appearance of a minimal angle, as small as may be imagined, the clinamen, inclining the 
path of one atom from the true, leading to collision with its neighbour, and by chain 
reaction to combinations of atoms, to recombinations of unstable forms, all deviations 
from the initial equilibrial state of strict downward fall. Turbulence. Our world, initially and 
perpetually out of true. 
Serres encourages the reader to recognize in this paradigm the antagonistic relations of 
order, complexity and entropy. The maximal fall represented by the true downward path of 
each atom is the unhindered path to and from eternal equilibrium.  
It is here that parallels begin to suggest themselves with Bergson’s mechanistic order.  
By the logic of this first state in the void, Serres argues, there is no time. If time is relational, 
if it is ‘what happens’, then perfectly isolated, laminar, parallel movement or fall, is 
equivalent to no movement at all, equivalent to rest. What surrounds the body of falling 
atoms is void; there is nothing by which to calibrate the fall, and equally no evolution of the 
system internally. The world begins and is forever set in the moribund state of inactivity 
which represents maximum entropy, stasis and equilibrium instantaneously, with infinitely 
short elapse. It is only through escape from the deterministic operation of maximal fall that 
space and time may arise. This escape is in and through the clinamen, the swerve leading to 
collision. As Serres puts it, 
 All movement is thus related to stability; it takes place more or less easily. In the 
first physical model [he is referring to atoms falling through the void], this signifies 
the encounter of an element with another atom, with other atoms: these hinder 
the first in its journey to rest. Collision is nothing but a hindrance, a brake, a 
difficulty, to the precipitous rush towards the base. (BP p.47) 
Here then are two suggestive parallels to the mechanistic order and the vitalistic, to the 
entropic and the complex outlined above. Firstly, time is null in the void; the speed of the 
fall escapes all measure, is the same as absolute rest, as terminal equilibrium, since there is 
an absolute lack of relation to anything beyond the atomic ensemble. Secondly, there is in 
the world a counter-principle to that of the maximal fall, a hindrance, a brake, which is as 
much as to say a retardation. It appears with the clinamen, and is generalised, Serres 
informs us, in the form of the thalweg. The term thalweg refers to those cross-currents of 
physical interactions which everywhere and immediately deflect atoms from the pure 
downward path; Serres’ repeated example is of the tributary which joins the larger river, 
whose established bed defers arrival at the lowest point sought by the flux in obedience to 
the principle of maximal fall. Maximal fall in the world is relative always to the inclines 
offered by cross-cutting flows or turbulence, retarding from the very first. The vertical 
right-angled fall becomes an ideal thwarted by contingency, the simple rule everywhere 
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confused by complexity. And Serres does not shy away from crowning this principle of 
complexification in the same manner as had that other Lucretian scholar, Bergson; 
Time is the interruption of rest. (BP p.48) 
The term ‘rest’ here we may gloss in light of the above as that absolute speed in the void 
which escapes measure; the same speed to which Bergson’s mechanistic order is subject, 
along with the same interruption, the same hesitation. It is time itself which is at stake. 
It would be the work of a different project to follow the mappings Serres makes from this 
mythological scenario, this cosmogony, to modern physics, the alignment of Lucretius’ 
poetic register with terms such as bifurcation, metastability, self-organisation. The 
language of chaos and complexity theory allows Serres to identify the clinamen, this 
deviation from equilibrium, as present not merely at one creationary instant in the 
Lucretian first void, but here, there, in ‘uncertain times and uncertain places’, emerging 
from and accounting for the myriad of systems, stable and metastable, which constitute 
the fabric of nature; 
There is no time zero, no origin. The instant of birth is proper to each vortex, here 
and there, once, tomorrow, long ago, this is how the clinamen functions. (BP p.138) 
 Finally, there is a certain character to the model offered by Serres through Lucretius, which 
is shared in turn by the Bergsonian schema in Creative Evolution. It is to do with the 
intricate interconnection of order with disorder, or rather, since neither thinker 
acknowledges the substantive existence of disorder, of entropy and complexity. The two 
are presented together in each case; the cause of one is the cause of the other, and in the 
same way. It is a question in each case of a certain immanence. For Serres, it is the 
clinamen and the clinamen only which is at the origination of things. While maximal fall is 
the regime under which all nature operates, it is nevertheless never achieved, since it is the 
ever-present resistance (retardation) of turbulence itself, of the thalweg, which defers it. 
As Serres puts it, 
 The stream is its own dyke, the river its own wharves…Everywhere in fact, there 
are formed only temporary cessations, provisional, that defer the cessation. 
Obstacles, atoms, bodies, world, are in their turn just stabilities, but transient. The 
dynamics of force, misunderstood, introduces, by the minimal angle, collisions, 
interlacings, fabrics. It is reduced to friction. Far from being motive, it slows.  
(BP p.48) 
 This theme of retardation is not merely explicitly present in Serres’ work, then – ‘far from 
being motive, it slows.’ - but as we see it is intertwined with the very idea of the genesis of 
complexity – ‘collisions, interlacings, fabrics.’ In Bergson’s case, as noted, all action would 
exhaust itself infinitely quickly in a (putative) world in which the only form of order were 
mechanistic; space, matter, ‘arises’ through the retardation of the vital order, or 
complexity. Serres and Deleuze both thematise this tenet in their respective ways.  
A secondary underlying text (to that of Lucretius) in The Birth of Physics is one we have 
treated already; Leibniz’ ‘On the Ultimate Origination of Things’. For Leibniz, one 
discernible entity ‘falls through’ into the actual world as if through a gap opened by its 
differentiation, deviation, from another given compossible. By this light, it becomes by 
association much more clear that what is at stake for Serres is the genesis of the material 
world itself, rather than its deviation from simplicity into complexity, from atoms in the 
void to turbulence. Serres’ presentation of the argument is often explicitly orientated to 
stipulating the structural analogies between Lucretius’ paradigm and that of Leibniz: 
 
 
88 
 
‘Things,’ he says, ‘are drawn into existence along the steepest route.’ Like Lucretius’ atoms 
in the void, actualising phenomena are subject to maximal fall, or in less Lucretian terms, to 
the maximum unfolding of their potential, which may be chemical, electromagnetic, or 
indeed gravitational, given local conditions. Serres takes pains to make explicit the same 
insight regarding Lucretius’ world as does Bergson for his mechanistic order; 
Without declination, there are only the laws of destiny, that is to say, the chains of 
order. The new is born of the old, the new is just the repetition of the 
old…Repetition is redundancy. And identity is death. Everything falls to zero: the 
nullity of information, the emptiness of knowledge, non-existence. The Same is 
Non-Being. (BP p.109) 
 Once more, space, ‘Being’, ‘arises’ through a counter-principle to this ‘nullity’, the 
clinamen. Serres’ equation (‘The Same is Non-Being’) refers first and foremost to the stasis 
or equilibrium of atoms in the void, but may easily be mistaken for a quotation from 
Deleuze’s work. As we have seen, Deleuze adopts the Nietzschean line that the world, had 
it ever attained stasis, self-sameness, equilibrium, would thereby blink out of existence. We 
have also examined the difficulties this presents for any orientation to physics. Yet finally 
we might conclude (on behalf of all our thinkers, Nietzsche, Bergson, Deleuze and Serres 
alike), that it is not existence as such which is at stake with mechanistic equilibrium, but the 
Event. In Deleuzian terms the Event would indeed cease at equilibrium. The positive 
inverse, that Being is essentially the Becoming of differentiation, the difference that 
precedes identity (Serres’ ‘nullity’) is the central message of Deleuze’s philosophy of 
difference. We should not fail to note, what is more, that for Serres, just as much as for 
Deleuze, what is in play here is the idea of reciprocal determination; ‘the stream is its own 
dyke, the river its own wharves’. 
 
GAME #3.0: DELEUZE’S IDEAL GAME 
 
As does Serres, Deleuze mobilises the ancient thought of Lucretius in characterising the 
play of chance, necessity and complexity. There is an accompanying suspicion at the heart 
of each of these authors about the opposition between order and disorder, and a desire to 
cast the paradigm of physical action in terms of immanence and its close correlate, 
reciprocal determination. These themes intermingle once again in Deleuze’s own analogy 
of The Game as physical action, in ways that both differ interestingly from Serres’ account 
and remain somewhat obscure unless we bear in mind the place of Lucretius in his 
argument. 
To begin, we should note that it is by no means the case that De rerum natura has been 
read uniformly as a treatise for a world of novelty and contingency against determinism; 
indeed opinion has been historically divided between the two understandings. 43 Most 
closely to home, no less an influence on Deleuze than Bergson plainly presents Lucretius as 
a pessimistic fatalist and determinist; 
Thus on every page of the poem and in a thousand varied aspects, we rediscover 
the same idea, that of the fixity of the laws of nature. This idea, which obsesses the 
poet, saddens him; it explains his melancholy, melancholy of a completely new 
kind, and which finds in itself, so to speak, something of its own consolation. 
Unable to find in the universe anything other than forces which combine or 
compensate each other, persuaded that all that exists results naturally, inevitably 
from that which came before, Lucretius takes pity on humankind.44 
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Indeed, it is clear from Bergson’s phrasing in this commentary on De rerum natura, his first 
published work, that Lucretius will come to represent exactly that spirit which he wishes to 
reproach in science, its redundant combinatorial and mechanistic framing of the world; 
‘[E]verywhere forces which combine or compensate each other, causes and effects which 
couple mechanically…laws of nature, fateful laws, force these elements to combine and 
separate; and these combinations, these separations, are strictly and for all time 
determined,’45 A letter to William James of 1908 complains retrospectively moreover of 
being completely steeped in mechanistic theories arising from his reading of Herbert 
Spencer at this period.46 
What is it in Lucretius’ text that Deleuze finds so at odds with Bergson’s reading, and how 
does it feed into the radical contingency he places at the heart of the Ideal Game? In fact, 
as we shall see, his conclusions are more in the service of Bergsonism than otherwise. To 
draw them out requires a kind of Cortazarian hopscotch through The Logic of Sense. 
The first hop places us in the chapter ‘Tenth Series of the Ideal Game’, where Deleuze 
contrasts his conception of the ideal game to that of the more rule-orientated mundane 
games with which we are familiar; the Ideal Game is one in which both the pieces and the 
rules themselves are in constant variation. We immediately find an apparent bar to the 
interpretation of Deleuze’s Ideal Game as an analogy for physical action; this is Deleuze’s 
assertion that the Ideal Game can only be thought. The implication seems to be that his 
version is not intended to be mistaken for a paradigm for physical action; 
The ideal game of which we speak cannot be played by either God or man. It can 
only be thought as nonsense. (LoS p.71) 
This alignment with Thought is confirmed repeatedly in quick succession; 
But for precisely this reason, it is the reality of thought itself and the unconscious of 
pure thought. (LoS p.71) 
If one tries to play the game other than in thought, nothing happens; and if one 
tries to produce a result other than the work of art, nothing is produced. (LoS p.71) 
 
There is a  prima facie meaning to this assertion, with the attendant implication that ‘life’ is 
the real ‘game’ or ‘work of art’ in question; in this first sense, the analogy of the game of 
life that Deleuze is offering us here is one that adds its own connotations to a fairly 
common trope in moral philosophy and from a reverse perspective, from the theory and 
practice of art; that life is a form of poesis which is best embraced or affirmed along with its 
own contingencies, this approach positively setting the individual free from delusions of 
control which both stifle potential creativity, sweeping away habits inculcated by a 
positivist (Western) history. Equally in this sense, we are at the Nietzschean end of the 
Deleuzian spectrum, in the realm of amor fati. Art movements and individual artists have 
shown overt sympathies with and manifestly incorporated this message into their own 
practice; the Dadaists and Surrealists with respect to unruly unconscious impulses, Jackson 
Pollock and Action Painters actively sought to subtract as far as possible all but accident 
and contingency from their making. Art approaches life in relinquishing the classical verities 
of mastery over, and preconceived outcome through, the materials and technique of a 
given discipline (e.g. painting), while life may learn from art its own vital connection to the 
accident and the open. Perhaps the quintessential exemplar of the work of art suggested 
through this reading would be the performance piece by Alexander Calder in collaboration 
with Earle Brown entitled Chef d’orchestre, premiering in Paris in 1967 in which a custom-
made ‘mobile’ (the form for which Calder was famous) was to serve as an instrument for a 
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small team of percussion musicians. The rubric for the performance was that as far as 
possible the random movements of the mobile itself were to invite or suggest percussive 
acts from the players, ramifying along with the movements of the instrument themselves 
generated by those acts; the ‘score’ resembled more than anything a Mondrian rectangular 
composition whose elements recede from each other in water, having bled all colour and 
favouring no direction of reading. The players were instructed to interpret this score from 
the intuitive closeness of the instrument’s configuration to any given (diagrammatic) aspect 
thereof; they were discouraged from driving the movement of the mobile to conform to 
the score.47 
In many ways, this piece captures the essential structuration of Deleuze’s Ideal Game, in 
that no two performances would ever resemble each other or could be rerun in the same 
way, the rules themselves mutate as the piece unfolds, and contingency is allowed to 
dominate, rather than left to peek between the trammels in a note bent or a in a 
paintbrush flourished. 
Yet while this is entirely within the import of the analogy of the Ideal Game, I would argue 
that it is first and foremost an analogy of action in the physical world, prior to life-as-poesis, 
to thought. Deleuze’s caveats point us to the next hop; ‘But precisely for this reason, it is 
the reality of thought itself…’ (italics added), and later in the ‘tenth series’, ‘The Aion is the 
ideal player of the game; it is an infused and ramified chance.’ (LoS p.75). Unless we were 
to take these as rhetorical flourishes, rather than statements intended to elaborate the 
characteristics of this paradoxical game, it becomes rather more difficult to locate the 
game as such within the finitude of thought or the work of art, even in the most allusive 
reading, for the Aion is a form of time indifferent to the costless permutations of the 
imagination. The key is in the connection of this tenth series with the appendix entitled 
‘The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy’, a connection with Lucretius’ text and the nature 
of time and contingency therein.  
Aligned, then, to the virtual time of the Aion, which it is so much the work of The Logic of 
Sense to establish as the time of the event, this ‘thought’ of the Game is more than it 
seems. In fact, as we shall see, it is to be read more in the vein of a ‘thinking God’, much as 
elsewhere we encounter a ‘reading God’ (The Fold), or a ‘calculating God’ (Difference and 
Repetition) and that, as in these cases, what we are being offered is (also) a figure of 
physical action. What is at stake both in the appendix and in discussion of the time of Aion 
is the infinite divisibility of time, which serves to explain the immunity of the Event from 
actualisation in states of affairs; the event, by dint of this infinite divisibility is always either 
just about to arrive or just having taken place. 
What are the features then, which distinguish this game, and how do they tie in to the 
appendix on Lucretius? Deleuze sets out four descriptors which serve to distinguish his 
concept from our usual notion of games, of which the first two are relatively brief; 
1) There are no pre-existing rules, each move invents its own rules; it bears upon its 
own rule. 
2) Far from dividing and apportioning chance in a really distinct number of throws, 
all throws affirm chance and endlessly ramify it in each throw. (LoS p.59) 
Here we might note both the shape of the Nietzschean will to power, the dice-throw with 
its power of constant creation, and a concomitant distinction between the ‘chance’ of the 
Game and more domesticated forms of probability. The phrasing (‘apportioning chance in a 
really distinct number of throws’) suggests Deleuze has in mind the classic Bayesian 
formalisation of probability, which proceeds by enumerating the entire range of outcomes, 
each of which with a salient weighting; in the case where each outcome is equally likely 
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(say, fair dice), the probability of each is represented by the fraction in which the 
numerator is unity (1), and the denominator the number of possible outcomes (in the case 
of fair dice, 1
6
 ). This being the case, it is clear that one important feature of the chance that 
Deleuze is valorising here (against Bayesian formalisation) is that it may not be subsumed 
under unity, since the mutating rules of the Ideal Game refuse a determinable, identifiable 
range of outcomes; check-mate for instance may be achieved only by adhering to pre-
existing stipulations, yet the ideal game is explicitly open-ended in terms of outcome. 
Construed in terms of physical causality or expression, in the site of the Ideal Game, the 
cosmos, events are not totalisable, the world is ‘open’, though this is in another sense than 
the one typically adopted in the register of thermodynamics, where an ‘open’ system is one 
through which external sources of energy are free to flow.48 We might also interpret ‘each 
move invents its own rules; it bears upon its own rule’ as foregrounding one aspect of 
stochastic probability. Stochastic probability, applied to series, is often characterised as 
‘non-repeating’; this form of chance is assignable in the case that the series involved is 
sensitive from one ordinal place n to the next, n + 1, to the content of what has gone 
before (e.g., the previous choice of ball from a lottery draw will remove that value from 
subsequent selection, though this is a particularly straightforward example); each selection 
‘bears upon’ the previous history of the series. Nevertheless, Deleuze’s phrasing suggests a 
singular form of stochastic chance for this singular game; each move invents its own rules; 
it bears upon its own rule, rather than merely the content of the series. In this sense, the 
Ideal Game represents a kind of chance that is definitively non-repeating, positively in 
constant variation. Far from undermining the second principle in Deleuze’s philosophy of 
difference, repetition, we are presented here with a model of that which conforms neatly 
to and illuminates his insistence that that which repeats, repeats as difference. 
The third and fourth rules are lengthy, but of most interest here is the presence in both of 
the idea of a minimum division of time; rule 3 asserts; 
Each throw is itself a series, but in a time much smaller than the minimum of 
continuous, thinkable time; and to this serial minimum, a distribution of 
singularities corresponds. (LoS p.70) 
While rule 4 elucidates on the relation of ‘thought’ to this minimum division; 
Each thought forms a series in a time which is smaller than the minimum of 
consciously thinkable continuous time. (LoS p.71) 
In context of this argument, then, the contrast of the Ideal Game to more familiar versions 
serves to contrast the linear time of Chronos, associated with those more familiar games, 
to the non-linear form of Aion, in which all remains constantly yet to be or just having 
occurred by dint of the infinite divisibility of time; ‘let us understand that each event in the 
Aion is smaller than the smallest subdivision of Chronos’ (LoS p.74). 
It is this relation between the time of thought and the time of the event, and the relation of 
these time-signatures to chance which is also in play in the appendix with respect to the 
Lucretian text. The task announced in this appendix is (once again) the ‘overturning of 
Platonism’, for which the Lucretian simulacrum is recruited as a figure of absolute 
contingency, with respect to specific features of the clinamen. For Lucretius, the swerve of 
the clinamen occurs in an ‘unassignable’ time, more swiftly than the speed of thought 
(intervallo minimo). The chance occurrence of the clinamen, then, is unassignable (Deleuze 
insists on ‘unassignable’ for the Latin incertus, rather than ‘undetermined’) due to its speed 
relative to the cognitive and perceptual faculties; the event is transcendental, the 
contingencies of the physical world noumenal in this sense. This in its turn accounts at this 
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level for both the non-totalisable nature of the Ideal Game and the distinction between 
‘domestic’ chance (Bayesian) and the radical contingency belonging to the clinamen; 
The clinamen manifests neither contingency nor indetermination. It manifests 
something entirely different, the lex atomi, that is, the irreducible plurality of 
cause, or of causal series, and the impossibility of bringing causes together in a 
whole. (LoS p.307) 
And here we may join the strands bearing on the Ideal Game together, serving to clarify the 
implicit role of the transcendental in the above; 
The atom is that which must be thought and which cannot be thought. (LoS p.305) 
The formulation here, that which must and yet cannot be thought, is fashioned to refer to 
the transcendental condition; Deleuze adopts it as a kind of shorthand for the orientation 
of thought to the transcendental; this shorthand formulation is especially prevalent in his 
book on Bacon, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. 49 If the Ideal Game exists only in 
thought, far from consigning its status to the realms of the imagination or ‘mere’ cognition, 
it is a matter of the relative speed of thought and atomic-scale action; a transcendental 
barrier to thought which, nevertheless, claims Deleuze, places the physical action and the 
thought on the same continuum, due to the infinite divisibility of thought (time) and 
percept (space); 
The Epicurean method is a method of passage or transition: guided by an analogy, 
and, as the sensible is composed and decomposed, we go from the sensible to the 
thought and from the thought to the sensible by means of transitions. We go from 
the noetic to the sensible analogue, and conversely, through a series of steps 
conceived and established according to a process of exhaustion. (LoS p.305) 
Here, ‘exhaustion’ is a reference to that Greek geometric precursor to the ‘sum toward a 
limit’ of calculus, entailing infinite divisibility. Given the above, Deleuze’s line of reasoning 
represents a dense act of synthesis between the thought of the Stoics, Kant, Lucretius, and 
moreover allows us to see that this reading of De rerum natura, far from distancing his 
position from Bergson, re-inscribes an essentially Bergsonian insight, acknowledged in his 
Bergson monograph; ‘What in fact is a sensation? It is the operation of contracting trillions 
of vibrations onto a receptive surface. Quality emerges from this, quality that is nothing 
other than contracted quantity.’ (B p.74). The language is a direct echo of Bergson’s 
phrasing in Creative Evolution.50 At this point we can return with fresh perspective to the 
nature of the game as ‘thought’ and ‘work of art’, to recognize that what is essentially at 
stake is the multiple time signatures of the world which for Bergson serve to disabuse the 
philosopher of a simple notion of simultaneous co-existence, to recognize that all the 
immediate givens are in fact always already synthetic contractions of the relative speeds of 
the material world, apprehensible not so much through percept but through intuition. 
Deleuze glosses as follows; 
Intuition is not duration itself. Intuition is rather the movement by which we make 
use of our own duration to affirm and immediately recognize the existence of other 
durations, above or below us. (B p.33) 
It is precisely the mismatch between the minimum interval of thought and the minimum 
interval of physical action which serves to place Lucretius in contact with Deleuze’s 
Bergson. Consequently for both there is no sense in which our action in the world may be 
adequate to the present circumstances, no sense that our purpose, intention or goal may 
have any bite in the temporal regimes of the subatomic; for this we would have to be 
Maxwell’s demon. Nor is the point any less salient on the scale of geological tectonic 
 
 
93 
 
movement. Yet if there is any true co-existence, it is the co-existence of these timescales as 
such. The contingencies of the world are ‘above and below’ us at once, just about to 
happen and having already happened. It is for this reason that Deleuze is motivated to 
describe the domestic versions of games as ‘partial’, in that ‘they retain chance only at 
certain points, leaving the remainder to the mechanical development of consequences or 
to skill, understood as the art of causality.’ In contrast, the Ideal Game lacks any such 
external punctuation to the expression of chance; how could our own action be anything 
other than a game or result in anything other than a work of art, when the conditions to 
which we are responding are both behind us and yet to happen in the time of the event? 
Just as the player in the middle of a game of chess, just as the artist intuitively divining the 
direction of the work in progress, we are obliged to intuit the long-term tendencies 
beneath each particular stochastic branching, and in the Ideal Game this obligation remains 
without distribution into punctuated occasions (our ‘turn’), without juncture at which the 
operation of chance freezes before the next cast of the dice, the next taking up of the 
brush; it remains an absolute condition of process itself, unslowed down, unretarded. In 
our relation to the physical action of the world, we are in the position of Calder’s musicians, 
able only to intervene in chance, to respond to those intuited (and transcendentally 
empirical) convergences of the contingent conditions with the schema before us, to wait 
until the mobile configures in a way that offers correspondence to our own unfolding; 
finally, rather, it is only in being stretched in tension, folded between these multiple 
durations that our own subjectivity, our own opportunity for intervention emerges. The 
pre-eminent character of the event for Deleuze is a reciprocal determination, a resonance 
between co-existent time-signatures. From this perspective, we can see more clearly the 
problems in identifying the Deleuzian event with the bifurcations of Chaos Theory; it 
cannot help but be continuous, since the tension between time-signatures never once 
ceases. A full account of the reciprocal influence of past, present and future would require 
a fulsome treatment of the three syntheses of time in Difference and Repetition, but this 
would occupy more space than we have.51 In the next chapter, we shall rather pursue 
further the implications of the principles of retardation and delay with respect to the idea 
of complexity, but it remains first to revisit the opening problematic of this chapter.  
 The contrastive strategy of the argument presented here brings into perspective some 
interrelated conclusions. Deleuze’s Ideal Game, his assertion of a certain radical 
contingency, can be differentiated from the (for Kant) dizzying prospect of a world of 
singular instances, of rules or laws for which each slightest event is the sole instantiation; 
the game board of Deleuze’s world rather consists in constant variation, each move bears 
upon its own rule; just as with Serres’ networks, the novelty of the world as a whole 
consists in the immediate recasting, redistribution of its singularities attendant on each 
move; the network is a new network, the game a new game, but with a consistency 
borrowed from the passage of nature. In short it is variation which lends consistency. This 
is one way to understand the seemingly paradoxical assertion that each throw of the dice 
both bears on its own outcome and the whole of chance at once. And it is only through 
acknowledging the operations of reciprocal determination that we can appreciate this 
character of physical action. Bearing in mind that Kant presented his singular 
instance/singular rule scenario in the end to refute it (and that Deleuze explicitly embraces 
Kant’s reasoning on this point, if not with respect to ‘affinity of the manifold’ as such, at 
least we could say in the name of ‘consistency in the chaosmos’), it is worth reflecting how 
the strategies played out here bear upon speculative discourse in the field of cosmology. It 
is not uncommon for physicists considering frameworks of physical law to conjecture on 
counterfactual universes; those in which the observed regularities of this universe are ‘run’ 
with slightly altered values, say altered atomic weights (e.g., the proton-electron mass 
ratio) or relative strengths of forces. The object of the exercise is of course to explore the 
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potential for such universes to evolve, and to consider in what way these salient 
differences may affect that evolution, thereby hopefully illuminating the character of our 
own physical law. In this respect, Kant’s singular instance/singular rule scenario may be 
seen as a kind of limit case of this speculative thinking, for not all scenarios turn out to 
promise the longevity and robustness of this our observed cosmos. Quite the reverse; the 
apparent fragility under change of the set of physical values pertaining to this universe is a 
feature routinely commented upon; the given specific values of constitutive elements of 
our world are often demonstrated to serve as a precondition for any possibility of evolution 
towards order; speculative variation of the relative strength of gravity offers upper and 
lower thresholds beyond which nucleosynthesis (the formation of elements in energetic 
solar processes) proves impossible, since either gases remain too dissolute to coalesce into 
stars at weaker assigned values for gravity, or for stronger, the Big Bang fails to impart 
momentum enough to prevent a kind of stillborn recollapse into a Big Crunch. This is a well 
established narrative in cosmology, which is referred to formally as the ‘fine tuning’ or 
‘Goldilocks’ problem (‘not too hot and not too cold’).52 From this perspective, there are 
intriguing parallels between Kant’s singular event/singular law scenario and the welter of 
minimally viable worlds countenanced by the cosmologists’ counterfactual worlds 
scenarios; among them, in principle, there must be an overwhelming number whose 
overall calibrations allow for no more than a singular event. Nor is this ‘in principle’ a 
wholly unwarranted imputation; one quantum rationale for the Big Bang countenances a 
pre-Bang scenario in which the energy inherent in vacuum gives rise, at uncertain times, in 
uncertain places, to random, fleeting conversions of the energy to mass and instantaneous 
reconversion to energy; this is the so-called ‘quantum foam’. It is only, so the argument 
goes, under certain precipitating conditions that this conversion assumes, by a kind of 
massive chain reaction, the overwhelming creative power of the Big Bang; for the most 
part, the emergence of matter would remain vanishingly fleeting, a singular event, a proto-
universe. Equally, String Theory has become notorious for the sheer profligacy of its 
mathematically ‘allowable’ worlds, running in some estimates to the astonishingly large 
number of 10500, with a corresponding range of ‘viability’. Finally, for the terms of this 
argument, it may plausibly make no substantive difference that Kant’s scenario is intended 
to represent a manifold, a kind of all-at-onceness of the disparate singular events, in 
apparent contrast to the stillborn speculative proto-universes of physics; in the absence of 
‘affinity’, there is definitive causal disconnect among the events of this world. In a sense 
which conjoins both with the Leibnizian relational understanding of space and time 
pursued here, and with its relativistic, even quantum descendants, Kant’s chaotic manifold 
would strictly speaking represent as many disparate universes, lacking even any 
topologically derivable metric furnished by Riemannian mathematics. In this sense, there 
could be no real meaning to the ‘all-at-onceness’ of such an entity, the manifold, nor 
indeed any meaningful way in which the singular events could be said to occupy the same 
location or space. Many physicists are willing to countenance ‘causal disconnect’ as a 
sufficient condition for separate universes, including in some cases those regions of our 
own cosmos which are merely beyond the light cone of our own region (these will be 
causally disconnected in a relativistic framework by the constant of the speed of light, c, 
which rules out in principle any physical influence between regions further away from each 
other in distance than could be traversed by light in the time since the beginning of the 
universe; as such it is considered plausible that their evolution may have proceeded in a 
way that need not resemble ours). Martin Rees, an advocate of the ‘multiverse’ is one such; 
‘From a reluctance to deny that galaxies with redshift 10 are proper objects of scientific 
enquiry, you are led towards taking quite seriously quite separate spacetimes, perhaps 
governed by quite different laws.’53 These considerations hopefully serve to throw into 
stark relief the ramifications of the different orientations of Kant and Deleuze with respect 
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to chaos. For Kant, chaos is there at the end of a road of subtraction, of increasingly 
pulverised necessity, there where no repetition is possible in principle, for there are no 
laws to govern it. The way out is deduced from within our own finitude; to the extent that 
our own cognition is coherent enough to detect pattern, we must be the product of 
conditions that allow for such coherence, there must be affinity among phenomena. For 
Deleuze, it is not law which serves to explain repetition, but repetition which serves to 
constitute law. Each move bears upon its own rule. We can now return to shed light on the 
problematic raised at the start of this chapter; what status to apply to the 
Bergsonian/Deleuzian disavowal of disorder, transcendental or empirical? And how, if at 
all, may this problematic be orientated to any possible scientific project? Consider the 
epistemological position of a theorist proposing a mechanism for the genesis of the 
universe. It has never once been lost on the scientific community that any such model 
cannot in any straightforward sense be tested empirically. Even should our ability to 
examine the earliest states extend (unexpectedly) beyond certain formidable barriers, 
allowing us to ‘witness’, say, a quantum fluctuation followed by a Big Bang, there is no 
empirical purchase on such a singular event.54 For that we need to observe the creation of 
more than one universe. If we proceed on the assumption that everything (even the Big 
Bang) is subject to law, we are irredeemably in the position of attempting to identify which 
among the laws we impute to our own universe could serve as the condition for any 
possible universe. If we think rather in terms of conditions, the transcendental point of 
view, both in the case of Kant and Deleuze, reminds us that the condition may not 
resemble in the slightest that which it conditions. The point of contention rests further on, 
in the formulation arising from the Ideal Game; for Deleuze, we should not seek the laws, 
the necessities which labour invisibly beneath the phenomena, but the repetitions which 
serve to constitute the law (and work to undo it). And what is that but to experience, to 
observe, to follow the traces of the folding and unfolding processes around us? In this 
sense, the transcendental and the empirical are intertwined for the philosophy of 
difference. And so much could be said for the cosmologist, who is just as surely conscious 
that assertions about the state of the universe are accompanied without exception by 
questions about conditions for the multiverse. Deleuze’s chaosmos serves not so much to 
render these questions perennial, here and now, but to foreground that it was ever thus.  
1 Serres, M., Genesis, tr.s G. James and J. Nielson (US: Michigan University Press, 1995), p.109. 
2 The similarities between Bergson’s thought here and those of Heidegger are worth noting. 
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experienced dynamically in terms of its usefulness for us, and which equally serves to shape those 
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he valorises the calculus, the argument remains in the service of an essentially Bergsonian duration. 
The examples Bergson offers in Creative Evolution are marked with the signature of the time elapse 
in the calculus, dt. In util ising this notation Bergson aligns it with all  other mathematical abstractions 
whose usefulness he unequivocally delimits. Simon Duffy argues convincingly, however, that 
Deleuze’s extended engagements with the calculus are motivated by a will  to identify those 
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Bloomsbury, 2013), pp.89-115. 
6 Bergson, the author of Duration and Simultaneity, is well  aware that ‘simultaneity’ here is a word 
that in post-Einsteinian physics may pertain only to a given local system whose elements are moving 
at the same speed in the same direction, or whose acceleration is uniform. The apprehension of any 
two events perceived from a distance as simultaneous is precisely relative. There is every sense, 
however, in which the Bergsonian critique is levelled quite as much against relativistic frameworks 
as Newtonian; indeed, Duration and Simultaneity was written to that end, though with mixed 
success. The specific assertion that scientistic time elides duration is not only applicable within the 
scope of wider relativistic frameworks, it is positively reinforced by Einstein’s own understanding of 
spacetime as a ‘block’, wherein the passage of time is effectively an i l lusion, having ‘already’ run its 
entire course (See Bergson, H., Duration and Simultaneity: Bergson and the Einsteinian Universe, ed. 
R. Durie (UK: Clinamen Press, 1999) and for a discussion of the ‘block universe’ view, Yourgrau, P., A 
World Without Time: The Forgotten Legacy of Gödel and Einstein (UK: Penguin, 2007). 
7 ‘Life’, the paradigm of the vital for Bergson, is unequivocally soldered to the notion of ‘complexity’ 
in the natural sciences with the arrival in the late twentieth century of the scientific movement going 
under that name – see for instance the work of Stuart Kauffman, Stephen Jay Gould, Brian Goodwin 
et al. 
8 Bergson, H., Matter and Memory, tr.s N.M. Paul and W.S. Palmer (US: Zone Books, 2002), p.30. 
9 Bergson, H., Duration and Simultaneity (UK: Clinamen Press, 1999), p.44. 
10 Bergson, H., Henri Bergson: Key Writings, ed.s K.A. Pearson and J. Mullarkey (UK: Continuum, 
2002), p.224.   
11 Levinas, whose work rested centrally on the encounter with ‘nothingness’, in a manner avowedly 
akin but not identical to Heidegger’s ‘anxiety’, from Time and the Other onward, remained troubled 
by Bergson’s l ine of argument here – he recurs to it both in that work and many years later in a 
series of interviews with Phil ippe Nemo spanning his career; collected as Ethics and Infinity. Levinas, 
E., Time and the Other, tr. R.A. Cohen (US: Dusquesne UP, 1987), p.46. Levinas, E., Ethics and Infinity: 
Conversations with Philippe Nemo, tr. R.A. Cohen (US: Duquesne UP, 1985), p.25.   
12 The topic here, while framed by Leibnizian thought, is Plato’s Timaeus, and while the denial of 
chaos seems to contradict the Deleuze of a Nietzschean stamp, who insists that ‘chaos must be 
affirmed’, it is nevertheless evident in context that it is precisely unaffirmed chaos which Deleuze 
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of the range of interdependent physical values amenable to the evolution of such a universe as ours, 
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Chapter Four: Order as Complexity 
 
There are a number of points in Difference and Repetition which serve to confirm that 
Deleuze is working with the notion of retardation in its fully Bergsonian sense. It is 
referenced in allusive fashion, for instance, in a discussion of what he calls ‘centres of 
envelopment’; a term referring to those systems or sets of systems which reach a threshold 
or a coupling which serves to sustain a relatively enduring meta/stability. He highlights a 
dual aspect of such processes; 
At the moment when they are explicated in a system (once and for all) the 
differential, intensive or individuating factors testify to their persistence in 
implication, and to eternal return as the truth of that implication. Mute witnesses 
to degradation and death, the centres of envelopment are also the dark precursors 
of eternal return. (DR p.256) 
Set, as it is, closely following a discussion of entropy, this dual aspect of ‘degradation’ and 
‘dark precursor’ corresponds in detail to Bergson’s distinction between entropic, 
mechanistic order and the open, vital order, entwined as tendencies within or between any 
given system(s). Death (equilibrium) as mechanistic condition is always immediate, a 
collapse, ‘once and for all’, yet forever deferred, retarded by the persistence of 
‘implication’, the continuous intertwining of series. 
Paradoxically, it is precisely this most Bergsonian duality which provides Deleuze once 
again with the impetus by which he departs from Bergson’s text, folding as it were, Bergson 
back against himself. In the insistence on the ontological priority of ‘intensive’ over 
‘qualitative’ relations, Deleuze pronounces the Bergsonian critique of intensity 
‘unconvincing’. 
Deleuze’s departure from the Bergsonian schema is part and parcel of his motivation to 
provide a genetic account of becoming which evades any residue of hylomorphism, of form 
or essence imposed on an inert material substrate. As Deleuze makes clear, for him it is not 
enough that Bergson’s ‘differences in kind’, or ‘qualitative differences’ are contrasted to 
‘quantitative differences’, in the terms through which Bergson presents this contrast. For 
Bergson, qualitative differences cannot augment or develop without changing in nature, 
while quantitative differences remain in static relation to each other. Bergsonian ‘quality’ 
nevertheless retains too much of the flavour of essentialism to furnish the basis for 
continuous variation which Deleuze would locate as the root of all change. 
Let us take seriously the famous question: is there a difference in kind or a 
difference of degree, between differences of kind and differences of degree? 
Neither. Difference is a matter of degree only within the extensity in which it is 
explicated: it is a matter of kind only with regard to the quality which covers it 
within that extensity. Between the two are all the degrees of difference – beneath 
the two lies the entire nature of difference – in other words, the intensive.  
(DR p.239) 
It is only in the process of explication, then, that quality is expressed. For Deleuze, it is this 
very expression which cancels out the operation of the intensive, masking under its own 
movement the more profound movement of intensity. Thus qualities may be perceived in 
extension, but intensities remain transcendental. And Deleuze is fully aware that these 
paired terms, difference of degree and difference in kind, are synonymous for Bergson 
respectively with mechanism and the vital, and quantity and quality. All these 
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correspondences are at stake; he is effectively claiming that these differences, so important 
for Bergson, are epiphenomenal on the underlying intensity which produces them all, but 
only on condition of cancelling itself out in explication. There are two striking aspects of 
this departure from Bergson which should be noted, however. 
The first is that the terms in which Deleuze performs this breach bear the very same 
rationale set out by Bergson himself, serving to relocate the analysis as a whole at a level of 
differential process below that of quality, rather than to disturb the philosophical 
machinery as such; 
…[I]n the passage from one quality to another, even where there is a maximum of 
resemblance or continuity, there are phenomena of delay [‘décalage’, ‘time-lag’] 
and plateau, shocks of difference, distances, a whole play of conjunctions and 
disjunctions, a whole depth which forms a graduated scale rather than a properly 
qualitative duration. Finally, if intensity were not there to attend to, support and 
relay quality, what would the duration attributed to quality be but a race to the 
grave, what time would it have other than the time necessary for the annihilation 
of difference in the corresponding extensity, or the time necessary for the 
uniformisation of qualities themselves? (DR p.238) 
This passage in effect re-allocates the function of retardation to intensity rather than to 
quality, or difference in kind. It is intensity which resists the entropic ‘race to the grave’ of 
Bergsonian mechanistic order, intensity which retards, rather than, as Bergson would have 
it, the vital. This shift is significant, indeed, for our present line of reasoning decisive. As we 
shall see, it goes hand in hand with questions of ‘locality’ and ‘non-locality’ in post-
relativistic physics. 
The second striking aspect of this departure from Bergson, especially from this, the most 
astute of his commentators, is that it may plausibly be said to carry force only by dint of a 
blind spot in Deleuze’s reading here. A blind spot the more notable since lacking elsewhere. 
Deleuze’s stated object of attack is Bergson’s critique of intensity. This is almost certainly a 
reference to the first chapter of Time and Free Will, in a reflection on the work of what 
Bergson calls the ‘psychophysicists’, among whom the chief target is Fechner. Bergson 
takes issue with intensity in the sense that Fechner’s work entails the idea of magnitudes of 
intensity, as the basis for analysing changes in affect and percept. Bergson counterposes his 
notion of quality as free of this quantitative approach. As Christian Kerslake points out in 
Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy, it can be argued that the root of Bergson’s 
argument here is entirely a resistance to the use of the term ‘magnitude’ understood by 
analogy to extensive/quantitative relations. The oxymoron ‘intensive quantity’ conveys 
precisely the mistake in misrecognising one form of order (the qualitative/vital) for another 
(the quantitative/mechanistic) which he will lay at the feet of scientific method in Creative 
Evolution. It is a contradiction in terms, and hence, as Kerslake has it, Bergson ‘is in effect 
using the notion of an intensive relation to argue against what he calls ‘intensity’.’ 1  
Deleuze’s blindspot here has something of a wilful character, then, when we recognize that 
elsewhere he fully appreciates Bergson’s allusions to intensive processes, and indeed their 
underwriting of qualitative phenomena; he cites Bergson on the dependence of the 
perception of qualities on ‘trillions of vibrations’, for instance, in Bergsonism.2  
This marking of the hermeneutic scorecard points beyond simple scholarly monomania, 
however, since it serves to foreground the real site of contention for Deleuze’s departure 
from Bergson. It is not, as professed, the relative priority of ‘intensity’ over ‘quality’; the 
real schism lies elsewhere, and moreover marks a significant future line of travel for 
Deleuze. There is indeed a deep subterranean shift taking place, which we might now see 
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rather as a Deleuzian commitment to implications from within the Bergsonian schema 
which Bergson himself did not fully countenance. If, as Deleuze insists, differences in kind 
(quality) and differences in quantity (extensity) are both produced by the movement and 
explication of intensity, what place does this leave for the mechanistic order tout court? 
We have seen that Deleuze displaces the retardative function to the level of intensity 
(‘phenomena of delay and plateau’). This is certainly the first import of the assertion here, 
but a closer reading reveals more. Where Bergson held mechanism culpable for entropic 
degradation, this charge is broadened out by Deleuze’s twist, in a kind of reciprocal default, 
to include Bergson’s ‘quality’. And in effect, this renders the mechanistic and vital orders 
equivalent in this explanatory framework. Both are harbingers of the grave. And, according 
to the dual correspondence we have been upholding between the vital as complexity and 
the mechanistic as entropy, we must expect any subsequent development in Deleuze’s 
thought to reflect this foreshortening. We should be alert to the recalibrations in the 
relations between complexity and entropy. To follow this thread first entails a discussion of 
the second term at stake here; Delay. Some care must be taken to distinguish between the 
concept of ‘retardation’, with its Bergsonian particularities, and the concept of ‘delay’. Both 
of these concepts recur in Deleuze’s writing, though he does not go so far as to topicalise 
either term as such, not conferring on either the weight of a technical term within his own 
philosophy of difference. 
Jay Lampert, whose work has astutely foregrounded the concept of ‘delay’ in philosophy, 
tracing the thematic issue from the Greeks through Husserl, not least highlighting its 
importance in understanding the Deleuzian event, draws our attention to a passage in 
Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature. It so closely resembles the Bergsonian analysis of 
mechanism as to offer the neatest possible parsing between retardation and delay; 
Now if any cause may be perfectly co-temporary with its effect, ‘tis certain…that 
they must all of them be so... The consequence of this wou’d be no less than the 
destruction of that succession of causes, which we observe in the world; and 
indeed, the utter annihilation of time. For if one cause were co-temporary with its 
effect, and this effect with its effect, and so on, ‘tis plain there wou’d be no such 
thing as succession, and all objects must be co-existent.3 
Lampert glosses the implications on Hume’s behalf; ‘One might almost say that a delay is 
one of the causes in the causal series.’ 4 And so much is true too for Bergsonian retardation 
we would conclude. Yet in absence of the counter-principle of ‘life’, ‘complexity’ to account 
for this character of physical action, we might reserve the term ‘retardation’ for the latter 
sense. This serves as an initial distinction. Though the two concepts ‘retardation’ and 
‘delay’ seem to be motivated by the same intuition, yet the explanatory corollaries may be 
very different indeed, allowing us to parse the two moments of this thought as it develops 
in Deleuze’s work.  
Lampert’s treatment characterises the term delay far more thoroughly than this initial 
default distinction. He develops the concept in counterpoint to the (often fraught in both 
science and philosophy) concept of simultaneity; 
In its simplest form, simultaneity consists of two or more events at one time, and 
delay consists of one event at two or more times. By varying the formal relations 
between the unity and multiplicity of events, and the unity and multiplicity of time, 
we might deduce forms of simultaneity and delay5 
He systematically parses the possible formal relations in the concluding chapter of 
Simultaneity and Delay, furnishing eight possible combinations in all, from ‘one event in 
one time’ to the disjunctive relation ‘one or two events in one or two times’. With respect 
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to what is most germane to the philosophy of Deleuze, Lampert emphasizes the 
simultaneous co-existence of his three syntheses of present, past and future. This 
simultaneity is of course more than the common-sense conception of states-of-affairs 
occurring at a punctum – Lampert treats in detail the numerous sources in philosophy and 
contemporary science which problematize this picture; the co-existence of the three 
syntheses, he claims, serves to make explicit what is already implicit in Bergson, that 
simultaneity does not serve to halt the flow of time; ‘it is precisely,’ he says, ‘simultaneity 
that constitutes flow.’ In other words, simultaneity is best conceived as a syncopated 
oscillation between multiple time-signatures, which may operate over significant, 
potentially infinite distances of Chronic, linear time. Lampert emphasizes that this is due, 
for Deleuze, to a ‘model of delayed reaction’, so to speak, a theory of delay. He is referring 
here to the nature of the Deleuzian event, which is never exhausted in any here and now, 
but retains the potential to re-emerge in combination with continuously varying series in 
the passage of nature. 
…[I]t is not that there exist two events separated in time, the potentials in the 
earlier event getting resolved in the later, or the later reacting to the earlier. 
Instead, there is one event occurring at two distant moments in time at once.6 
We are dealing not with succession as such when we talk of the Deleuzian temporality of 
the event; indeed, in all that we are offered in the three syntheses of Difference and 
Repetition and with respect to the nature of Aionic time in The Logic of Sense, events are to 
be seen as intimately imbricated in connected series both forward and back in linear time. 
It is Lampert’s nuanced construal of the three syntheses in terms of simultaneity and delay 
which is of most interest here, helping to open up the distinction between ‘delay’ and 
‘retardation’. 
… [I]n its multiplicity, simultaneity is delayed. If we live our lives at different 
temporal levels at the same time in different ways, each moment of life has its 
lived time at many times later than the time it is formed. The very structure of 
simultaneity is delay.7 
Let us articulate the contrast. Firstly, for both Bergson, and Deleuze after him, retardation 
is identified with those factors in the passage of nature which resist the onward, downward 
encroachment of entropy. And for both, the attainment of equilibrium achieved on a 
cosmic scale would not merely produce a moribund state of inactivity, but the cessation of 
existence as such. What retardation retards, so to speak, is the ‘degradation’ of available 
free energy for systems, in the direction of equilibrium or disorder. It is ‘life’ or complexity 
which performs this retarding function; the tendency of nature to envelop material 
processes in higher-order, stable or meta-stable structures. 
This resistance in the circuits of the world is not nearly so evident with respect to the 
concept of delay. Rather, delay as such serves to characterise the identity-as-difference of 
events through their own internal rhythms, the syncopation of multiple time-signatures. 
This is every bit as much a form of complexity, no doubt, but one which is directly 
predicated on a temporal enfolding rather than a material. Retardation of necessity 
endures the weight, the friction and the braking effect (as Serres would have it) of 
explication; it belongs to locality, it furnishes the world with location. Delay belongs to non-
locality.  
The idea of retardation, clearly identifiable within Deleuze’s own philosophy of difference, 
up to the time of Difference and Repetition, undergoes a subtle, implicit, rather than openly 
topicalised, transformation in later work. This implicit character of the change is a result of 
this concept’s subordinate role to the more explicitly thematised developments Deleuze 
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performs on Time (which will come increasingly to be viewed as a multiplicity of relative 
speeds) and ‘Life’ (which comes increasingly to be viewed as transcending the organism, 
and indeed the organic as such). In the shifting triangulation between these major 
developing features of the Deleuzian landscape, ‘retardation’ undergoes its own silent 
translations, which bear on the interrelations between entropy and complexity. By the time 
of A Thousand Plateaus, retardation has been obscured by delay. With respect to the first 
theme, time, references to relative speeds abound in this work, governing the means by 
which such concepts as ‘stratification’ are characterised; a tendency which persists with 
What Is Philosophy?, where ‘relative speed’ becomes the question of the various 
orientations of the arts, science and philosophy to the infinite speeds of chaos. 
With respect to the second theme, Life, there is an unmistakeable expansion of its role in 
the later work, a direction marked by the foregrounding of the concept of in- or an- organic 
life in A Thousand Plateaus. Indeed, if the final known short piece by Deleuze, ‘Immanence: 
A Life’8 can be considered summative, life ultimately comes to characterise the entire 
domain of the virtual and the immanent as such. If the assertions of A Thousand Plateaus 
leave room in their phrasing for a domain outside of life, a something beyond inorganic life, 
that corner is painted over by this last work. 
This brings us to the key set of questions for this line of enquiry; what room is there left in 
Deleuze’s line of travel for Bergson’s ‘inert matter’ and ‘mechanism’, even as a never-fully 
realised ideal? If all nature is increasingly marshalled under one emblem of order alone, 
‘Life’, the complex, then it appears there is nothing (in Bergsonian terms) for this order to 
push against, no entropy to retard. Equally, if the vectors of time are without direction, as 
we are led to conclude by the end of the third synthesis in Difference and Repetition, if ‘the 
very structure of simultaneity is delay’, if the dimensions of present, past and future are 
governed more by the logic of their own defining forms of synthesis than succession as 
such, in what direction could ‘degradation’ be said to occur? This set of questions are of 
course different viewpoints on the same paradox; the arrow of time is commonly 
understood to be synonymous with the increase in entropy ostensibly displayed by the 
universe as a whole. And the reader of Deleuze is left in no doubt as to his standpoint on 
both aspects; entropy is a transcendental illusion, applicable in principle only on the level 
of the actual, never to the virtual. The arrow of time is merely the stamped imposition of 
‘good sense’ in search of ordered causality in the labyrinth of a paradoxical, recursive 
nature, a need for the general (indifferentiation) to emerge out of the particular 
(differentiation), for equilibrium to replace disparity. As such, all these correspondences 
contribute to Deleuze’s critique of representation, not his positive position. 
A first step on the way to working these questions through is to note that, in the 
dramatisations of A Thousand Plateaus, by far the most prevalent characterisation of time 
is not with reference to the three syntheses as such, but to relative speed and slowness. It 
is by no means that the kind of resistance in the circuits of nature to the death represented 
by equilibrium has disappeared from the discussion; on the contrary, A Thousand Plateaus 
is bristling with figures of sedimentation, of stratification, along with the counterprinciples 
of de-stratification, lines of flight, epistrata. Striated space is counterposed against smooth. 
It is merely that these structurations and destructurations are subordinate to the 
interrelations of relative speeds. 
Speed and slowness, movement and rest, tardiness and rapidity subordinate not 
only the forms of structure, but also the types of development. (ATP p.255) 
There is a notable shift of emphasis, more of an insistence that it is only relative speeds 
which constitute the underlying condition of the world. 
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In any case, there is a pure plane of immanence, univocality, composition, upon 
which everything is given, upon which unformed elements and materials dance 
that are distinguished from one another only by their speed and that enter into this 
or that individuated assemblage depending on their connections, their relations of 
movement. A fixed plane of life upon which everything stirs, slows down or 
accelerates. (ATP p.255) 
What motivates this change of emphasis with respect to time? And to what extent does it 
parallel the shift from ‘retardation’ to ‘delay’? I would argue that the intuitions and 
formulations of Difference and Repetition have paid forward, so to speak; the language, the 
imagery of entropy, of the ‘race to the grave’, was already explicitly problematized in the 
text of Difference and Repetition. Entropy as such (as opposed to thermodynamic concepts) 
was consigned to the status of a transcendental illusion. At the end of the working through 
of the three syntheses, however, we have definitively arrived at a new scenario; if ‘the very 
structure of simultaneity is delay’, if the three syntheses co-exist, then there is no obvious 
direction of time in which ‘degradation’ may be said to occur. Strictly speaking, series can 
be spoken of in relative speeds, but not relative direction; Alice may get bigger ‘at the same 
time’ as she becomes smaller; there is no sense in saying that forward orientating series 
may interact with backward orientating series; all are both at the same time. Which is as 
much as to say, there is no direction to the arrow of time. In this light, the phrasing which 
reflects this is the language of relative speed.9  
This is another way to say that the scientist looking to derive the arrow of time as a 
function of entropic processes can at most labour under an illusion. In addition, any 
customary attempt to characterise the vector of time in the direction of the descent from 
order to disorder is effectively ruled out of court; again, this is highlighted in interesting 
ways in terms of the mutation from the regime of ‘retardation’ to the regime of ‘delay’, but 
this time best unpacked with respect to the development of the second major theme, that 
of ‘Life’. It can serve only as a surface reading to equate Bergson’s ‘vital’ with Deleuze’s 
conception of Life. The difference is again decisive. 
As is well-known, the centres of envelopment of most interest in A Thousand Plateaus are 
organisms; as in Difference and Repetition, they are in a sense, but more provisionally now, 
still ‘mute witnesses to degradation and death’ while remaining now more, now less, open 
to the plane of immanence, to the body without organs. But let us follow the thread once 
again; for the regime of retardation, it is life, the vital, the complex, which serves to slow 
the fiat of mechanism, the race to the grave. It is not that order in the Bergsonian schema is 
under the threat of being devoured by disorder; on the contrary, the mechanistic and the 
vital are two antagonistic forms of order; there is no such thing as disorder; order is 
opposed to, intertwined with, complexity. But the order that is opposed to complexity is 
the order of entropy, of inert matter, of equilibrium; so to speak, too much order all at 
once. 
And so too, we find this sense of ‘too much order all at once’ in the dramatisations of A 
Thousand Plateaus. The will to the Body Without Organs is the will to maintain the 
maximum number of open connections to the plane of immanence, to productive 
difference; this is one definition of complexity, not dissimilar to the notion of ‘self-
organization’ in chaos and complexity theory. Yet Deleuze and Guattari also acknowledge 
that for an organism (indeed, a centre of envelopment more generally) to become more 
complex, is for it to ‘interiorise’, enfold, increasing numbers of productive differences. The 
tension between the organism and the Body Without Organs arises when this 
interiorisation goes too far, when there is too much order all at once; 
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The BwO howls: “They’ve made me an organism! They’ve wrongfully folded me! 
They’ve stolen my body! (ATP p.159) 
Yet now this thanatic howl of the enfolded organism, the enclosed system, is tempered by 
the existence of anorganic life; 
What movement, what impulse, sweeps us outside the strata (metastrata)? Of 
course, there is no reason to think that all matter is confined to the 
physicochemical strata. There exists a submolecular, unformed Matter. Similarly, 
not all Life is confined to the organic strata; rather, the organism is that which life 
sets against itself in order to limit itself, and there is a life all the more intense, all 
the more powerful, for being anorganic. (ATP p.503, italics added) 
Finally, it is this formulation which comes to seem inevitable retrospectively; ‘that which 
life sets against itself in order to limit itself’. 
In the departure from the Bergsonian schema, what perhaps comes to constitute its real 
meaning is not so much the shift from ‘quality’ to ‘intensity’ as the elision of inert matter, 
the equilibrial, the entropic mechanism. And if we read ‘complexity’ there where Deleuze 
writes ‘life’, then these triangulations of life and temporality, retardation and delay, seem 
inevitably to lead us to this substitution of one formula for another; no longer the 
antagonism of order versus complexity, of the mechanistic versus the vital, but life, the 
vital, versus itself, which is as much as to say, the complex versus the complex. 
The foregoing reading of the philosophy of difference has served to foreground features of 
Deleuze’s philosophy which are largely unaddressed in the literature and which deserve 
both attention and consolidation; most significantly, there are three interrelated 
conclusions which bear at once on the remit of natural philosophy and of science: the first 
is that the line of development of Deleuze’s thought increasingly rules out any, even ideal, 
role for inert matter; life (or complexity) is what limits itself, not inert, mechanistic matter; 
the second, potentially much more contentious, conclusion is that the philosophy of 
difference appears on this reading to entail a truncation of distinctions which have served 
natural philosophy and science indispensably; the demarcations between states of 
disorder, order and complexity are abolished in favour of one sole term, the complex. It 
should be said that this diagnosis, while drawn from central threads of the Deleuzian 
corpus, is subject to certain caveats; the argument runs only if we track the development of 
Deleuze’s thoughts with respect to order and complexity against the genesis and 
development of more explicit and developed themes. Indeed, there are points in the 
Deleuzian text where he implicitly acknowledges such a useful formal distinction; he speaks 
of complexity remaining evident within the operation of (simplifying) differenciation; 
elsewhere he defines the complexity of an organism in terms of the number of connections 
it maintains with the body without organs.10 In this sense, the question of order and 
complexity pursued in this reading is one which dwells in the folds and pleats of the 
Deleuzian fabric, not on the surface. Nevertheless, the implication that complexity is the 
sole modus operandum of nature, if taken in any strong sense, is in danger of removing 
considerable conceptual traction on the passage of nature; the perhaps almost ubiquitous 
understanding of the development of the world is predicated on an evolution from simple 
to more complex forms of being; this tendency has been dubbed ‘the arrow of complexity’, 
in that it is taken to confer a direction of time, an index that is most often, though not 
uniquely, understood to be correlated with the thermodynamic arrow of entropy. Given 
these (and other) entailments, it may well be that to forego these distinctions of form 
would be at best unpalatable and at worst nonsensical for those who wish to conceptualise 
natural processes.  
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Finally, the third foregrounded aspect; Deleuze’s orientation toward the notions of limit 
and constant. Once again, this is an aspect which enjoys its own subtleties and displays 
apparent contradictions at different junctures of the Deleuzian corpus. We have touched 
upon one side of this question with respect to Deleuze’s resistance to the reliance of 
scientific method on constants as such; this is certainly so in Difference and Repetition, and 
revisited in What is Philosophy? We are left in little doubt that the constants and limits in 
question refer to those purporting to determine the scope of nature’s possible unfolding; 
Absolute Zero, the speed of light etc. And once again, this may represent a stumbling block 
for many wishing to explore the productive application of Deleuzian philosophy to scientific 
frameworks. Yet it would be mistaken to interpret Deleuze’s resistance to limits and 
constants as a simple denial of their existence. Indeed, we encounter passages which assign 
them a productive place, as in What is Philosophy?; ‘Every limit is illusory and every 
determination is negation, if determination is not in an immediate relation with the 
undetermined.’ (WP p.120). Indeed, ‘limiting’ may be seen to have a necessary role in the 
multivalent processes of different/ciation for Deleuze; to claim that ‘life is what limits itself’ 
is to offer an answer to the question of how series get caught up in centres of envelopment 
in the first place. The phrasing of the quotation above from What is Philosophy?, however, 
indicates a resolution to the apparent contradiction here; it is negation which is rejected, 
rather than limitation as such; the phrasing marks an enduring commitment to Bergson; 
‘We see, therefore, how all the critical aspects of Bergsonian philosophy are part of a single 
theme: a critique of the negative of limitation, of the negative of opposition, of general 
ideas.’ (B p.47). But what is the positive form of limitation which seems to be implied here? 
There are ways in which these potential objections may be addressed, to align them with 
respect to conceptual developments in modern physics, and to outline the productive role 
the philosophy of difference may occupy with respect to that ongoing development. 
Certain figures in the philosophy of science whose work bears notable affinity to Deleuze’s 
own will be invaluable in this respect; Alfred North Whitehead, David Bohm and Lee 
Smolin. 
In terms of aligning the philosophy of difference with physics after the quantum revolution, 
the first implication we have voiced through Deleuze is surely the most easily supported; 
the claim that inert matter does not exist. Indeed, there is no place for it; the very notion is 
problematized in any number of ways. Young’s famous wave/particle duality effectively 
forces explanation in terms of interference patterns, even in those cases where the 
experimental set up imposes a ‘particle-like’ scrutiny, and this even in cases where it is a 
single particle under consideration. This is a paradox routinely noted in most introductions 
to quantum physics; that the wave-like nature of particles dictates that their wave-fronts 
are capable of producing interference with themselves. Since the beginning of the quantum 
age, it has been implausible to represent the action of particles in the manner of statistical 
mechanics, which deals effectively with the atomic scale as though it were essentially 
composed of tiny objects, each with its own momentum and speed which remain 
unchanged until some physical collision with another particle. As Young’s slit experiment 
demonstrates, even single particles are in complex, resonating relations to their associated 
field. Richard Feynman’s formulation of Quantum Electrodynamics problematizes the 
notion of a ‘bare charge’ for the particles associated with electromagnetic phenomena, the 
photon, electron and positron. The bare charge is to be understood as a basic or least 
energy state. However, due to the continual fleeting production of ‘virtual particles’ around 
an electron, a kind of cloud of positively and negatively-charged particles of vanishingly 
fleeting existence associated with the ambient field, pushing and pulling the central particle 
according to charge, this bare charge is understood to be definitively cloaked. The value is 
nevertheless derived through a calculation referred to as ‘renormalization’, which amounts 
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to a cancellation of infinities. Roger Penrose comments; ‘Another point of view is to regard 
the bare charge as being no more than a conceptual convenience, and to take the 
standpoint that the notion of ‘bare charge’ is actually ‘meaningless’, because it is 
‘unobservable’.’11 However interpreted, the bare charge, understood as the value in effect 
in absence of interaction with other charges, is far from thereby unproblematically inert. 
More generally, the energy state of any particle is theoretically derivable only in reference 
to its ‘ground state’, its state of least possible activity. This in turn, however, can only be 
derived by subtracting the energy inherent in its ambient field, entailing another 
cancellation of infinities. In a Deleuzian register, the construal of quantum particles as 
enduring patterns of associated fields serves to write disparity into the account at the most 
fundamental level; all particles are in constant energetic tension with their fields. There is 
no such thing as inert matter. 
A more challenging question is the one relating to the ‘arrow of complexity’ mentioned 
above. Taken at root, Deleuze’s resistance to the idea of the Heat Death of the universe 
goes hand in hand with the associated idea that the universe as a whole must be capable of 
maintaining a steady measure of order, some distance from the disorder of equilibrium. 
This seems at first to be supported by the scientific account; complexity seems to be 
increasing as time goes on, from undifferentiated plasma states shortly following the Big 
Bang, to structured galaxies, clusters of galaxies and even ‘megastructures’ occupying 
significant proportions of the observable cosmos. Biological evolution has evolved from 
proto-cellular systems to sophisticated trillion-celled organisms. Given this history it seems 
the arrow of complexity should be able to constitute a kind of arrow of time; we could 
judge without knowing in advance whether such and such a cosmological state of affairs 
were earlier or later by some agreed measure of complexity (however hard-won that 
agreement might be). Most accounts, however, recognize that the development of 
increasingly complex conditions to this point in the history of the world is no necessary 
indicator to the projected overall arc over the lifetime of the universe. The received view is 
that such accounts should be compatible with acceptance of the second law. For most, the 
arrow of complexity is expected to describe an arc, peaking somewhere around the 
midpoint of the cosmic lifetime and declining steadily toward the end, as free energy is 
depleted.12 There are dissenting accounts, however, notable among them being the 
complexity theorist Stuart Kauffman. He argues that the arrow of complexity could 
potentially rise indefinitely, as a function of the ‘adjacent possible’. The ‘adjacent possible’ 
is that set of chemical products which are attainable given present conditions, but never 
yet actualised. The potential range and diversity of the universe might, he conjectures, rise 
indefinitely as a kind of force multiplier: 
As the diversity of molecular species increases, there are always proportionally 
more novel reactions into the adjacent possible. If we take the formation of a 
chemical species which has never existed in the biosphere, or perhaps the universe, 
as a breaking symmetry, then the more such symmetries are broken, the more 
ways come into existence by which yet further symmetries may be broken.13 
In other words, complexity begets complexity. Kauffman recognizes that this proposition 
contradicts the second law, but points to the dependence of that law on the essentially 
ergodic character of nature, and seeks to demonstrate that this does not apply to our 
universe. This is a significant standpoint in context of the present argument, since we have 
identified a certain incongruence inherent in Deleuze’s adoption of the argument from 
Eternal Return with respect to the Ergodic Hypothesis and its attendant principle of 
indifference. Having noted that Chaos Theory essentially renders untenable the principle of 
indifferentiation as utilised in classical thermodynamics (due to the tendency of particles to 
resonate in tandem under certain conditions, rather than indifferently to bounce off one 
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another), we encounter here the stronger proposition that ergodicity itself is implausible. 
Kauffman’s argument is predicated on two observations. The first is that the level of 
complexity of organic molecular species within our biosphere has ‘exploded’ over the 
course of the earth’s history, from the modest tens or hundreds of varieties, including 
methane, cyanide etc., to some hundreds of trillions if we include the diversity of genetic 
expression. The biosphere has expanded exponentially (far from indifferently) into its 
adjacent possible. The second observation is that the realm of the adjacent possible into 
which increasingly more complex molecular species could expand is vastly greater than 
those already realised. According to his calculations; 
It would take the known universe, chunking along on the Planck timescale, 1039 
times its current lifetime to make all proteins of length 200.14 
Nor are proteins of length 200 the upper bound of known forms of protein; the exponent 
rises accordingly for greater lengths. The conclusion is twofold. The universe is ‘vastly 
nonergodic, vastly nonequilibrium at the level of complex organic molecules.’ And ‘the total 
system “wants” to flow into the adjacent possible.’ The two are interrelated. For Kauffman, 
the relationship between the actual and the adjacent possible is one of substrate to 
product; it is merely that the molecular species of the product has never yet occurred. As 
such, there is a displacement from the equilibrium conditions all systems seek (an 
overabundance of substrate components in proportion to product); 
The simple conclusion is that there is a real chemical potential from the actual to 
the adjacent possible.15 
The picture we arrive at is that of a ‘sink’, akin to the thermodynamic sense of a body which 
draws heat from the neighbouring body. The adjacent possible in effect provides a gradient 
down which the actual is inclined to flow. The substrate components will always 
outnumber the product, if not actually then adjacently; a situation which places the world 
out of equilibrium. The gradient will not resolve unless the ‘total system’ flows into the 
adjacent possible, yet that very expansion will in itself open up a new adjacent possible, 
deferring equilibrium to one remove in an ever-expanding ‘workspace’. Complexity begets 
complexity.16  It seems in light of the foregoing that to subscribe to the philosophy of 
difference serves to incline us to those paradigms which do not rest on or presume the 
ergodic hypothesis.    
 
Complexity as Principle 
 
The overall question remains whether the implication we have drawn - that order has no 
name but complexity – serves to place Deleuze’s philosophy beyond any productive 
orientation to physics.  
The quantum theorist and philosopher of science David Bohm resists the notion of disorder 
in the twin works Science, Order and Creativity and Wholeness and the Implicate Order. As 
we shall see, this resistance entails a novel conception of order and complexity bearing 
striking similarities to Deleuze’s own. He calls this form of order ‘generative’. It is best 
understood in contrast to another conception of order commonly found in scientific theory, 
which I shall collectively refer to as ‘indexical’. Though Bohm (and by extension Deleuze) 
favours the former, his work offers examples of both, and will serve to establish the 
contrast.  
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The question of the meaning of chance, randomness and disorder has been a 
particular headache, not only in science, but also in mathematics and philosophy. 
But here it is proposed that whatever happens must take place in some order so 
that the notion of a “total lack of order” has no real meaning. Indeed, even what 
are called random events do happen to take place in a definable and describable 
sequence and can be easily distinguished from other random events. In this 
elementary sense they obviously have an order.17 
The particularities of the route serve to date and place the journey, to index the 
phenomenon; a fact which in itself, in an ‘elementary’ sense, rescues nature from disorder. 
This is precisely the Borgesian character’s journey through the library which we have 
considered and found wanting before; a merely indexical form of order which is 
nevertheless prevalent in the scientific literature. Not infrequently we find a more 
formalised definition of this indexical form of order in play in the work of probability 
theorists. Algorithmic Information Content is a concept derived from the work of 
probability theorist Andrei Kolmogorov, in collaboration with Gregory Chaitin and Ray 
Solomonoff. It is based on the principle that the complexity of a system or set may be 
indexed by the length of a description required to express it in binary code on a designated 
operating system. A system or set displaying true randomness will be adequately described 
only by a bit string containing as many digits as the elements of that phenomenon, while 
those displaying regularities will require shorter output. DNA sequences may be taken as a 
case in point, containing a readily identifiable and short set of basic elements, the amino 
acids, but arranged in repeating combinative patterns capable of expressing the production 
of proteins. Any repetition in the set of amino acids allows for compression of the 
descriptive Algorithm, and hence reduction of the information content. Thus, the presence 
of structures periodically occurring along the length of the strand which ‘instruct’ the DNA 
how and when to replicate, such as ‘introns’ and ‘outrons’, will allow further economy of 
expression.18 Algorithmic Information Content, and all equivalent definitions of order, are 
not designed to convey any sense of the evolution of a system, the order of its ongoing 
structuration. In this sense, indexical forms of order are external, while evolutionary or 
generative forms of order are internal. 
A distinct yet related notion was adopted by the physicists Murray Gell-Mann and Seth 
Lloyd, going by the name ‘effective complexity’, again predicated on the length of an 
adequate description of the phenomenon.19 This latter idea accommodates potentially 
more subtle structurations (or schemata, as Gell-Mann has it), but significantly for our 
purposes, Gell-Mann acknowledges a qualitative difference between internal and external 
effective complexity; a schema is said to be ‘internal’ when the schema somehow governs 
the system under discussion, as when the key to a coded text allows the cryptographer to 
generate its meaning directly, as opposed to ‘externally’ indexing potentially significant 
patterns (‘cracking’ the code). Indeed, both Gell-Mann and Bohm conclude that any real 
explanatory power belongs with the internal, rather than the external principle; Gell-Mann 
ultimately identifies complexity with adaptation in the sphere of life (the ‘complex adaptive 
system’ as such, he acknowledges, transcends description purely in terms of schemata) and 
self-organisation, while Bohm coins and valorises the term which I have adopted here, 
‘generative order’. Before investigating generative order more fully, it is worthwhile to note 
that in terms of the ambitions of Gell-Mann to describe nature as a whole, this valorising of 
an internal principle reflects a caution over the notion of laws of nature, considered as 
immutable, pre-set conditions governing the world. Gell-Mann adheres to a physis which is 
itself in a sense adaptive, conjecturing that what we have traditionally taken for immutable 
laws may be rather the (relatively durable) results of ‘frozen accidents’, embracing the idea 
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that structural features such as the left- and right- handedness of molecules may 
contingently arise in particular parts of the universe for particular intervals only: 
 The tree-like structure of branching histories involves a game of chance at every 
branching. Any individual coarse-grained history consists of a particular outcome of 
those games. As each history continues through time, it registers increasing 
numbers of such chance outcomes. But some of those outcomes become frozen as 
rules for the future, at least for some portion of the universe.20  
As such, this form of order has much in common with Deleuze’s positive sense of limit or 
constant as ‘deployment’ rather than negation, as we shall see.  
For his part, Bohm’s valorisation of the internal, generative form of order, in itself elides 
any simple distinction between order and disorder, between the simple and the complex. 
He offers a treatment of order understood as the play between ‘different similarities’ and 
‘similar differences’. This is illustrated by the example of the construction of a geometric 
curve, which may initially be thought of as the repetition of a given line segment 
augmenting a straight line, the beginning of each segment coterminous with the end of the 
last added and so forth, each a different similarity. A simple line gets longer by the same 
amount each time. The difference between one segment and another has only one 
dimension in this case, that of spatial displacement, which due to its one-dimensionality he 
names a difference of first class. A second class difference pertains when the reiterated 
function or generator contains two separate aspects, as when the line segments are added 
to each other as before, but this time with a designated angle introduced between the 
current line-segment and the last. Such a procedure, given the invariance of the adopted 
angle, would ultimately produce a rough circle. For a two-dimensional spiral, orders of third 
class and above would be required, since both the angle and the length of the line-segment 
would have to be varied by some ratio or other, bearing similarly different relations to each 
other. Clearly, the generation of lines occupying three dimensions acquires its own further 
classes of order.  
As the degrees become indefinitely high, we are able to describe what have 
commonly been called ‘random’ curves – such as those encountered in Brownian 
motion…In this way, we are led to make an important change in the general 
language of description. We no longer use the term ‘disorder’, but instead we 
distinguish between different degrees of order.21  
This is one fashion, then in which the distinction between the simple and the complex can 
be understood as at best secondary and perhaps illusory when viewed through the lens of 
generative order; from this point of view, complexity is not qualitatively distinct from, does 
not supervene on the simple.22 The distinction between indexical and generative 
complexity is a significant one, nor is it any less significant that both Gell-Mann and Bohm 
considered forms of generative order more fruitful. Gell-Mann’s example of grammar, 
Bohm’s example of the functions governing the addition of line-segments both amount to 
acknowledging the superior epistemic value of the instructions for propagation, the code 
for self-replication. Indeed we might find an equivalent predilection for most other 
scientific theorists; Prigogine’s valorisation of auto-catalytic reactions in cycles, cycles in 
which products from the last phase generate the chemical capacity for the next, is one 
concrete example whereby the flag of order has been planted further into the territory of 
the non-linear, the chaotic, where the last step in the evolution of a system informs or 
instructs the next. Nor should this be intrinsically surprising; it is effectively the difference 
between applying the code for decrypting phenomena, as opposed to brute observation of 
pattern. It may take a decryption programme some time to identify the irrational number 
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in question with only the number-string of its expansion to go on, in comparison to the 
moments it would take to perform that same expansion given a specified irrational as a 
starting point. This on the face of it amounts to no more than common sense, yet at the 
same time it must be said that behind every scientific decision in favour of generative 
explanations lies a disposition to understand the world in terms of process, of evolution, 
rather than static structure or pattern. So much is true of the Bergsonian-Deleuzian 
disposition toward explanation in terms of the temporal rather than the spatial, and 
equally of Whitehead’s emphasis on process and evolution. 
Deleuze himself references the idea of evolution as the focus of the investigations of 
Difference and Repetition, not merely in the section devoted to biological evolution, but as 
a paradigm for the passage of nature as a whole, inorganic processes included. This is in 
context of his rejection of an account of the world by resemblance, identity, 
representation, in favour of a repetition which escapes law. He speaks of the need to 
distinguish two different types of causality with respect to repetition: ‘one which concerns 
only the overall, abstract effect, and the other which concerns the acting cause.’ He 
proceeds to characterise this difference in terms reminiscent of those set out in the 
discussion of Gell-Mann and Bohm above: 
One is a static repetition, the other is dynamic. One results from the work, but the 
other is like the ‘evolution’ of a bodily movement. One refers back to a single 
concept, which leaves only an external difference between the ordinary instances 
of a figure; the other is the repetition of an internal difference which it 
incorporates in each of its moments, and carries from one distinctive point to 
another. (DR p.20) 
We have then, a distinction as above between internal and external difference, couched in 
terms of evolution, and tellingly, illustrated by a difference between types of geometrical 
figure which directly recalls Bohm’s own example of the spiral; 
A distinction is drawn between arithmetic symmetry, which refers back to a scale 
of whole or fractional coefficients, and geometric symmetry, based upon 
proportions of irrational ratios; a static symmetry which is cubic or hexagonal, and 
a dynamic symmetry which is pentagonal and appears in a spiral line or in a 
geometrically progressing pulsation – in short, in a living and mortal ‘evolution’. 
(DR p.20) 
 
Limits without negation 
 
What is of most interest for the argument developed here is that this concept of evolution 
is the key to the positive form of ‘limitation’ for Deleuze; he goes on to develop this 
connection in the first chapter of Difference and Repetition: 
There is a hierarchy which measures beings according to their limits, and according 
to their degree of proximity or distance to a principle. But there is also a hierarchy 
which considers things and beings from the point of view of power: it is not a 
question of considering absolute degrees of power, but only of knowing whether a 
being eventually ‘leaps over’ or transcends its limits in going to the limit of what it 
can do, whatever its degree. ‘To the limit’, it will be argued, still presupposes a 
limit. Here limit [peras] no longer refers to what maintains the thing under a law, 
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nor to what delimits or separates it from other things. On the contrary, it refers to 
that on the basis of which it is deployed and deploys all its power. (DR p.37) 
‘Power’ here is something akin to an internal principle of evolution, understood not as the 
power to arrive at an end-state, but a principle which will persevere beyond the provisional 
constraints pertinent to a given system; a power of mutation. Deleuze is alluding to the 
positive sense of limitation which the philosophy of difference requires; ‘deployment’. It is 
in this sense we can see something akin to Gell-Mann’s ‘frozen accidents’. All systems 
require some constraint or set of constraints, some ‘limits’ without which no process, no 
deployment, is possible, but these constraints are themselves subject to evolution. 
Evolution, repetition, variation, we may summarise, escape the law, the limit and the 
constant; ‘a perseveration is still not a repetition. The constants of one law are in turn 
variables of a more general law, just as the hardest rocks become soft and fluid matter on 
the geological scale of millions of years’ (DR p.2). These elements in the passage of nature 
all require limits, but limits which escape the negative, which do not depend on opposition. 
Laws and constants are not barriers as such, but more like a fulcrum, enabling traction, a 
precondition for the deployment of power. And once a heavy block is moved, the fulcrum is 
redeployed to shift it further. These are, as Whitehead would have it, ‘decisions’. 
 
Limits are first and foremost a matter of explication, of unfolding. For both Deleuze and 
Whitehead, explication, the decision, never achieves full determination; what is explicated 
retains its implication in the ceaseless enfolding of things, each decision carries with it 
future prehension. Moreover, for both, explication is a precondition for anything at all to 
occur, for events to actualise, to concresce, into states of affairs, to take (or rather, make) 
their place among the heres and nows, the local and the global tableau. And for neither can 
it ever be a simple matter that events simply ‘latch’ on to the time and the place that 
invites them, like a seed planted in a waiting field; for both the event is immanently bound 
up with the manifestation of the very fabric of space and time in which it occurs; there is no 
pre-existing field, just as for modern physics, the energetic field is shaped by the particles 
associated with it, and particulate matter takes its form and location from that field. 
We are in a position now to expand on the interconnected and parallel themes of 
explication and limit, spatial manifestation and cosmological evolution in the work of 
Deleuze and Whitehead, with a view to foregrounding productive links with the 
phenomenon known as non-locality in the physics of the quantum age, and to the 
increasing prevalence of the evolutionary paradigm in cosmological models.  
In both Science and the Modern World and Process and Reality, A.N. Whitehead presents 
his thought under the rubric of cosmology. It must immediately be conceded that the 
vocabulary, and indeed the terms of reference in those works bear scant resemblance to 
the terminology to be found in reference books on the subject, yet his explicit aim is to 
provide a metaphysics which is adequate to the emerging new quantum physics of the era. 
Whitehead’s intricate arguments in these works is at once heavily indebted to Leibniz, from 
whom he derives the important concept of ‘prehension’ for instance (he acknowledges the 
debt to Leibniz’ ‘appetition’) and placed in the service of cosmological speculation.  
Whitehead addresses the topic of limits with respect to a deficiency he identifies in 
Spinoza’s metaphysics; the concept of modes of a universal single substance; 
Thus as a further element in the metaphysical situation, there is required a 
principle of limitation. Some particular how is necessary, and some 
particularisation in the what of matter of fact is necessary.23 
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This link between limitation as a principle, and explication as a matter of actualisation is 
unmistakeable in the following comment; 
The only alternative to this admission is to deny the reality of actual occasions.24  
Limitation, actualisation and explication, then, circle round each other in Whitehead’s 
account as they do for Deleuze. As Isabelle Stengers points out, Whitehead’s position on 
this question at once reveals its key importance for his cosmology, and furnishes a final 
disagreement with Leibniz on the tenet of Sufficient Reason; 
This is indeed what Whitehead reproaches Leibniz: to have proclaimed that “there 
is a reason for everything,” even the choice of God, who has access to the sole 
genuine reality, to the infinite conspiration of the universe with each state of the 
monad, or, reversibly, to each state of the monad as a standpoint implying an 
entire universe. If Leibniz were right, the true meaning of our experiences would be 
unlimited, “behind the scene,” and our choices would be mere appearances, with 
the divine choice of this world as their hidden reason. Decision must therefore be 
primordial, and our reasons must be relative to it.25  
Here, ‘decision of God’ is synonymous with limitation, for decision is what abstracts, or 
prehends, both positively and negatively, from the ‘envisagement’ (might we hazard, for 
Deleuze, ‘complication’) of all possible values. Decision is what limits, and without limit 
there is no substantive actualisation. At the very least, with respect to the alignment of the 
Whiteheadian register with that of Deleuze, we might note that this limitation-explication 
shares on both sides a crucial aspect; the expression of disparity, and at a ‘primordial’ level; 
Whitehead requires a first disparity which entrains all others. The primordial dissymmetry 
is closely akin to the swerve of the clinamen, at a non-assignable time in a non-assignable 
place; there is no reason to it, though all reasons must be relative to it. 26 For all that 
Whitehead may be said finally to hold back from the Principle of Sufficient Reason, then, it 
is only at this deepest level of his cosmology, and significantly for the sake of reinforcing 
essentially the same cosmological intuitions as in Leibniz’ work; the primacy of 
discernibility, the introduction of a limit discriminating ‘this’ from ‘that’ is the genetic root 
of disparity. Limitation works to break the symmetry of ‘a general realm of systematic 
relationships’; 
Restriction is the price of value. There cannot be value without antecedent 
standards of value, to discriminate the acceptance or rejection of what is before 
the envisaging mode of activity. Thus there is an antecedent limitation among 
values, introducing contraries, grades and oppositions.27  
For Deleuze, this ‘antecedent limitation’ is what forces the move from intensive to 
extensive relations.28 In a different register, Whitehead is serving here to embellish the 
question which troubled Deleuze and Guattari; how do centres of envelopment occur in 
the first place? Whitehead’s answer is that there is no reason due to the fact that 
primordial limitation is what escapes sufficient reason, it is what bestows reason. And to 
bestow reason is to introduce ‘contraries, grades and oppositions’. 
To make these correspondences is to consolidate the essentially Leibnizian shared 
cosmological intuition established earlier between Serres, Deleuze, Simondon, Lucretius et 
al.29 It is also to foreground the connection between limitation and disparity; from the first 
explication-limitation, the world is dissymmetrical, assembled from fundamentally crooked 
timber. This is its specific form of sufficient reason. As I hope now to show, this shared 
intuition is not confined to our grand metaphysicians; it offers further correspondences 
between contemporary cosmology and theoretical science more generally. Moreover, I will 
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contend that in this transdisciplinary sense, it is because the world is dissymmetrical that its 
central mode is to evolve; disparity and the evolutionary, generative paradigm go hand in 
hand. 
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Chapter Five: Sufficient Reason as Dissymmetry and the Evolutionary Paradigm 
 
Notwithstanding the practical success of reason from symmetry in the formulations of 
contemporary science, it is not uncommon to find scientific theoretical counterparts of the 
disposition toward this sufficient-reason-as-dissymmetry. We might go so far as to say that 
theoreticians are marked by their disposition toward symmetry or dissymmetry. On the 
one hand, Einstein, whose theory of relativity might count as an extended argument from 
symmetry, and Weyl, for whom symmetry serves as the a priori; on the other, Dirac, for 
whom constants may be nothing more than a product of contingent initial conditions, 
potentially varying throughout the cosmos, and Smolin, for whom constants and laws 
adapt and evolve. For our purposes, these dispositions in their turn predispose to one of 
two particular forms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason; as an argument from symmetry 
or from dissymmetry, as a principle of indifference or difference.  
Anaximander’s cosmological arguments served us earlier to illustrate the former; if there is 
complete symmetry in the world, there is insufficient reason for anything to happen. As I 
hope to have established, the Leibnizian variant of sufficient reason is opposed to this 
disposition toward symmetry; we might go so far as to say that that sufficient-reason-as-
dissymmetry rules out of court the use of the Principle of Insufficient Reason in explaining 
natural processes, for the simple reason that there can be no final symmetry in nature. In 
the end, for any given scientist, faith in the symmetry of the world is perforce constrained 
by phenomena; when the practitioner of Group Theory, for example, divines the 
mathematical description of physical invariants from among the sophisticated symmetries 
of an evolving ensemble, this serves first and foremost to distinguish those invariants, 
those symmetries, from those that have broken. For, as A. Zee points out, nature, if it 
displayed perfect symmetry, would simply stall: 
Symmetry is beauty, and beauty is desirable. But if the design is perfectly 
symmetrical, then there would be only one interaction. The fundamental particles 
would all be identical and hence indistinguishable from one another, such a world 
is possible, but it would be very dull: there would be no atom, no star, no planet, 
no flower and no physicist.1 
 This is to say nothing more than that everything is ultimately discernible from everything 
else. It is also worth noting the striking parallel between Zee’s tableau here and that 
proffered by Bergson. While for Bergson it is a surfeit of mechanism that stalls the world, 
for the modern philosopher of science, it is a surfeit of symmetry. In a very real sense, this 
is to some extent merely a shift of register, given the historical convergence of the notions 
of symmetry with invariance and laws of conservation, which underpin the concept of 
entropy, and by extension, Bergson’s ‘mechanism’. In both cases, the diagnosed result is a 
preclusion of complexity. 
In a more distinctly logical vein, we might note an exchange between the astronomer 
physicist Joe Rosen and Charles Hartshorne. Hartshorne, without doubt the second most 
influential name belonging to the Process Philosophy movement initiated by Whitehead, 
devotes a chapter entitled and intended to debunk, ‘The Prejudice in Favour of 
Symmetry’.2 He attacks the tendency of scientific reason to equate simplicity with 
symmetry, which he equates with the principle of indifference, or of insufficient reason. 
Hartshorne is in effect critiquing the remote spiritual inheritors of Anaximander. Two 
assertions in Hartshorne’s chapter are closely related and serve further to illuminate our 
argument: ‘Symmetry is in a sense a lack of order,’ and ‘…symmetry is a partial or abstract 
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aspect of what, in its concrete wholeness, is an asymmetry.’ Commenting on the first 
assertion, Rosen observes: 
Order is practically synonymous with distinguishability, discriminability, irregularity 
and heterogeneity. Indeed, symmetry is inversely related to order, 
distinguishability, discriminability, irregularity and heterogeneity…Thus we have 
“the more symmetry, the more regularity, and the closer to homogeneity.”3  
For Rosen too, then, a world of perfect symmetry is an inert world. He proceeds to argue, 
elaborating on Hartshorne’s assertions, that ‘for change to be possible for a situation, there 
must be some aspect of the situation that is not immune to the proposed change and can 
serve as a standard for the change.’4 Hence invariance or symmetry is necessarily 
accompanied by some variant or asymmetry. What is more, Rosen notes, asymmetry is 
prior, a condition in every case pertaining to the total situation; he takes the case of the 
rotational translation of an equilateral triangle; it is only the existence of spatial 
surroundings which ensure invariance under rotation through, say, 120°; 
But if the equilateral triangle were a universe unto itself, there would be no 
standard for 120° rotation, so it would not be a possible change...The existence of 
the symmetry depends on the existence, somewhere in the world, of a 
corresponding asymmetry.5 
In all of this we can see both the operation of a Leibnizian style of reasoning and the 
motivating impulse behind Whitehead’s assertion on the primordiality of a first ‘decision’ 
or ‘limit’ as a precondition for ‘reason’, and indeed sufficient reason.  
The final supporting example here for our sense of sufficient reason as dissymmetry is 
offered by the quantum cosmologist Lee Smolin, who belongs unquestionably and 
avowedly to the Leibnizian spirit delineated here. Throughout his work, Smolin pursues a 
critique of recent developments in theoretical physics through the explicit application of 
Leibnizian ideas. Once again, this critique entails a demurral from the convergence of ‘law’ 
with ‘symmetry’. The adoption of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, he argues, militates 
against any presumption of eternal, ubiquitous laws presiding over events in the world; 
under the presumption of a ‘relational’ world, on the contrary, by which he means that of 
Leibniz, Mach and Einstein, it is illegitimate to treat any element in nature as immune to 
reciprocal determination; laws, for Smolin (as they were for Peirce), are that ‘par 
excellence’ which demand an explanation, a reason. Smolin acknowledges the intricate 
association of the Principle of Sufficient Reason with the Principle of the Identity of 
Indiscernibles, and teases out its implication for modern science with respect to 
dependence on arguments from symmetry; 
Another consequence of the PSR [Principle of Sufficient Reason] was stated by 
Leibniz as The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII)…there cannot be two 
distinct objects in the world with the same properties. This rules out symmetries in 
the sense of global symmetries, i.e., transformations which take a system between 
two physically distinct states which have the same values of all conserved 
quantities. 6 
And as for symmetries, so for laws; 
Our universe should not be seen as a vast collection of elementary events, each 
simple and identical to all the others, but the opposite, a vast set of elementary 
processes, no two of which are alike in all details. At this level fundamental 
principles may be discerned but there are no general laws in the usual sense.7  
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The critique enables Smolin to identify key components of the framework of physics which 
are in need of reconceptualization, in line with our argument here for sufficient-reason-as-
dissymmetry; 
For example, in reality, no physical system is translationally invariant because the 
universe is complex enough that each and every event has a unique curvature 
tensor reflecting the influence of distant masses as well as gravitational waves, 
neither of which can be screened by any physically real material. Another example 
is the global symmetries of the standard model, which are only approximate when 
the effects of the fermion masses are ignored. To put it in slightly simpler terms, 
the proton is slightly lighter than the neutron.8 
The examples Smolin offers here are somewhat more central to the scientific corpus than 
those generally acknowledged. The much-noted asymmetry of beta-decay (for example by 
Feynman) tends to figure in the literature as an interesting anomaly which does not in itself 
disturb the general faith in arguments from symmetry. In contrast, Smolin acknowledges 
that his argument serves to undermine the cornerstone work of Emmy Noether in the 
formalisation of the laws of conservation.9  
This is a particularly significant standpoint for the present argument, since it was Noether 
who formalised every known and widely accepted conservation law, in line with the 
theorem named after her; 
Every symmetry corresponds to a conserved quantity.10 
The formulations are each expressed in mathematical notation, but are translatable into 
statements expressing equivalence or invariance. Spatial Invariance, for instance, equals 
Conservation of Momentum, while Rotational Invariance equals Conservation of Angular 
Momentum. Dave Goldberg draws out the fundamental importance of Noether’s work for 
the underpinnings of modern physics as a whole: 
Noether’s Theorem describes much, much more. It describes and explains the 
conservation of spin, electrical charge, of “color” (the equivalent of charge in the 
strong nuclear force), and on and on, ultimately providing the mathematical 
foundation for much of the standard model of particle physics.11 
Noether’s formalisations of conserved quantities (or constants) include the conservation of 
energy. The specific invariant underlying the conservation of energy is ‘time’. Time 
Invariance equals Conservation of Energy. Put slightly differently, this equivalence states 
that, given the invariance of the laws of physics over time, energy will be conserved. This at 
once serves as the preconditional first law of thermodynamics and precisely what is 
contested in evolutionary cosmological paradigms. Hence Smolin’s position comes into 
contention with the first law of thermodynamics, and by extension the second law which 
depends on it. In these terms, then, Smolin’s position lends some credence to Deleuze’s 
own position with respect to entropic processes.  
Another aspect of particular importance follows from Smolin’s reasoning. In absence of any 
true translational symmetry, he describes the world as ‘a vast set of elementary processes, 
no two of which are alike in all details’. It is this last formulation of what we are calling 
sufficient-reason-as-dissymmetry with which both Deleuze and Whitehead share the most 
telling ground; the absolute singularity of the event for Deleuze is everywhere proclaimed 
as loudly in Whitehead’s work. In all of the above, the central point of departure from 
arguments from symmetry relies on a more or less explicit recognition that Leibniz’ 
Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is inseparably dovetailed with the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason. There is no reason under the sun which can rely on perfect symmetry. 
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Smolin’s Leibnizian heuristic rather satisfyingly speaks to the arguments marshalled here, 
and hopefully embellishes the association of ‘limit’ (or constant, or law) with sufficient-
reason-as-dissymmetry in closer dialogue with the discourse of science. Nevertheless it 
would be misrepresentative to claim that such broadside correspondences , much less any 
general suspicion of the universality of entropic processes, can unproblematically be 
assigned to all scientific thinkers who are disinclined to accept arguments from symmetry. 
Such a case in point is Roger Penrose, who expresses caution over the axiomatic use of 
arguments from symmetry.12 The argument for his own ‘Conformal Cyclic Cosmology’, 
however, goes so far as to insist that the second law of thermodynamics should hold firm 
not only within the lifetime of one cosmos, but between the expiry of one cycle of the 
universe and the commencement of the next from its ashes.13 
 
Limits and Non-Locality 
 
If the correspondences between limits and dissymmetry allow us to identify a shared 
ground between the philosophy of difference and certain paradigms in scientific discourse, 
there is a second aspect to the nature and role of ‘limits’ as proposed by Whitehead, which 
aligns his cosmology with Deleuze’s own. It opens up further correspondences with 
contemporary physics. This aspect is encapsulated in the following quotation from Science 
and the Modern World: 
By “limitation” as applied to the spatio-temporal continuum, I mean those matter-
of-fact determinations – such as the three dimensions of space, and the four 
dimensions of the spatio-temporal continuum – which are inherent in the actual 
course of events, but which present themselves as arbitrary in respect to a more 
abstract possibility.14 
It is clear from this assertion that Whitehead has in purview an ‘abstract possibility’, a 
virtual, which extends far beyond any simple extrapolation from the actual to the possible; 
indeed, as Deleuze would have it, this abstract possibility as condition, is not constrained to 
resemble that which it conditions. The particular exemplar here – the contingent 
dimensionality of the space-time continuum – is for Whitehead as arbitrary in the 
particulars of its expression (three dimensions of space, one of time) as it is for Deleuze, 
who speaks of a preconditional Depth whose dimensions remain undetermined prior to 
differenciation, or explication.15 This is as much as to say that the parameters for 
expression proper to nature include a topology of n dimensions in the domain of the virtual 
which enjoys delimitation only through the process of explication, of decision, of limitation. 
Deleuze closely echoes Whitehead’s assertions with respect to spatio-temporal 
dimensionality in his discussion of the Idea in Difference and Repetition; 
An Idea is an n-dimensional, continuous defined multiplicity…By dimensions, we 
mean the variables or coordinates upon which a phenomenon depends; by 
continuity, we mean the set of relations between changes in those variables.  
(DR p.128) 
On the face of it, we might take the word ‘dimensions’ in this quotation in a sense more 
related to the ‘dimensions’ of a state space as accommodated by the Hamiltonian or 
Lagrangian, with no necessary connection to spatio-temporal coordinates; indeed, the 
supporting example of colour values suggests as much. Deleuze goes on however, to make 
clear that spatio-temporal dimensions are to be included as variables in the Idea; 
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Such relations are precisely non-localisable ideal connections whether they 
characterise the multiplicity globally or proceed by the juxtaposition of 
neighbouring regions. In all cases the multiplicity is intrinsically defined, without 
external reference or recourse to a uniform space in which it would be submerged. 
Spatio-temporal relations no doubt retain multiplicity, but lose interiority.  
(DR p.183) 
This elaboration serves to cast phenomena, Ideas, in the (acknowledged) stamp of 
Riemannian multiplicities and manifolds, which are explicitly conceptualised as 
independent of any homogenous embedding space. A key factor of Riemannian topology is 
that relationships between points are assumed in advance of any metric which may assign 
distance between them. Relations are understood independently of any pre-determined 
dimensional order which frames them, ‘a system of multiple, non-localisable connections 
between differential elements which is incarnated in real relations and actual terms.’   
This higher-order topology figures prevalently in the underpinning narratives of post-
relativistic and post-quantum physics, whose most flambuoyant expression remains string 
theory and its derivative hypotheses, M-, or Brane- Theory, but is no less in play whenever 
quantum theorists undertake to conceptualise non-locality. It may be argued, for instance, 
that any realist interpretation of the wave function, such as that of de Broglie or Bohm 
implies perforce a commitment to spatial higher-order dimensionality.16  
For Whitehead, some expression of the spatio-temporal continuum must be in play as a 
prerequisite for actualisation; 
Further, the status of all possibility in reference to actuality requires a reference to 
this spatio-temporal continuum. In any particular consideration of a possibility we 
may conceive this continuum to be transcendental. But in so far as there is any 
definite reference to actuality, the definite how of the transcendence of that 
spatio-temporal continuum is required. Thus primarily the spatio-temporal 
continuum is a locus of relational possibility, selected from the more general realm 
of systematic relationship.17 
The implication that things may be (or may have been) otherwise than our three-
dimensional space-time, that other ‘decisions’ may have arisen, is explicitly embraced by 
Whitehead in Modes of Thought; 
Perhaps in the dim future mankind, if it then exists, will look back to the queer, 
contracted, three-dimensional universe from which the nobler, wider existence has 
emerged.18  
In other words, the particular order of extension we are familiar with is, potentially, a 
contingent matter-of-fact, a how, pertaining to the particular cosmic epoch in which we 
find ourselves.  
 Whitehead’s thinking on this point reflects an all-encompassing sense of the mutability of 
any and every element of nature. That the order of dimensions may change, along with the 
‘natural kinds’ we encounter therein is a consequence of the mutual interaction between 
those natural kinds and the regimes of organization in which they are implicated, the 
constants and laws such as the speed of light and the conservation of angular momentum. 
Whitehead’s coinage for natural kinds, ‘societies’, is tellingly chosen to reflect this 
character of mutability, of epochal nature; 
The laws of physics are the laws declaring how the entities mutually react among 
themselves. For physics these laws are arbitrary, because that science has 
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abstracted from what the entities are in themselves. We have seen that this fact of 
what the entities are in themselves is liable to modification by their environments. 
Accordingly, the assumption that no modification of these laws is to be looked for 
in environments, which have any striking difference from the environments for 
which the laws have been observed to hold, is very unsafe. The physical entities 
may be modified in very essential ways, so far as these laws are concerned. It is 
even possible that they may be developed into individualities of more fundamental 
types, with wider embodiment of envisagement. Such envisagement might reach 
to the attainment of the posing of alternative values with exercise of choice lying 
outside the physical laws.19 
What is at stake here, then, is a certain conception of ‘limitation’ and its corollary, 
‘openness’, which is, I would argue, fully consonant with Deleuze’s own metaphysics, the 
counting God and the Ideal Game. Each limit and each constant is susceptible to breach 
through the incremental modulation of nature itself; each ‘problem’ to be solved by nature 
in search of itself, natura naturans, is recast anew by the ensuing regime. It is at this point 
we can recognize the ‘structurally schematic’ notion of the Problem which Deleuze inherits 
from Lautman in operation at the cosmological scale; each solution which paradoxical 
nature proposes, each epoch and each regime is structurally driven to supersede itself. 
There is a certain shared view of contingency, chance as the only necessity. These 
correspondences between the two thinkers, along with Whitehead’s more explicit 
motivation toward a metaphysics adequate to the relativistic and quantum sciences of the 
day, allow us at once to foreground ways in which contemporary physics may be said to 
express similar paradigms, and to consolidate our picture of Deleuze’s concept of the limit. 
With respect to the first question, it is generally understood that the work of contemporary 
physics is to determine the particularities of the ubiquitous and continuous exchange 
between matter and energy. On this broadest characterisation, Deleuze’s investigation of 
the relation between the extensive and the intensive stands full square on the same 
territory, though important caveats bar any simple identification between ‘the intensive’ 
and ‘energy’. Rather, it is more apt to consider the intensive and the extensive as in effect 
two regimes of energy; the first characterised by continuous multiplicity, the second by 
discrete multiplicity. For Whitehead too, intensive relations assume priority over 
extensive.20 More generally, it is important to note that for both thinkers, the energy which 
is directly amenable to empirical observation necessarily displays an inherently 
adumbrated set of behaviours in comparison to the intensive, virtual realm. This represents 
for Deleuze the essential block to any direct empirical access to intensive phenomena as 
such; 
Nevertheless, we encounter severe difficulties when we attempt to consider 
Carnot’s or Curie’s principles as local manifestations of a transcendental principle. 
We know only forms of energy which are already localised and distributed in 
extensity, or extensities already qualified by forms of energy. (DR p.223) 
Whitehead expresses essentially the same problematic in Science and the Modern World: 
But energy is merely the name for the quantitative aspect of a structure of 
happenings; in short, it depends on the notion of the functioning of an organism. 
The question is, can we define an organism without reference to the concept of 
matter in simple location?21 
Whitehead is using the term ‘organism’ in a rather specific sense here, one which does not 
refer solely to an organic living entity. In his terminology, an organism is simply any system 
or set of systems which embody a somewhat stable, more or less coherent range of pattern 
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or rhythm; chemical cycles would count as an example.22 What is shared between the 
quotations from both thinkers is a conception of energy inclusive of, but distinct from, its 
instantiation in specific locations. Whitehead’s critical term ‘simple location’ here makes 
reference to a line of argument he offers against classical physics in light of the revolution 
of Relativity; to conceive of phenomena uniquely in terms of action between contiguous 
elements in the way we find in classical dynamics, is to prolong the mistaken illusion that 
both micro- and macro-physics deals with forces exerted between spatially well-defined 
bodies, ‘simply’ located, an illusion he dubs ‘the fallacy of misplaced concreteness’. This 
thread of argument in Science and the Modern World is orientated first and foremost to the 
problematisation of the notion of simultaneity in Relativistic theory. The import behind the 
critical term ‘simple location’ may thus leave ambiguous whether he believes in a kind of 
‘distributed’ event which acts without contiguous connection, but the phrasing in the 
shortly subsequent Process and Reality is both unequivocal and serves as a remarkably 
prescient intuition of issues in quantum physics that would arise as the source of a major 
controversy that is yet to be resolved; 
Provided that physical science maintains its denial of “action at a distance,” the 
safer guess is that direct objectification is practically negligible except for 
contiguous occasions; but that this practical negligibility is a characteristic of the 
present epoch, without any metaphysical generality. (PR p.308)  
For ‘direct objectification’, we may read ‘contiguous causal influence’ here, but only with 
respect to macroscopic phenomena in our own epoch; there may be others, Whitehead 
infers, in which direct objectification, causal influence, does not rely on contiguity. In terms 
of the history of modern physics, we might observe that Whitehead was writing at a time 
shortly after the Copenhagen Interpretation was being consolidated at the Solvay 
Conference in 1927; arguably, this could be said to be the point at which ‘action at a 
distance’ was instantiated as an implication of quantum theory, yet this was not 
foregrounded as problematic as such until almost a decade later, 1935, in a series of papers 
Einstein was to write, precisely against ‘action at a distance’. What is more prescient in 
retrospect is the key idea that such phenomena may be more or less prevalent in given 
epochs – an aspect that is echoed in certain recent theories, as we will see.  
In terms of the history of philosophy, we should recognize that the fallacy to which 
Whitehead refers is in direct contention with David Hume’s picture of causality, which 
placed spatial contiguity at the centre of what it was to be considered a cause.23 The critical 
term ‘misplaced concreteness’ finds its counterpart in the positively employed term in 
quantum physics, ‘non-locality’; a concept which contradicts Humean causality equally 
unambiguously. The term refers in the first instance to a phenomenon conjectured as an 
unavoidable inference from the tenets of quantum theory as it was being consolidated in 
the 1930s. The phenomenon in question is ‘entanglement’, understood to describe that 
circumstance where two (or more) particles are attuned to each other’s states through 
interaction. Quantum principles entail that the wave collapse of one entangled particle, 
prompted by measurement thereof, will dictate a corresponding immediate collapse of its 
partner’s wave (technically, they are the same thing), resulting in a directly correlated value 
with respect to the property investigated, say spin or polarisation. The paradox is that such 
a phenomenon must apply even in those circumstances where the particles in question are 
separated by distances which rule out communication within the constraint imposed by the 
speed of light; in other words, this implication of quantum theory is found to entail a 
contradiction of the fundamental principle of relativity theory that nothing (no causal 
influence) can travel faster than light.24 The paper which raised this undesirable 
consequence was in fact published by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in 1935, with the 
intention of debunking those aspects of quantum theory which entailed such sacrilege, or 
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at least to demonstrate that quantum physics must be incomplete. In fact, the undesirable 
consequence in question, which Einstein was famously to label ‘spooky action at a 
distance’, has been well verified in subsequent experiments, and given conceptual 
credence independently of any given quantum framework by John Stewart Bell in 1964.25 
The phenomenon of non-locality has been almost universally accepted subsequently by the 
physics community to such an extent that any theory which does not offer some account 
thereof will face some difficult challenges of justification. We will consider some examples 
in a later section. 
Equally, for Deleuze, ‘location’ as such, the particular topological structuration of our 
observed space-time, is contingent, a result of the particularities of the unfolding of 
intensive processes. This is the thread behind his concept of ‘depth’ in Difference and 
Repetition; 
Extensity can emerge from the depths only if depth is definable independently of 
extensity. The extensity whose genesis we are attempting to establish is extensive 
magnitude, the extensum or term of reference of all the extensio. The original 
depth, by contrast, is indeed space as a whole, but space as an intensive quantity: 
the pure spatium. (DR p.230) 
As Deleuze goes on to make clear, it is only with the explication of extensity that it can 
make sense to talk in terms of direction, length, left or right, and most importantly of 
metric space. ‘Location’ does not have any simple meaning in the non-metric space of the 
virtual. Moreover, the differentiation between the concepts of ‘the intensive’ and ‘energy’, 
to all intents and purposes rests on the distinction between location and non-locality: 
Only a particular form of empirical energy, qualified in extensity, can be at rest; one 
in which the difference in intensity is already cancelled because it is drawn outside 
itself and distributed among the elements of the system. However, energy in 
general or intensive quantity is the spatium, the theatre of all metamorphosis or 
difference in itself which envelops all its degrees in the production of each. . . there 
is no more an extensity in general than there is an energy in general within 
extensity. (DR pp.240-1) 
In the case of the spatium, there are certain characteristics which we should note. Firstly, 
the term is not to be taken to refer to the explicate, to the spatial or the extensive as such. 
It is nevertheless the condition of all explication; it is what produces space (as we shall see, 
this formulation serves to align Deleuze with certain strands of thought in quantum 
physics; specifically the holographic paradigm and loop quantum gravity). The conditions 
themselves are intensive. But again we should be sensitive to the particularities of the 
distinction here; while it is tempting to visualise ‘the intensive’ as ‘energy’ and ‘the 
extensive’ as matter or material space, this does not do justice to the thought. Rather, the 
passage above first and foremost makes the distinction between two forms of energetic 
phenomena; the intensive and the ‘empirical’ (or explicated). What is it that distinguishes 
them? In Deleuze’s word, distribution. The illusion pertaining to entropy, he claims, stems 
from the fact that we have access only to the already distributed, located forms of energy 
in the explicate world. In present context, it is unmissably clear that this claim does not 
depend on energy coming to express itself at a particular point and place, having previously 
been unlocatable. ‘Distribution’ is not akin to distribution on a map. Distribution, rather, is 
what produces space as such, left and right, its metric and its dimensionality. When 
Deleuze uses phrases such as ‘qualified in extensity’, this is what he means. The terms of 
his claim about the illusory nature of entropy are not fully visible until they are understood 
in this sense; ‘Only a particular form of empirical energy, qualified in extensity, can be at 
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rest.’ Equilibrium, in other words, is unavailable to the intensive realm since it lacks the 
site, we may say literally the ground, in which it may take place. The demarcation between 
the philosophy of difference and modern physics on the question of ‘regimes’ of energy 
may not be as clear cut as it at first seems, however. On the face of it, it is relatively 
uncontroversial to observe that physics encompasses more than one regime of energy. The 
energy inherent in the vacuum, the so-called ‘quantum foam’ is so named because it 
operates under a different regime than the distributed energy which macroscopic or even 
atomic physics treats. Firstly, it is understood to apply at the Planck scale, many orders 
smaller than the atomic. Secondly, it is understood not to impinge on the balance of 
energetic phenomena at higher scales due to the principle of the conservation of energy. 
The ‘quantum fluctuations’ of the vacuum take place at distances so short and time-scales 
so brief that nature proceeds unaffected. Exceptions to this rule are countenanced, 
however, and spectacular ones at that. One such exception is the central proposition of a 
theory we have alluded to previously: Edward Tryon’s short paper published in Nature in 
1973 posits the creation of the material universe as a quantum fluctuation of the vacuum 
which led to the Big Bang.26 If the ‘routine’ quantum fluctuation can be considered as a tiny 
wave arising from a sea of energy, the fluctuation leading to the Big Bang might be called a 
tsunami; like the tsunami, this super fluctuation would be composed of many coinciding 
waves acting in tandem, prompting a cascade of symmetry-breaking, breaching the sea-
walls of the quantum regime and propagating a new, conjoined material-energetic 
structure in the form of our observable universe. Clearly, the simple structural similarity 
between dual regimes of energy in modern physics and the philosophy of difference can 
only serve as an initial marker. We are bound to ask to what extent the existence of 
vacuum energy may serve to advance or rebut Deleuze’s position on entropy as a 
transcendental illusion, applicable only in one regime but not the other. This line of 
questioning is further complicated by the recognition in modern physics of a ‘dark energy’ 
which permeates the cosmos and accounts for a staggering proportion of its total 
estimated mass (due to the equivalence of mass and energy established by Einstein). The 
nature of this dark energy is thus far a matter of some dispute, and the question as to 
whether it might constitute a further separate regime must remain a moot one for now. 
Nevertheless, we will have the opportunity later to examine the implications of vacuum 
energy for the philosophy of difference in context of the work of Charles Lineweaver and 
David Bohm.    
The distinction in kind between the two regimes of energy are equally reflected, and 
equally in terms of topological theory, in Whitehead’s work, where he assigns ‘coordinate’ 
or ‘extensive’ division only to extensity, or as he terms it, the ‘physical pole’. 27 There is for 
both thinkers, then, an account of causality or expression which makes no fundamental use 
of the concept of location, and in both cases this is reflected in their conception of the 
topological structure of nature. Locality is produced through intensive exchange.  
In all of these correspondences, we find an emerging shared picture between the two 
thinkers with respect to extension and its relation to the intensive which at once serves to 
calibrate their at first apparently tangential attitude to the concept of ‘limit’ (Whitehead’s 
insistence on the need for a ‘principle of limitation’ and Deleuze’s rejection of the 
substantive existence of limits and constants) and to orient both toward a metaphysics 
adequate to the modern era. Firstly, the intensive is primary, topologically multivalent and 
thereby capable of action at a distance; indeed, this may serve as the major distinction 
between the intensive and extensive regimes. Nevertheless, for each, the supervenience of 
the extensive on the intensive is necessary for empirical phenomena to occur. The priority 
of the intensive in no way mitigates the essential exchange between the two regimes; 
without the extensive, limitation may not occur. We should not miss the corollary here, 
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however, since it marries together the notions of ‘limitation’ and ‘retardation’. If, by the 
lights of quantum theory, action at a distance, non-locality, entails superluminal influence, 
then all production of localised phenomena, all contiguity, is at the same time a 
retardation. Without the circumscription of intensive topology through explication, there is 
no ‘hesitation’, no ‘retardation’ and thus no creativity.  
To establish the correspondences with modern physics, it is instructive to consider the 
recent ‘completion’ of the Standard Model in physics represented by the discovery of the 
Higgs Boson in 2012. Prior to this discovery, the existence of the Higgs Boson was 
conjectured as a consequence of the so-called ‘electroweak theory’; 
But one of the consequences of the electroweak symmetry is that, if nothing new is 
added to the theory, all elementary particles including electrons and quarks would 
be massless, which of course they are not.28  
The mismatch between the observed mass of the elementary particles and their predicted 
masslessness within the theory was acute, since according to Relativity, massless particles 
are free, indeed bound, to move at the speed of light. In a universe in which all particles 
move at the speed of light, no material structure is possible. The initial version of the 
electroweak theory was in other words fundamentally at odds with the observed order of 
the world. The Boson and its associated Higgs Field was proposed as the mechanism by 
which mass is conferred upon elementary particles. Some slowing down, some retardation 
was required to square the circle. Rodolphe Gasché recognizes the correspondences here, 
in a discussion of Deleuze and Guattari’s chaos in What is Philosophy? The Plane of 
Immanence, which serves to slow down the infinite speeds of chaos is, he says; 
Not unlike the field of forces manifested by the Higgs Boson, which, according to 
the Standard Model, is comparable to a kind of molasses that permeates space, 
and prevents the elementary forms of matter from just zooming around at the 
speed of light by providing them with the mass necessary for there to be atoms, 
and hence matter, the planes that cut through chaos actualize it in the different 
shapes of the concepts, functives and percepts/affects through which the particles 
of chaos become imbued with reality.29  
Where Gasché adopts the Higgs metaphorically as a figure to characterise the operation of 
the Plane of Immanence, the plane which governs the chaoids, Philosophy, Science and the 
Arts, we might more particularly focus on the correspondences regarding the genesis of 
matter as such. In the history of physics, the Higgs was posited as a required element of 
supersymmetry, of which the Electroweak Theory constitutes a milestone. The central idea 
behind supersymmetry is that the various disparate forces, fields and natural kinds, with 
their diverse associated laws, are a remnant in our cooled down universe of what once was 
a unified cosmos, governed by one single ‘super’ force. This being so, the reasoning is that 
all forces will be found to converge into fewer and fewer manifestations the more 
proximately we can map conditions pertaining in the high-energy conditions of the early 
universe. Ultimately all will be subsumed into one at or near the Big Bang. The Electroweak 
force represents just such a step along the way; it displays the unity of electromagnetic 
force and the ‘weak’ atomic force (the one governing interactions between atoms and 
attractions or repulsions within, excluding those in operation in the nucleus) under high-
energy conditions. A third force, the ‘strong’ atomic force was subsequently reconciled 
theoretically at yet higher energy levels, leaving only one force currently outside the 
purview of supersymmetry; gravity. The Higgs Boson and Higgs Field are understood to be 
responsible for the cleaving apart of the other forces: 
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Although the universe began in a perfectly symmetrical state, the Higgs broke this 
symmetry and enabled the matter that formed within the universe to evolve into 
complex and diverse structures.30 
From the point of view of material existence, we might consider this first breaking of 
symmetry the primordial limitation of which Whitehead speaks, introducing ‘contraries, 
grades and oppositions’. Prior to this, the cosmos was an entirely energetic phenomenon, 
whose only speed was the speed of light. It represents a retardation, then. Moreover, the 
retardation is a precondition for the ‘diverse structures’ we observe; it is a principle of 
complexity. Lastly, in a quite literal way, we can view the operation of the Higgs Field on 
massless energetic phenomena as an explication in our sense, involving an unfolding of 
dimensionality. The Higgs Mechanism is explicitly conceived as such.  
As Jim Baggott recounts, the world before the Higgs field takes effect is massless and two-
dimensional;   
 The mechanism works like this, a massless field particle with spin 1 (a boson) 
moves at the speed of light and has two ‘degrees of freedom’, meaning that its 
wave amplitude can oscillate in two dimensions that are perpendicular (that is, 
transverse) to the direction in which it is travelling. If the particle is moving in the z-
direction, say, then its wave amplitude can oscillate only in the x- and y- directions 
(left/right and up/down).31 
The reason for this two-dimensional restriction may be understood simply as a function of 
the speed of light as an absolute upper speed limit. Any entity moving at the speed of light 
could oscillate ‘forward’ only by exceeding that speed limit. Equally, any oscillation 
‘backward’ would by definition fall below the speed of light. But the lesson of the Higgs is in 
effect a corollary to the principle that massless particles travel only at the speed of light; to 
fall below the speed of light is to acquire mass. The transition from masslessness to finite 
mass is intimately linked to the transition from two-dimensionality to three-dimensionality, 
a spatial symmetry-breaking. In effect, it is the presence of the Higgs background quantum 
field which serves to allow this symmetry-breaking. The field displaces the vacuum energy 
from zero, forcing phenomena to ‘make choices’ in seeking their lowest energy state, just 
as the balanced pencil falls over in one direction; 
Breaking the symmetry creates a massless Nambu-Goldstone boson. This may now 
be ‘absorbed’ by the massless spin 1 field boson to create a third degree of 
freedom (forward/back)…In the Higgs mechanism the act of gaining three-
dimensionality is like applying a brake. The particle slows down to an extent which 
depends on the strength of its interaction with the Higgs field.32 
Again, there is an inseparable connection between the explication described here and the 
retardation or braking effect. The Higgs field introduces inertial mass into the world, but in 
the process redefines the way inertial mass itself is to be understood; 
The inertial mass of an object is a measure of its resistance to acceleration. Our 
instinct is to equate inertial mass with the amount of substance the object 
possesses. The more ‘stuff’ it contains, the harder it is to accelerate. The Higgs 
mechanism turns this logic on its head. We now interpret the extent to which the 
particle’s acceleration is resisted by the Higgs field as the particle’s (inertial) mass.33  
In the Deleuzian register, the intensive regime, the spatium, provides the conditions for the 
extensive, including its dimensionality, through a process of explication. Energy becomes 
‘distributed’. It is not the limited thing which defines the limit, but the limit which produces 
the limited thing. It is not the retarded thing which defines retardation, but retardation 
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which produces the retarded thing. Let us not forget that when Deleuze speaks of the 
‘freeze-frame’ which science imposes on the Plane of Immanence (the scientific ‘frame of 
reference’), this is no mere cognitive framing, it refers to physical processes too; ‘It is a 
fantastic slowing down, and it is by slowing down that matter, as well as the scientific 
thought able to penetrate it with propositions, is actualised.’ (WP p.118). As such, the Higgs 
field might be taken to foreground the role of mass in this account of material genesis. For 
our purposes too, we are now in a position to submit that the philosophy of difference 
carries traction not only in the classical and chaotic paradigms, but in quantum theory too.  
While all these suggestive correspondences fall out of the supersymmetry account quite 
naturally, there is nevertheless (at least) one circle still to square. The speed of light, albeit 
staggeringly fast, is not the infinite speed which Deleuze attributes to chaos, nor the plane 
of immanence. The slowing down in question is of another order we might say. With this 
observation, it is doubtless tempting to allow the philosopher the metaphorical (perhaps 
even hyperbolic) latitude which the intrinsically anexact disciplines are due. ‘Infinite speed’ 
can be taken to mean nothing more, after all, than ‘the fastest possible’. Yet it is too early 
to allow this distinction to collapse for the sake of alignment with a particular strand of 
physics. Without embarking on a discussion of whether we can countenance (even from 
Deleuze) a really existing infinity, let us only earmark the word ‘infinity’ as a signifier of the 
mutability of constants-limits and a refusal to arbitrarily curtail this mutability. A reminder 
that ‘the fastest speed possible’ is only nominally attached to any given value and indeed 
any given phenomenon for a world in which the only necessity is chance. This is what 
Deleuze means when he claims that ‘every limit is illusory and every determination is 
negation, if determination is not in an immediate relation with the undetermined.’ (WP 
p.120). An infinity in the service of evolution.  
‘Limit’, ‘locality’ and ‘retardation’ are at root different aspects of the selfsame 
phenomenon. But the key thing to recognize is that for both Whitehead and Deleuze, any 
given limitation is as contingent as limitation per se is itself necessary. No limit, no 
constant, is eternal. No law is forever. Deleuze explicitly connects this non-local 
characteristic of nature to the contingency of laws; 
Moreover, while the laws of nature govern the surface of the world, the eternal 
return ceaselessly rumbles in this other dimension of the transcendental or the 
volcanic spatium. (DR p.241) 
Perhaps the most telling illustration of this is again with respect to the speed of light; it 
must and does serve as a constant for the Special and general Theories of Relativity, yet as 
we have seen, this constant, understood as a maximum limit to speed in the propagation of 
phenomena is not without its experimentally verified exceptions.34 Nevertheless, there is 
little denying that the broad generality of observed phenomena does conform to such a 
speed limit (Whitehead would add cautiously, in this epoch, Deleuze refers us to the 
capacity for evolution in the ‘volcanic spatium’). Indeed, we need only ask what would 
happen if the speed of light were infinite to recognize the role such a limit must play in the 
order of nature. Michael Epperson comments; 
…[I]t should be emphasized that for Whitehead (and likely as well for Einstein), the 
critical importance of the constant c had little to do with the phenomenon of light 
per se; its significance, rather, lay in the derivative invariance of spacetime intervals 
and the associated possibility of (I) the asymmetrical, logical and causal ordering of 
events within spacetime reference frames, and (II) the provision of a congruence 
relation that allows for the comparison of spatial and temporal extensive 
coordinations across diverse spacetime reference frames.35 
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Here the fact of the speed of light’s potential variability (it may have been faster or slower) 
is not so much the point as that any selection of this limit through the calibrations of the 
cosmos will represent a ‘slowing down’ from the superluminal speeds of ‘abstract 
possibility’, of superluminal ‘non-locality’, of infinitely fast communication. The limit is 
necessary, while its value is contingent and potentially mutable. This limit, then, is both a 
prerequisite for any definitive arrow of time, of a ‘logical and causal ordering of events.’36 
The ‘principle of limitation’ as Whitehead has it, then, is equally a principle of retardation, 
in its outermost scope, and is so in the sense that it bestows order.37 We are palpably close 
to Deleuze’s assertion that chaos is a matter not so much of disorder, but of the infinite 
speed with which every form vanishes in an ‘infinite speed of birth and 
disappearance…without consistency or reference.’ (WP p.118) 
The metaphysics of both Deleuze and Whitehead, then, afford a framework for non-
locality, and both insist that locality is a product of the intensive domain, an explication of 
the implicate order. For the most part, the scientific literature acknowledges that non-
locality must be addressed, but this acknowledgement tends to be limited to a rehearsal of 
the problems and paradoxes attached to EPR-type experiments, pertaining to the 
entanglement of a pair of or at most several particles. While it can be and has been put to 
practical use in quantum computing for instance, non-locality still tends to be seen as an 
oddity or an exception to the ‘routine’ operation of quantum events. There are 
counterpoints to this view, however; two such are the ‘network’ and ‘holographic’ 
paradigms, put forward to address the conditions which must pertain in order to account 
for non-locality on a cosmological scale, to offer a structure which is faithful to the 
phenomena.38 
 
A Network Paradigm: Loop Quantum Gravity 
 
Loop Quantum Gravity is an ambitious proposal to reconcile the stubborn persistence of 
perhaps modern physics’ most deep-rooted problem; the conceptual mismatch between 
relativistic and quantum theories. At its most basic, the mismatch consists in the nature of 
space which each depends on; for relativity theorists, space must be a continuum, while for 
quantum theorists space is essentially discrete. The proposal behind loop quantum gravity 
is that the basic building block of matter is not particulate, not formed from atoms, nor 
quarks, nor ultimately from any smaller particle which may remain to be discovered, but 
from ‘loops’ of energy at a much smaller scale, which may combine in a multitude of ways 
which constitute the sub-structure of the particles in the standard model. As such, space is 
understood to be quantised; indeed, there is nothing more to it than the connections 
afforded by these vanishingly small loops; it is produced by the endlessly imbricated 
network of such connections. Due to this structuration, however, space has properties 
which mimic the continuum on which Relativity depends.39 What is discarded in this picture 
is the criterion of contiguity for nodes of the network to count as neighbours. The key to 
the network paradigm can be presented in terms of connectivity; any node may be 
connected to any other at all in the network, regardless of how ‘near’ or ‘far’ it may be, not 
limited to its spatial neighbours; in fact, the relation of neighbouring is better thought of as 
a function of connectivity than distance. The corollary is that the ‘space’ of these loops 
must be conceived as higher-dimensional, allowing for connections not limited to 
neighbours contiguous in three dimensions, while the relative potential for connection 
between nodes is a function of available energy. Nodes may connect without regard for 
distance, even in theory beyond the light cone which represents the limit to the 
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propagation of influence for relativistic theories. The conceptual shift required for this 
paradigm requires a certain reversal of perspective; the question becomes not ‘how do we 
account for non-local phenomena?’, but how it is that locality arise from such a situation, 
‘how does the three-dimensional character of the observable world emerge?’ If Loop 
Quantum Gravity networks rely on non-local connectivity, then localised spatial structures 
emerge with the loss of those connections. Leonard Susskind expresses this succinctly; 
Things that are separated are not really separated…There’s just a cancellation of 
the things that are connecting them.40 
It is useful in context of this argument to give in full a quotation already alluded to above 
from Deleuze and Guattari’s What Is Philosophy?; 
It is difficult to see how the limit immediately cuts into the infinite, the unlimited. 
Yet it is not the limited thing that sets a limit to the infinite, but the limit that 
makes possible a limited thing. (WP p.120) 
It seems that the required reversal of perspective is not lost on Deleuze here; indeed, we 
have encountered just such an insight with respect to lines of flight – the question ‘how do 
lines of flight escape centres of envelopment’ is reversed in favour of the real question, 
‘how do intensities come to be enveloped in the first place?’ – here, however, the same 
problematic touches much more illuminatingly on the themes of topological limitation-
explication and retardation, following as it does after discussion of the ‘constant-limit’, 
such as the speed of light in science. While it is true that not all the phenomena envisaged 
by Deleuze’s term ‘constant-limit’ are quite so directly associable with speed (he references 
the quantum of action and absolute zero), we should bear in mind that in Deleuze’s 
framework, all phenomena, including constants of nature, are repeatedly referred back to 
relative speeds; 
 Such limits do not apply through the empirical value that they take on solely within 
systems of coordinates, they act primarily as the condition of primordial slowing 
down, that, in relation to infinity, extends over the whole scale of corresponding 
speeds, over their conditioned accelerations or slowing-downs. (WP p.119) 
Non-locality is prior, then, pertaining until ‘cancelled’. For the network paradigm in Loop 
Quantum Gravity, it is the number of connections sustained by the network which dictate 
the topological character of the world, and this in turn is dictated by the energy available; 
in a maximally energetic system, each node would be connected to every other, in a 
manifold which includes, but is not limited to the three dimensions we are familiar with. 
Lower-energy patterns offer a different story. They’re just what we want. Each 
grain connects to just a few others, forming a regular grid like a honeycomb or 
woven fabric. The notion of distance regains meaning: some grains are close 
together, the rest far apart. The network is nice and roomy. The principle of locality 
holds: for an influence to go from one place to another, it can’t hop straight there, 
but must work its way through the network. The passage of the signal takes time, 
which would explain why the speed of objects through space is limited (by the 
speed of light).41 
Further, then, the topology of the world dictates the causal character of the world; 
contiguity may be more or less salient; non-local connections are not an ‘all or nothing’ 
condition of nature; the path from full connection to null may drop off cancellation by 
cancellation. In higher-energy conditions, effects may occur instantaneously at a distance. 
In lower-energy states, causal influences will have to propagate through the contiguous 
nodes of the network.  
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We are in a position now to map the detailed exemplification of this theory in physics onto 
principles outlined in the metaphysics we have been discussing. We can translate from one 
register to another. 
The quantum network described by Loop Quantum Gravity is not space as such, but that 
which produces space, a spatium. The ‘depth’ of the connected network is intensive in that 
the propagation of energy therein is qualitatively different to the propagation of energy 
within what Deleuze describes as the ‘already distributed’ systems which alone are 
susceptible to empirical investigation; any and every connection is available in the loop 
quantum spatium. The intensive character of the network is inextricable from topological 
structure, just as for Deleuze the intensive is a topological depth. The network (to enlist 
Serres’ insight) is a continuous multiplicity; no connection may be added without rendering 
the network anew. Causal influence takes place at superluminal speeds, approximating the 
infinite speed of relations which Deleuze attributes to the Plane of Consistency. Distance is 
meaningless for the quantum network; it is produced by cancellation of connectivity. The 
intensive regime becomes explicated, space appears along with locality, and the name of 
that explication is ‘cancellation’.42 These processes certainly avoid what Whitehead 
referred to as ‘the fallacy of simple location’. Explication-cancellation is inextricable from a 
loss of available energy, a degradation. Cancellation is a limitation, not merely in the loose 
sense that the synonyms imply, but in the topologically symmetry-breaking terms which 
Deleuze and Whitehead favour. Finally, the production of space from the intensive 
structuration is to be understood as the transition from one epoch to another; the 
transition from the epoch of maximal energy to our cooled-down universe, from one 
typology of numbers to another for Deleuze’s calculating God, whose calculation produces 
the world.  
Is everything here? Is nothing lacking? Can a case be made that order for quantum loop 
gravity answers to all the requisites of a philosophy of difference? Not as such; there are 
caveats to observe. 
Some reflection on the network model itself suggests a natural distinction between 
regimes of the Loop Quantum universe with respect to simplicity (simple order) and 
complexity. The range of levels of connectivity is from maximal to minimal, from a fully-
connected matrix in n-dimensional space to a state in which no node is connected to any 
other. For both limit cases, maximal and minimal, we could say the organization is simple; 
each node is identical to every other.43 As such, the overall levels of complexity over the 
course of the lifetime of the cosmos according to Loop Quantum Gravity describe an arch, 
peaking at greatest complexity in the middle and falling away toward the end. The theory 
does not offer the same escape from the second law as promised by Stuart Kauffman’s 
‘adjacent possible’. 
It is a matter of inclination, perhaps, whether we prefer to adhere to Bohm’s (and 
Deleuze’s) proposition that there are no states which lack complexity (merely greater or 
lesser orders thereof), or whether we choose to acknowledge the qualitative distinction 
between simple order and complexity which suggests itself through the terms of Loop 
Quantum Gravity. Yet in either case, the lack of an explicitly reciprocal determination 
between the ‘virtual’ and ‘actual’ aspects of the theory may defer any closer equivalence 
between the nature of complexity we find in it and the philosophy of difference. Perhaps 
the principle of reciprocal determination itself belongs so resolutely to metaphysics that it 
can only be ‘put in by hand’, rather than ‘falling out of the equations’. Yet in an important 
way, outwith the terms of Loop Quantum Theory, Smolin does adhere to reciprocal 
determination, as we shall see.      
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With respect to retardation, the devil is in the detail. Undoubtedly the genesis of spatial 
phenomena is part and parcel of a ‘slowing down’ of the cosmic network; to lose 
superluminal connection incrementally as available energy recedes is analogous to an 
incrementally enforced speed-limit gradually rolled out through a city. Certain districts 
remain frenetically active, like a scene from Koyaanisquatsi, while others adopt the 
sedentary pace (Smolin says, ‘When space emerges in such a model, so does locality. So, 
also, does the existence of a speed limit for the transmission of signals.’)44 The overall 
potential for speed decreases. Gradually the regime switches from relative domination by 
the superluminal speed to relative domination by the subluminal. More accurately, 
everything happens as though the speed-limit roll-out were implemented by reckless, 
criminally negligent town planners; the superfast districts remain enfolded within the 
speed-restricted, non-locality nestles inextricably within locality. Nevertheless, the ultimate 
direction of travel is unmistakeable; the retardation in question is tied to the loss of 
available energy, to entropy. It is not allotted the same role as Bergson’s vital nor Deleuze’s 
life. Strictly within the dynamic account of this network paradigm, there is no ‘principle of 
complexity’ as such. Yet here again is a juncture at which to parse the concepts. The 
cancellation of connections, precisely because it entails a localisation of phenomena, can 
only serve to defer the speed of phenomena. In a universe where available energy is 
insufficient to sustain maximal connection, as Smolin has it, ‘[T]o travel between two 
widely separated nodes, a particle has to make many hops. It takes time for a particle, or a 
quantum carrying information, to go a long way.’45 Yet what is it to ‘hop’, what is it to be 
deferred, but to become caught up in the exchanges of the subatomic world? Of photons, 
of bosons, of the natural kinds of the standard model? To join the ‘interlacings’ described in 
Serres’ account of Lucretius’ text? Which is as much to say turbulence and complexity? 
From this point of view, we are able to identify more parsimoniously just what it is that 
constitutes the thalweg in the Loop Quantum Gravity account of explication/cancellation; it 
is the production not so much of matter but of space itself, a tract which serves as the 
incline frustrating the maximal fall which is the fate of all phenomena. This is the real 
meaning of locality. Yet again, though, there is a circle to square here; it seems intractably 
that this geometrogenesis is a result of slowing down, of retardation, not the cause thereof. 
As such, the reciprocality of determination which characterises Deleuze’s philosophy of 
difference so strongly is lacking. The account affords us all the latitude, all the openness of 
a Deleuzian-Whiteheadian cosmology, yet seems to stop short of the crucial sense of 
expression. And so it does; for the story it tells is one of the particularities of explication. It 
says nothing of implication, nor complication. Indeed, it is not in Smolin’s network 
paradigm for quantum gravity as such that we should look for anything corresponding to 
these ideas, but in the evolutionary account he offers for cosmology writ large, as we shall 
see. 
 
A Holographic Paradigm: David Bohm’s Implicate Order 
 
Loop Quantum Gravity provides no explicit parallel to Deleuze’s implication as such, the 
ultimate return of all actualised phenomena to the intensive, virtual regime, ceding place 
continually to subsequent actualisations. The exchange, rather, as laid out in that theory, is 
one-sided, from the intensive non-local network to the explicate local.  
David Bohm’s ‘holographic’ paradigm offers more direct potential to match the scope of 
Deleuze’s metaphysics, not least in terms of the reciprocal determination of two regimes of 
energy. Key terms he employs answer quite neatly to those employed by Deleuze himself; 
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he organizes discussion of the exchange between the energetic and the physical under the 
rubric of the ‘implicate’ and ‘explicate’ orders respectively. 
Bohm adopts the example of the holograph to illustrate a form of causality understood to 
embrace both the features of ‘wholeness’ (or ‘holism’) and non-locality, which he singles 
out as the essential explananda for physics after the quantum revolution. In his view, the 
universe is definitively interconnected in all of its parts, or rather, to underline the point, 
‘sub-wholes’, and in ways independent of three-dimensional contiguity. The production of 
a holograph employs a split-beam laser, one path of which is used to illuminate a body 
from all sides, then recombined with the other path to create an interference pattern at 
the surface of a photographic plate. The 3-d image is encoded, or ‘enfolded’ into all parts 
(sub-wholes) of the plate by dint of the fact that what is recorded is not the image as such, 
but the interference pattern itself. The image is not localised, then, in the sense of a one-
to-one mapping of visual content, but retains a coherence from multiple viewpoints, with 
maximum clarity and faithfulness to the original object from one particular angle. ‘Locality’ 
in this example corresponds to the 3-d image from a given point of view, the crucial feature 
being that this apparently autonomous single image viewed from a fixed point is 
indissociable from the whole of the distributed wave-pattern itself; the single holographic 
phenomenon may be viewed throughout the bounds of the plate, but will take on different 
visual aspects (perhaps appearing with a more truncated perspective) depending on the 
location of the observer. Writ large, this modest example serves to encapsulate the 
ubiquitous organization of nature; no localised phenomenon is isolated from the 
movement of nature as a whole; all relations extend in an interconnected fashion 
throughout the whole of the universe (Bohm’s term for the intertwined forms of order 
illustrated here is ‘holomovement’). Bohm’s ‘holism’ unequivocally frames the question of 
cosmology in the form ‘how is locality produced?’, rather than ‘how do we account for non-
locality?’ Our very problem. 
For Bohm, the implicate is that same order we have encountered above under the name 
‘generative’; he uses the terms as close synonyms. It is non-local and transcendental, while 
the explicate is subject to locality. He attributes the inspiration for this concept to what is 
known in physics as Green’s Function. Green’s Function is a formalisation of what Bohm 
calls ‘the general structure of movement according to quantum mechanics,’ which, ‘can be 
thought of as representing a summation of very many waves’. A Feynman Diagram is in 
essence a visualisation of this process. Both the function and the diagram are designed to 
account for the way in which a ‘particle’ may be said to have a ‘trajectory’. Both ‘particle’, 
understood as subsisting self-same material substance, and ‘trajectory’, understood as the 
path taken by such a substance, are definitively relinquished concepts in quantum theory; 
the eternally enduring, ‘uncuttable’ atom of the ancient atomists is not that of the particle 
physicist. Movement at the atomic and subatomic level is rather understood to propagate 
outwards from a given point in wave-form until some section of the wave encounters 
another converging from another direction; this encounter in turn determines a fresh point 
from which radiation propagates outward. It is the point of connection between the wave-
fronts which may be considered in terms of particles, though even here, it is better 
conceived as a locus of energetic exchange between particle types; the original incoming 
particle is not preserved. A ‘trajectory’, then, is not the passage of a subsisting entity 
through space from one point to another, but a successive series of exchanges, a self-
renewing pattern of movement. The lack of resemblance to a classical concept of trajectory 
is all the more stark given that both Green’s Function and the Feynman Diagram allow us to 
speak of a single trajectory only in abstraction from the ‘real’ scenario of a vast continuum 
of other possible pathways along which the movement may take place. Significantly, Bohm 
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locates the twin moments of his explicate/implicate order within these already-established 
conventions of quantum theory; 
Evidently the Feynman Diagrams give an imaginative picture of a wave motion. In 
this picture, wavelets can be seen unfolding from each point toward the whole. Yet 
the very same movement can be thought of as wavelets enfolding toward each 
point from the whole… [T]he basic movement of enfoldment and unfoldment is 
thus a dual one in which there is ultimately no separation between enfoldment and 
the unfoldment.46  
There is clearly a great deal of resonance between this framework and the concepts of 
explication and implication which Deleuze borrows from Renaissance Neoplatonist 
thought. For Bohm, as for Deleuze, the explicate, or unfolded, order, is that amenable to 
empirical observation. It is the expression in three dimensions dominated by contiguous 
phenomena, of an underlying ‘sea’ of non-localised, energetic phenomena; this latter is the 
implicate order. The terminological confluence centring around the fold, the pli, and its 
etymological affiliates speaks of a broad conceptual convergence. Bohm’s ‘holism’ echoes 
Leibniz’ work in all the ways foregrounded in the above discussion. Nature is understood as 
the reciprocal determination of the two forms of order and composed of phenomena 
interconnected throughout; 
This discussion appears, at first sight, to reduce the time order [the explicate] so 
that it could, in principle, be derived completely from the timeless [the implicate] 
order. This would indeed be so, if the “flow” in the implicate, generative stream 
were only in the “direction” from the source or origin down to ever more explicate 
orders of succession. However, because of the two way nature of this flow, there is 
an inherent dynamism in the theory and such a reduction is not possible.47  
Each individual is inherently discernible, following Leibniz and Whitehead; 
So the relationship of each moment in the whole to all the others is implied by its 
total content; the way in which it ‘holds’ all the others enfolded within it. In certain 
ways this notion is similar to Leibniz’s idea of monads, each of which ‘mirrors’ the 
whole in its own way, some in great detail and others rather vaguely. The 
difference is that Leibniz’s monads had a permanent existence, whereas our basic 
elements are only moments and are thus not permanent. Whitehead’s idea of 
‘actual occasions’ is closer to the one proposed here…48 
 Further than meeting on common Leibnizian ground, however, Bohm’s conception of 
nature offers more specifically Deleuzian parallels. As a result of the holographic, holistic 
character of the world, we find support lent to Deleuze’s insistence that qualities are 
epiphenomena masking wave after wave of intensive phenomena. Employing the 
analogously holographic metaphor of a flat-screen TV, George Musser comments on this 
aspect of Bohm’s paradigm; 
Going back to our flat-screen metaphor, you might visualise field entanglement as 
a nest of wires crisscrossing the screen to link together. For most purposes this isn’t 
a bad image… [b]ut deep down it fails. Entanglement doesn’t mean that the 
brightness and colour of one pixel can become coordinated with the brightness and 
colour of other pixels. It means that individual pixels don’t actually have brightness 
or colour values: only groups of entangled pixels do. An entangled field has holistic 
qualities that do not exist in any one place, but span the entirety of space.49 
In its own register, then, the holographic paradigm reiterates for us Deleuze’s assertion 
that quality is an epiphenomenon of explication, ‘covering over’ intensive relations. 
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As with Loop Quantum Gravity, connections may be drawn between the topology of 
Bohm’s cosmology and Deleuze’s own idea of ‘depth’. The process of explication in each 
case relies on a spatium which has its own order of dimensions, independent of locality or 
contiguity; 
 One discovers, instead, both from consideration of the meaning of the 
mathematical equations and the results of the actual experiments, that the various 
particles have to be taken literally as projections of a higher-dimensional reality 
which cannot be accounted for in terms of any force of interaction between 
them.50  
The implicate order, first and foremost for Bohm is a structuration of the prodigious energy 
inherent in the vacuum, the so-called ‘Dirac sea’, which underlies the phenomena which we 
encounter in the explicate order. Its sheer latent power, he recognizes, dwarfs the ‘already 
distributed’ forms of energy in the explicate world; 
 … [W]hat we call empty space contains an immense background of energy…matter 
as we know it is a small, ‘quantized’ wavelike excitation on top of this background, 
rather like a tiny ripple on a vast sea.51  
Such a disparity of energy between the two orders is a theoretical consequence of the 
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, which states that increasingly accurate knowledge of a 
particle’s position will correlatively render increasingly uncertain any knowledge of its 
momentum; the reverse is axiomatically true. This means that if completely accurate 
knowledge of a particle’s position is required, the information about its momentum is 
effectively predicated on a frozen instant; this has the unfortunate consequence of 
ushering in an infinity into the solutions to the equation, or to put it another way, the range 
of values of energy associated with the particle are absolutely without boundary. This 
phenomenon is referred to as the ‘zero point’ energy, and is associated with the vacuum. 
Despite misgivings over the presence of this infinity, zero point energy has been generally 
accepted, at the very least as a necessary working hypothesis by much of the physics 
community. It is more universally accepted that energy values ramp up exponentially the 
closer the approach to zero point. For Bohm, this underlying energetic order in itself should 
force us to reappraise the structuration of energy we find in the explicate order, in 
particular to recognize that true causal efficacy belongs to phenomena of the implicate 
order rather than the explicate.52 Bohm’s two regimes of energy are equally two regimes of 
order, with profoundly different properties. It is not that Bohm recognizes the importance 
of the two forms of energy in a way that other physicists do not; the concept of vacuum 
energy is routinely conveyed in most introductions to modern physics, most often in 
context of its significance for the cosmological constant. Rather, in Bohm’s speculative 
physical theories, the two regimes of energy serve to prompt an overall conception of 
nature bearing striking correspondences to Deleuze’s philosophy of nature. The 
inexhaustibility of the implicate order both informs the detail of Bohm’s understanding of 
cosmic evolution, and serves to clarify the implications of Deleuze’s resistance to the 
second law. The reader will also be struck by palpable similarities between Bohm and 
Deleuze with respect to the Event as an exchange between two regimes of order, and two 
orders of time; 
…[S]cience has, up to now, emphasized the sequential order of successive changes. 
In the larger scale this includes, for example, the theory of evolution. In the 
generative order, however, time is not put into the first place. Rather, time has to 
be related in a fundamental way to the generative order. The image of a stream is 
helpful in this respect. The stream can be studied by following an object that floats 
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along it, in a time process. However, it is also possible to consider the entire stream 
all at once, to reveal the overall generative order that goes downstream from the 
source or origin.  
But the stream is only an image. The essential flow is not from one place to another 
but a movement within the implicate and superimplicate (generative) orders. At 
every moment, the totality of these orders is present and enfolded throughout all 
space so … they all interpenetrate. The flux or flow is therefore between different 
stages and developments of these orders. However, because of the possibility of 
loops, this flow may go in a pair of different “directions” at the same time.53  
It not uncommon to encounter claims that linear time, or indeed time of any sort, is birthed 
concomitantly with space in the relativistic and quantum physics literature, and the above 
quotation certainly conforms to that tenet, but what is most striking here is the way Bohm 
is drawn to envision the consequences of this conclusion in terms of the two domains of 
order. There is much in common between Deleuze’s  discussion of the temporal regime of 
the Aion in The Logic of Sense, wherein series may ramify both backward and forward in 
time, potentially infinitely, and Bohm’s ‘loops of time’ in the generative order. 
 
Evolutionary Expansiveness 
 
‘The general aspect of nature is that of evolutionary expansiveness.’  
A.N. Whitehead54 
 
‘…and the rules of actualization are not those of resemblance and limitation, but those of 
difference or divergence and of creation.’  
Gilles Deleuze55 
 
If limitation is a real factor in the passage of nature, it may never be so in the sense of 
negation or opposition; we are enjoined by Deleuze always to bear in mind the infinite 
speeds of relata on the plane of consistency, the infinite mutability of both pieces and 
rules, laws and natural kinds in the Ideal Game.  
What serves to consolidate this particular thought of limitation beyond the clutches of 
negation is the process of evolution; the passage of nature is evolutionary. 
The history of science, and indeed of the philosophy of science, is not short of examples of 
thinkers who adopt ‘evolution’ as a descriptor for the passage of nature, the unfolding of 
cosmological history as a whole, rather than restrict the term to the adaptation of life. Nor 
should this be particularly surprising, given the general acceptance that the universe has 
altered during the course of its history not merely from configuration to configuration but 
from one state to another.56 Evidently there is a necessary looseness of the metaphor: 
could it ever make sense to speak of ‘adaptation’ in this context? To what might a cosmos, 
the entirety of being, adapt? And if we were to allow ‘descent with modification’ in the 
case of cyclical cosmologies, it is not clear what mechanism, if any, could serve analogously 
to genetic recombination, nor even that any such mechanism could survive the annihilating 
transition from one cycle to another. 
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The key identifying feature of the evolutionary paradigm which we will adopt for this 
argument is the reciprocal determination of law, constant and natural kind in the 
development of nature. From this criterion, we might identify four variants of the 
paradigm, each of which have gained currency in the scientific discourse: 
1) Those accounts which posit varying natural conditions in causally disconnected 
regions of the universe. Adherents would include Paul Dirac and Fred Hoyle.57 
Rather surprisingly, it is also possible to include the more speculative Newton in 
this category.58  
2) Those which posit the cyclical renewal of the universe, with conditions cast anew at 
each reiteration.  Roger Penrose’s Cyclical Conformal Cosmology would be an 
example, as would Lee Smolin’s multiversal account, which goes so far as to 
identify a mechanism of ‘natural selection’ based on the superior propensity of 
universes with a relatively high density of black hole production to give rise to 
subsequent cycles. 59  
3) ‘Bubble Universe’ accounts, which posit the ongoing creation of branching 
universes from within our own. These are predicated on the phenomenon of 
‘inflation’ proposed by Alan Guth.60  
4) Those accounts in which laws, constants and natural kinds co-vary within a given 
region over time. David Bohm’s work must be included here, as must that of 
Murray Gell-Mann, and again Lee Smolin.61 
At this point, it becomes clear that if we are to pursue Deleuzian/Whiteheadian 
metaphysics on the landscape of modern cosmology (though the list above is by no means 
exhaustive), the variant which offers most productive exchange is of the fourth kind; those 
accounts which favour the concept of internal evolution. The cosmos as a chaosmos. For it 
is this version most directly in which creativity, the Event, may be said to be continuous, 
never to cease (‘il ne cesse pas’). Just as the Event does not hold in abeyance for the 
disjunctions of chaotic bifurcation, nor does it await the branching of bubble universes, nor 
the transition between cycles from one universe to the next. As for causally disconnected 
regions of the universe, these are difficult to square with a thoroughgoing non-local 
account. It seems then we have a criterion in the metaphysics which is sufficiently salient to 
favour or disfavour specific variants of the cosmic evolutionary paradigm. If the chaosmos 
is a ‘multiverse’ it is so because of the internal multivalency of the conditions which it 
comprises. Universes are enfolded within it. The volcano rumbles on underneath the 
explicate order. But it is not the singularity of the cosmos alone which marries the fourth 
category of cosmology above with the philosophy of difference; it is the fact that each 
example adheres to a certain sense of ‘openness’. Here again the openness in question is 
not only, not limited to, the openness of chaotic open systems. It is the triple mutability of 
constants, natural kinds and laws.  
While much argument has been devoted thus far to Deleuze’s adherence to the principle of 
reciprocal determination, it is worthwhile to devote a little time to consolidating the 
degree to which his own text entails specific application of this principle to the evolutionary 
triad, law, constant and natural kind.  
With respect to law, a quotation at greater length from one we have already seen; 
The constants of one law are in turn variables of a more general law, just as the 
hardest rocks become soft and fluid matter on the geological scale of millions of 
years…[I]f repetition is possible, it is due to miracle rather than to law. It is against 
the law: against the similar form and equivalent content of the law. If repetition 
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can be found, even in nature, it is in the name of a power which affirms itself 
against law, which works underneath laws, perhaps superior to laws. (DR p.2) 
This opposition to ‘the law’ is not so much a lawlessness, but a non-indexical, generative 
principle of order, in the first instance a divergence of series; there is no content to the law 
which may operate ‘from above’ upon the phenomena; all events are immanent. 
So too with limits and constants; limits are as necessary as they are subject to supersession; 
they are valid only insofar as we bear in mind the infinite speeds of relata on the plane of 
consistency. It is the limit that makes possible the limited thing. We have seen with the aid 
of Whitehead that this thought takes us to a primordial breaking of symmetry, a primordial 
divergence which constitutes the reasonless root of sufficient reason. Indeed, bearing in 
mind the close association of the constant or invariant with the notion of symmetry, we 
have seen how chimerical the notion of symmetry may be in the first place; it can be no 
final arbiter in a world where each event, no matter how large or small, contributes its own 
unmeasurable quantum of discernibility, of incommensurability.  
If there is much in the Deleuzian text to consolidate our association of the principle of 
reciprocal determination with these first two terms, law and constant, there is perhaps less 
explicitly to underwrite such an association with ‘natural kinds’, even though we might 
from the outset suspend any essentialist connotations that phrase bears. Nevertheless, 
there is sufficient material to point this way; the insistence that relative speeds are all that 
differentiate entities on the thousand plateaus is a case in point. By the same token, is it 
not one implication of the assertion quoted above with respect to limits, that the very 
typology of ‘limited things’, of natural kinds, is a function of the contingent limit 
supervening on the open-ended plane of consistency? It is of course part and parcel of the 
radical contingency of the philosophy of difference that these limits may have been other 
than they are, and hence the ‘things’ different in kind. It is just this kind of idea that 
Deleuze and Guattari have in mind with the claim; 
There is no reason to think that all matter is confined to the physico-chemical 
strata: there exists a submolecular, unformed Matter. (ATP p.503) 
And again; 
[Chaos] is a void that is not a nothingness but a virtual, containing all possible 
particles and drawing out all possible forms, which spring up only to disappear 
immediately. (WP p.118)  
Deleuze and Guattari describe the fate of a science bound to a ‘plane of reference’ (in 
contrast to the plane of consistency) forever to ‘bifurcate’, to produce new axes of 
reference, in response to the contingent limits it encounters along its journey. Due to its 
reliance always on pre-set coordinates, science is bound to investigate only the underside, 
so to speak, of an already-distributed natural landscape, whose limits have already closed 
over, whose tectonic plates already dovetail; 
The history of the sciences is inseparable from the construction, nature, 
dimensions and proliferation of axes. Science does not carry out any unification of 
the Referent but produces all kinds of bifurcations on a plane of reference that 
does not pre-exist its detours or its layout. It is as if the bifurcation were searching 
the infinite chaos of the virtual for new forms to actualize by carrying out a sort of 
potentialization of matter: carbon introduces a bifurcation in Mendeleyev’s table, 
which, through its plastic properties, produces the state of organic matter. The 
problem of a unity or multiplicity of science, therefore, must not be posed as a 
function of a system of coordinates that is possibly unique at a given moment. As 
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with the plane of immanence in philosophy, we must ask what status before and 
after assume, simultaneously, on a plane of reference with temporal dimension 
and evolution. Is there just one or several planes of reference? (WP pp. 123-4) 
The outline here unmistakeably casts the scientific project as doomed always to traduce 
the creativity of nature, its genius for the baroque production of novel form. The choice of 
carbon as an example is a particularly telling one in the history of physical chemistry, since 
it presented a seemingly insurmountable challenge of explanation. On the principle that all 
lighter elements are converted into heavier elements, there was a problem encountered by 
Fred Hoyle, working in the early 1950s, in accounting for the transition from helium to 
carbon; it requires a qualitatively different process than that which produces helium from 
hydrogen, yet all heavier elements must subsequently be synthesised from carbon. Hoyle 
conjectured that what was required was a particular excited state of carbon atom which 
could conform in its mass to a triangulated combination of various forms of helium; this 
was quickly confirmed by experiment.62 In short, unlike the syntheses of lighter elements, 
which were in large part produced during the Big Bang, carbon requires a bridging form for 
its nucleosynthesis; a form which requires the energy of stellar formations. The measure of 
this breakthrough is the success of Hoyle’s conviction that nucleosynthesis occurs largely at 
the heart of stars. Nature changes its tactics in the course of completing the periodic table. 
May there not be times in the history of the cosmos when it is free once again to adopt 
new tactics in the production of previously unimagined natural kinds? This is the meaning 
of the question, are there one or many planes of reference? From a different perspective, 
given the well-established tendency of modern physics to understand matter as simply the 
expression of patterns of energy, then any mutation in the way those patterns express is by 
the same token a mutation of material kinds themselves. Plasma gives way to atomic kinds.  
Yet if the evolution of natural kinds falls within the purview of Deleuzian thought, it is once 
again Whitehead who draws out the theme most fully, and who perhaps establishes the 
necessity of this phenomenon in a world in which constants and laws co-vary. Firstly, 
Whitehead commits to an explicitly evolutionary account of nature as a whole from Science 
and the Modern World onward;  
On the materialistic theory, there is material – such as matter or electricity – which 
endures. On the organic theory, the only endurances are structures of activity, and 
the structures are evolved.63  
This is as much as to say that the world is a becoming, comprised of structures of activity, 
events, inheriting their character from preceding events and in turn bestowing their own 
modifications to subsequent generations of events.64 By the evolutionary analogy, the 
characteristics of family can be shared only through a directly-related lineage; the family 
(Whitehead prefers to talk of ‘species’ or ‘societies’) propagates locally, so to speak. Yet for 
Whitehead, these local events are not divorced from the global environment in which they 
take place; 
The causal laws which dominate a social environment are the product of the 
defining characteristics of that society. But the society is only efficient through its 
individual members. Thus in a society, the members can only exist by reason of the 
laws which dominate the society, and the laws come into being by reason of the 
analogous characters of the members of that society. (PR p.91) 
If the conception here places us recognizably on that same territory which Murray Gell-
Mann captures with the phrase ‘frozen accidents’ (all the more so, since Whitehead is given 
to speak of ‘protonic’ or ‘electronic’ societies), nevertheless, Whitehead more forcefully 
identifies a positive momentum in the evolutionary transition from one epoch to the other; 
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Thus a system of ‘laws’ determining reproduction of some portion of the universe 
gradually rises into dominance; it has its stage of endurance, and passes out of 
existence with the decay of that society from which it emanates. (PR p.91) 
Whitehead’s ‘societies’ are natural kinds. Just as does Nietzschean-Deleuzian active force, 
they too ‘go beyond the limit’ of their power.  
This metaphysics goes so far as to dispose toward those theories of cosmology which 
propose the co-varying permutation of each of these terms together. Indeed, the 
congruence is explicitly acknowledged in the quotation below, from Roberto Unger; 
Consider three styles of explanation that have wide-ranging use in natural 
history…we have no good reason to reject out of hand their application in thinking 
about the universe and its history…we can call them the principle of path-
dependence, the principle of the mutability of natural kinds, and the principle of 
the co-evolution of laws and phenomena.65 
Lee Smolin has made an extended case for a version of cosmological evolution which 
broadens the analogy with the principles of biological evolution far beyond the sense 
pursued here, but his collaboration with Roberto Unger focuses more compatibly on our 
narrower terms. Equally, David Bohm’s conception of cosmological evolution provides an 
example of the kind favoured by Deleuzian-Whiteheadian metaphysics. It is Bohm’s version 
which I will argue jibes most favourably in the final nuances. I intend to conclude the 
argument by reading off these respective ideas against a particular hypothesis recently put 
forward by C.H. Lineweaver. In conclusion, this will help to establish more nicely the 
contention that for Deleuze, ‘order’ must be heard first and foremost as ‘complexity’, and 
complexity in its turn as ‘evolution’. 
We have already seen the broad use of Leibnizian principles by which Smolin hones his 
cosmological argument; no less is true of Roberto Unger, his co-writer for The Singular 
Universe and the Reality of Time. Unger develops the theme of a causative relation prior to 
and independent of law. This is for the sake of an open cosmic evolution. It is when he 
brings this to bear on Leibnizian-Machian principles that the points of intersection with the 
line of argument we have been pursuing come to the fore. Neither Leibniz, nor Mach, he 
claims, quite succeeded in stating a ‘relational position’ adequate to the open-endedness 
of the evolution of nature: Leibniz because his philosophy ‘hollows out the meaning of 
causation,’ while Mach, ‘confusingly combines a relational perspective with a very 
traditional, indeed Newtonian, view of causation.’66 In short, the potential for evolution of 
constants and laws is not brought within the purview of either statement of the relational 
position. The quotations below, given at length to draw out connections to Deleuze, is 
unequivocal on the matter; 
The chief distinction between cosmic time under a relational and a cosmic view is 
that, for the relational account, the global character of time resides in the 
unbroken and inclusive web of connections in the singular universe and its singular 
history rather than in some independent place: the place of the invariant 
background or of the eyes of God.67 
Thus far, we are securely on the territory of the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, yet Unger 
goes on to elaborate on the centrality of ‘cosmic time’ to a relational approach in a way 
that joins hands with Deleuze through Bergson: 
It may be objected that this statement simply alters the meaning of words, by 
calling change and causation time. However, something of great consequence is at 
stake. Nothing is for keeps in nature: no typology of being (as described by particle 
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physics and by the periodic table), no set of laws of nature, no ways by which some 
things change into others. Only changing change endures.68 
It is here, where the notion of causation is uncoupled from law, that we can see a 
recoupling, perhaps axiomatic after Bergson, with a duration synonymous with chance, 
creation, evolution and complexity. Unger is familiar with Bergson’s insistence on the 
reality of time (indeed, this very phrase is the subtitle of the work quoted) independently of 
deterministic, extensive relations, and his concern here echoes Bergson’s; to resist the 
relativistic conflation of space and time in complementary dimensions. Deleuze is close to 
marshalling all the arguments of Creative Evolution when he expresses the same idea: 
But the fact that real space has only three dimensions, that Time is not a dimension 
of space, really means this: There is an efficacity, a positivity of time, that is 
identical to a “hesitation” of things and, in this way, to creation in the world.  
(B p.105) 
To include time as a fourth dimension is to risk seeing time as a container brimming with all 
the pre-set possibilities, to enclose micro- and macrocosm within a totality. In this light, we 
would not be wrong to associate Deleuze’s formulation ‘chance is the only necessity’ with 
Unger’s ‘Only changing change endures.’ 
But if Unger dovetails with the metaphysical arguments, this is clearly in the service of a 
more adequate natural history of the evolution of the universe. He takes issue, for 
instance, with those models of cosmic natural history which are intended to simulate the 
early conditions of the universe in keeping with the established laws of our observable 
epoch; ‘The trouble is that the laws and other regularities of nature fail to explain change 
beyond or before nucleosynthesis.’69 The point here is precisely that raised by Deleuze and 
Guattari when they enquire whether there is one plane of reference or many. Since nature 
is capable of adopting different tactics, seems to have done precisely that in prior epochs, 
and may switch again, it is illegitimate to extrapolate the plane of reference derived from 
our present epoch forward or backward to others. Unger’s point entails the further claim 
that phase shifts between one cosmic state of affairs and another are not to be understood 
as governed by ‘meta-laws’, but rather evolve from one to another. In a Whiteheadian 
register, the only endurances are structures of activity, and the structures are evolved. The 
particulars of the correspondence between the physics and the metaphysics are striking. 
C.H. Lineweaver, of the Australian National University’s Planetary Science Institute, recently 
produced an article devoted to nature’s potential for sustaining complexity in light of 
entropic boundary conditions. It touches closely on our highlighted themes – the 
supersession of limits, changing constants, cosmological evolution – and offers one way to 
understand just how the second law of thermodynamics may apply to the explicate order, 
while remaining an illusion, as Deleuze would have it.  
Lineweaver first points out that as a necessary but not sufficient condition, nature’s 
potential for complexity is a function not of the total amount of energy, which is 
understood to remain constant, but of the available free energy, understood to deplete 
through the operation of entropy. This, he proposes, may be understood in terms of the 
difference between the level of entropy accrued by any given time in the history of the 
universe, and its maximum entropic state; to estimate the remaining free energy at any 
point requires only that we subtract the former from the latter. Between this maximum 
and minimum, order and complexity are able to flourish. He identifies a number of useful 
gradients (in terms of making ‘work’ possible) from which free energy may be extracted; 
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luminosity, redox chemistry, pH, humidity, density, gravity, etc., along with a floor, the 
energy associated with the vacuum, below which no gradient can extend. 
Granted a cosmos in which all constants are retained, this scenario should outline the 
boundary conditions for the evolution of complex systems, between the maxima and 
minima of the ‘entropy gap’. Yet, as Lineweaver is at pains to point out, both maximum and 
minimum values are subject to changing conditions over the life-history of the cosmos, 
which necessitates some scrutiny of accounting. The maximum potential for free nuclear 
energy – that energy locked into the fusion of lighter elements into heavier – cannot figure 
on the balance sheet of the early universe, he observes, since it lacked the solar formations 
necessary to engineer such nucleosynthesis; the principle established by Fred Hoyle. 
Equally, the expansion of the universe shortly after the Big Bang served to defer potential 
fusion, and therefore narrow the entropy gap, until such massive structures as stars could 
emerge.70  
If the upper bound is no fixed constant, neither, more importantly for our concerns, is the 
lower. Lineweaver focuses on the phenomenon referred to as inflation, with its associated 
opposition between ‘false’ and ‘true’ vacuum. The concept of inflation was introduced into 
the cosmological narrative in 1979 by cosmologist Alan Guth.71 It is intended to account for 
the apparent ‘flatness’ of the observed universe, with its attendant uniform densities of 
matter and energy.72 This uniform ‘flat’ spread is considered unlikely between systems 
which have never been in contact and thus have had no chance to equilibrate. This it was 
thought must be true of the wider extremes of the universe, since any realistic 
extrapolation backwards to earliest times of the then current estimated ranges for the 
speed of expansion fell short of the required opportunity for communication between 
disparate regions. Guth’s conclusion was that there must have been a period of prodigious 
expansion, a hyper-inflation, at the very earliest point in the history of the universe, 
effectively spreading a single, compact, highly energetic system outward uniformly beyond 
any means of subluminal communication. This brief, dramatic episode was powered by the 
unstable existence of a ‘false’ vacuum energy ensuring a floor, a minimum, destined to 
break through to a lower energy state (the ‘true’ vacuum), both releasing free energy and 
allowing new forms of matter to emerge. The stream found a lower thalweg. 
Lineweaver’s speculative innovation is to propose that such phase transitions may repeat, 
perhaps indefinitely, from one false vacuum to another; at the outer limit, as Serres 
asserts, there is no ‘lowest thalweg’, no true vacuum. The overall effect of such an 
evolution would be to maintain and perhaps increase the entropy gap from epoch to 
epoch; the minimum falls ever away. The accompanying conjecture is that each transition 
may allow for a further ‘collapse’ of matter. Just as hydrogen and helium are given scope to 
fuse into higher elements after the transition from inflation, so, we may conjecture, 
decaying protons, or other seemingly stable particles may provide a source of free energy 
for the next epoch of lower vacuum energy.  
From this synopsis, we can identify the importance Lineweaver’s speculation carries for 
Deleuze. The association of order or complexity with the accessibility of energy gradients, 
free energy, aligns the argument (uncontroversially) with Deleuze. To frame this 
accessibility in terms of the gap between maxima and minima at once preserves the 
(productive) sway of the second law and the indefinite potential for novelty from epoch to 
epoch, as successive collapses unlock ever further potential from the limitless ‘Dirac Sea’. 
Are we not then free to identify on Deleuze’s behalf a certain illusory status for the second 
law as it operates within Lineweaver’s scenario? To reserve the logic of this law for the 
explicate order of each epoch, inapplicable to the underlying aleatory evolution of the 
implicate? Almost, and this almost is instructive. The quotation below allows us to bring to 
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the fore a substantive element which maintains distance between our metaphysics and this 
scientific speculation on cosmological evolution; 
If an infinite number of such free energy sources are identified then the universe 
can keep on evolving…forever. On the other hand, if we have already identified all 
the sources of free energy in the universe, then the acceleration of the expansion 
of the universe and its asymptotic approach to a vacuum state will lead to the heat 
death of the universe.73 
In Lineweaver’s scenario, successive collapses of the minimum may potentially unlock 
sources of free energy understood as already inherent in the cosmic body, some 
recognized, others to emerge subsequently or not, as the case may be. We have, then, a 
distinguishing criterion, for by the lights of our metaphysics, such collapses should be 
attended by a repopulation of natural kinds, new relations and new relata, not yet within 
the range of ‘envisagement’ of the evolving cosmos. Such a repopulation need not be taken 
as an absolute fiat; just as the ‘quark-gluon soup’ remains under actually-occurring (if rare) 
conditions in our epoch, so Whitehead countenances the persistence of superseded (or 
rather, ‘other-than-dominant’) form from one epoch to another. But the very modes by 
which the implicate order unfolds into the explicate and vice versa must alter. Coupling 
constants may change, the relative weight of protons and electrons may alter, any 
variability in the relative strength of gravity to the other forces will affect the tendency of 
matter to clump together, the relative diversity of boson and fermion types may shift. For 
our metaphysics, a change in the regime of energetic exchange must lead to a variation in 
the taxonomy of natural kinds. Whitehead says as much; the members, the societies and 
the environment of the world are reciprocally determinative. Deleuze’s Ideal Game 
requires no less. Nor yet Roberto Unger’s resistance to ‘meta-laws’. 
And it is here that the speculative risks of the metaphysics lies, its amenability to 
discreditation or ultimately disproof, at least in principle.74 By extension, it is the same risk 
run by scientific theorists wedded to this specific variant of the evolutionary paradigm. 
There may ultimately be inherent limits to the permutation-space; the calculating God may 
reach the final typology of number. Whatever these limits might turn out to be, they will 
already be expressed in some fashion in the typology of matter-energy Lineweaver (and the 
Standard Model more generally) refers to; they may not be transparent in the quiddities of 
any given epochal transition, but ultimately they would ‘shake out’ as true invariants, 
symmetries and harbingers of equilibrium.  
 
In turn, this rather sombre conclusion reveals to what extent the radically evolutionary 
moment of our metaphysics must entail, may be the only standpoint which truly entails, an 
illusory status for the second law. To return to Emmy Noether’s formulation, ‘what is 
conserved in temporal symmetry is energy’, let us recall at the same time that this may be 
couched in conditional terms; ‘given the unchanging endurance of the laws of nature, 
energy will be conserved.’ There is a counterpoint to this reasoning which appears 
frequently in the literature of thermodynamics. Henri Poincaré reflects on the potentially 
incommensurable and heterogeneous forms of energy which had been marshalled under 
the name ‘heat’ in the time of Carnot: 
As we cannot give a general definition of energy, the principle of the conservation 
of energy simply signifies that there is a something which remains constant.75 
This something may be nothing more than a mirage produced by our adopted measuring 
practices, of conventional calibrations ensuring parity. Deleuze was sensitive to this 
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reasoning, and indeed quotes this passage in support of the idea of disparity in Difference 
and Repetition. Poincaré continues; 
Whatever fresh notions of the world may be given us by future experiments, we 
are certain beforehand that there is something which remains constant, and which 
may be called energy. Does this mean that the principle has no meaning and 
vanishes into a tautology? Not at all. It means that the different things to which we 
give the name energy are connected by a true relationship; it affirms between 
them a real relation. But then, if this principle has a meaning, it may be false; it may 
be that we have no right to extend indefinitely its applications, and yet it is certain 
beforehand to be verified in the strict sense of the word. How, then, shall we know 
when it has extended as far as is legitimate? Simply when it ceases to be useful to 
us – i.e., when we can no longer use it to predict correctly new phenomena.76    
In other words, Noether’s definition remains unhelpfully circular should we suspend the 
assumption that all forms of energy we encounter are simply variants of the same 
underlying energetic phenomenon.  
This critique is decided unambiguously from the standpoint of our metaphysics: it is 
patently implausible to maintain that energy is conserved when the very forms of energy 
(matter included) and modes of energetic exchange are amenable to permutation from one 
epoch to another. For if there really is no such thing as ‘energy in general’, where then is 
the ‘something’ conserved? And if there is no such principle of conservation in the cosmic 
long term for energy (if the first law does not apply), then it cannot serve as a boundary 
constraint for the production or consumption of free energy (hence neither can the 
second). Disparity itself is unbounded. Dissymmetry is the deepest principle and sufficient 
reason of all that appears At last we can affirm after this lengthy redirection back through 
the Leibnizian version of sufficient reason the necessity of chance which the Nietzschean 
version required; “And are not all things bound fast together in in such a way that this 
moment draws after it all future things? Therefore – draws itself too?” And we have gone 
some way to showing how the sense of this affirmation may in fact be triangulated (we do 
not say resolved) with conceptual strands of modern physics, as Nietzsche had declared it 
his ambition to achieve.   
Nor are we left to extrapolate these conclusions from Deleuze’s own suspicions of 
symmetry and valorisation of disparity. They are explicitly drawn by David Bohm in the 
work Causality and Chance in Modern Physics. In this work, Bohm aims to establish what he 
calls the ‘qualitative infinity of nature’, which entails precisely that open-endedness of 
constants, laws and natural kinds on which we have been focusing. His is an evolutionary 
cosmology in our sense. In a passage considering the question of the irreversibility of 
processes and its relation to thermodynamics, he succinctly lays out the implications of a 
qualitatively infinite nature; 
For, as we have seen, the notion of a law that gives a perfect one-to-one 
mathematical correspondence between well-defined variables in the past and in 
the future is only an abstraction, good enough to describe limited domains of 
phenomena for limited periods of time, but, nevertheless, not valid for all possible 
domains over an infinite time.77  
This being so, we are obliged to recognize that no process can be considered indefinitely 
reversible, since the very channel along which it runs is given over to other modes at each 
end, future and past, of its viable lifetime. We might note that this is an argument for the 
innate irreversibility of the arrow of time which does not essentially rely on the 
thermodynamic arrow of entropy as such. Indeed, Bohm signals a suspicion toward the pre-
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eminence of the second law in numerous references to the inexhaustible energies of the 
Dirac Sea. He continues; 
… [T]he very entities with which physics now works, satisfying the currently studied 
laws of physics, must have come into being at some point in the past, while 
changing conditions, brought about in part by chance contingencies, will eventually 
lead to a stage of the universe in which new kinds of entities, satisfying new kinds 
of laws will come into being.78 
The implication of this standpoint follows; 
The importance of considering the impact of these qualitative changes on the basic 
mode of being of things is also seen when we consider the predictions of the “heat 
death” of the universe…However long before this comes about, it is evidently quite 
possible and indeed very likely that qualitatively new developments reflecting the 
inexhaustible and infinite character of the universal process of becoming will have 
invalidated predictions [of this type]. For example, just as there may have been a 
time before molecules, atoms, electrons and protons existed, the further evolution 
of the universe could also lead to a new time in which they cease to exist, and are 
replaced by something else again. And new sources of energy coming from the 
infinite process of becoming may be made available even if atoms, molecules, etc., 
continue to exist…[T]he infinite substructure of matter very probably contains 
energies that are as far beyond nuclear energies as nuclear energies are beyond 
chemical energies.79 
It is finally in one and the same sense, then, that Deleuze’s resistance to limits of opposition 
and negation and to the ‘heat death’ implied by the second law, and indeed to his 
insistence on the illusory status of that law may be understood. It is the very mutability of 
constants, laws and natural kinds, and perhaps only this, which could maintain an endlessly 
enduring complexity and underpin the infinite process of becoming. The philosophy of 
difference is a philosophy of evolution.  
Once more, though, having reached this conclusion, a final pause is due. After all, the point 
of departure which prompted this exercise in reorientation was the observation that the 
Event for Deleuze was to be understood as ceaseless. Have we not resolved one horn of the 
dilemma, the conflict over entropy, to arrive at a framework which requires of the Event a 
punctuation over a timescale which could not possibly be longer; the transition from one 
epoch to another? Have we not recast the role of periodisation on a scale many trillion-fold 
larger than the chaotic bifurcations which were so problematic? But we must bear in mind 
the connections drawn between the local and the global. Each micro-event, the formation 
of every membrane and every crystal, depends on forces which leap beyond their powers; 
each ‘society’ works to its own demise. Each epoch is a mobile army in redeployment. Each 
and everything is evolving at all times and the single throw of dice conjoins with the whole 
of chance.  
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Conclusion 
 
The question has been not so much how to reconcile Deleuze’s natural philosophy with 
fundamental tenets of science, as to establish what it might mean in a scientific register to 
accommodate the direction of travel. With respect to Deleuze’s stated arguments against 
the substantive existence of entropy, the answer appears to be simply; ‘nothing’. The 
arguments Deleuze adopts against entropic processes risk being dismissed as ‘not even 
wrong’, ironically not because they contradict scientific common sense, but because they 
are unable to secure enough distance from that common sense to meaningfully contradict 
it. Nor is there more than suggestive support from Chaos Theory.  Even the most forthright 
advocates of Chaos theory stop short of pronouncing any other destination but equilibrium 
in the very long term.1 To establish the illegitimacy of generalising from the ideal 
(unachievable) experimentally enclosed system to the world in the wild cannot in itself 
establish that the world will finally, after all deviations and deferments, avoid the same 
moribund fate as the enclosed system. Chaos theory cannot ultimately underwrite the 
broader metaphysical import of Deleuze’s critical argument. In the end, however, I hope to 
have shown that it is not in the critique of entropy that we can triangulate Deleuze’s 
resistance to the Second Law, but in the positive aspects of his metaphysics more generally. 
Disparity and dissymmetry take on their own powers at the cosmological scale. From one 
epoch to another, evolution outruns entropy. 
Ultimately, at this scale too, we can learn the value of Deleuze’s insistence that the Event is 
ceaseless, always diverging but not contingently on chaotic bifurcation; the principle which 
sets him apart from an overly complete assimilation to Chaos Theory. If we are to subscribe 
to this claim, we must conceive the event as independent of contiguity, both spatially and 
temporally. That foreign war a decade ago and this memorial ceremony on home soil are 
not two events but one and the same event at different times and different places. The 
asteroid being nudged at this moment out of its orbit as a result of collision is part of the 
event of the city it will destroy on earth many months hence. The two are conjoined now in 
the same event long before they converge in the same time and place. There is nothing 
essentially episodic nor periodic about the event. Episode and period are epiphenomena, 
limitations and distributions of the more fundamental intensive continuity. This is so at a 
deeper level than the endlessly etiolated interconnection of all phenomena with all others. 
The very structuration of space supports action at a distance. Non-locality is the deepest 
motif of a ceaseless event. It is also a key part of the dialogue between the philosophy and 
the physics. Deleuze’s philosophy invites a natural dialogue with the network and 
holographic paradigms. 
In the end, a great part of any value this work may have consists in establishing a specific 
meaning for ‘openness’ with respect to Deleuze’s cosmology. The lens bringing this 
definition into view has been the central question of entropy; entropy is not definitively 
overcome on this account without the co-variability of laws, constants and natural kinds. At 
its most simple, there is simply nothing to balance out to equilibrium if we accept that 
there is no ‘energy’ in general, and that all manifestations of energy are liable to 
substitution from one epoch to another. Still, a little further reflection and context is due to 
the question of openness. For all that it has become a commonplace to speak of the 
universe as ‘open’ in scientific and philosophical terms, this word, like any other in complex 
argument, accrues its own meaning from context. For Alexandre Koyre, the history of 
cosmology traced a path from the ‘closed’ world of the ancients to the infinite universe of 
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modern science; ‘openness’ can mean simply ‘infinite’ in extent and duration.2 For 
Hermann Weyl, the natural world displayed an openness which was intuitively accessible as 
a potentially infinite ‘open field of possibilities’; an openness demonstrated first and 
foremost by mathematical symbolic construction.3 For Karl Popper, openness connoted 
‘indeterminism’, a status guaranteed in a universe capable of producing consciousness and 
cultural strata.4 From a relativistic point of view, the openness of the universe can be 
judged by its curvature; this openness is a freedom to expand indefinitely on condition of 
‘flatness’. The inflationary model of the big bang encompasses the multiversal conjecture 
that each created universe contains within it the conditions to create further universes, in 
an open cascade of ‘bubble’ universes. For chaos theory, ‘openness’ connotes the 
impossibility of definitively isolating even a single system in the universe as a whole; all 
systems are open. In all cases, perhaps most especially the last, the question of what it is 
for the universe to be open has spawned attendant questions on the nature of physical 
law, and drawn out tensions between determinist and indeterminist treatments of nature. 
‘Openness’ has always been a close synonym for indeterminacy, but the nature of the 
indeterminacy in question can take many forms. It is perhaps always legitimate to ask of 
any given theory not merely what degree, but also what type of openness it entails.  This 
has certainly proven to be the end goal for this investigation. 
To accommodate the ‘evolutionary expansiveness’ which Deleuze and Whitehead envision 
for their philosophy of nature, and to tune this into the scientific register is to recognize 
that trio of elements which must be subject to mutability. It is at the same time to single 
out those strands of thought in the scientific discourse which speak to the same sense of 
evolution. They are already there. This particular form of openness is requisite if Deleuze’s 
thought as a whole is to maintain coherence and value in conversation with speculative 
physics. I am conscious nevertheless, that some sleight of hand may be suspected in all of 
this. After all, what elements are there other than laws, constants and natural kinds in the 
constitution of nature? Does this not encompass everything? The original question re-
emerges; what remains of order if all fixed points are undone? Is this position not 
tantamount to the claim that anything can happen at any time? A claim incommensurate 
with any endeavour that could call itself science? No. There is every reason to insist on a 
more accurate formula for the Deleuzian thought we are presenting here: ‘all things are 
evolving at all times’. To appreciate this point, we might consider and contrast the work of 
Quentin Meillassoux, who claims in apparent agreement with Deleuze, that radical chance 
is the primitive root of everything that appears; ‘contingency alone is necessary’, 5 he states, 
in a palpable echo of Deleuze’s ‘chance is the only necessity’ . Moreover, his reasoning, just 
like Deleuze’s own, is bound up with a rejection of Leibniz’ Principle of Sufficient Reason. 
Despite the apparent common ground, however, I would argue that Meillassoux’ 
conception of radical chance is at direct odds with Deleuze’s. The points of contention are 
worthy of a full exposition and undoubtedly constitute one necessary development of this 
argument, but the main crux is encapsulated in the following quotation; 
If we look through the aperture which we have opened up onto the absolute, what 
we see there is a rather menacing power – something insensible, and capable of 
destroying both things and worlds, of bringing forth monstrous absurdities, yet also 
of never doing anything, of realizing every dream, but also every nightmare, of 
engendering random and frenetic transformations, or conversely, of producing a 
universe that remains motionless down to its ultimate recesses, like a cloud 
bearing the fiercest storms, then the eeriest bright spells, if only for an interval of 
disquieting calm.6 
What Meillassoux is presenting here is a contingency without reason, without need of 
sufficient reason. His formula (his only necessity or absolute), he says, is the principle of 
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unreason, an innate capacity in nature for any random suspension, reversal or 
transformation of laws whatsoever. But we should understand something further, 
conveyed by the phrase ‘random and frenetic transformations’. ‘There is no reason for 
anything to be or to remain the way it is;’ he says, ‘everything must, without reason, be 
able not to be and/or to be other than it is.’7 At every point the persistence of states of 
affairs and structures is subject to a potential reversal. This is not at odds with the enduring 
structuration we actually observe; there is equally no reason why it may not persist. He 
draws an ontological difference between this principle and what he calls the 
‘precariousness’ of all entities under the sun which ultimately may cease to exist; that 
inherent possibility is already encompassed by the lawful regularities of a tame universe. 
The unreason he envisages is rather a ‘lawless destruction of every law’.  
There is something missing from this account which is everywhere declared in Deleuze’s 
philosophy; a sense of propagation, of explication and folding/unfolding. Of evolution. In 
Meillassoux’ universe, laws are considered somewhat like ‘settings’ which may be switched 
on or off here, there or ubiquitously instantly as if by fiat. The openness entailed by 
Meillassoux’ contingency requires an acute adherence to the weightless equivalence of 
radically incongruent possibilities, without delay or retardation in actualisation, without 
mechanism, process or propagation. This is precisely what scientists tend to call ‘magic 
thinking’, a charge often laid at the door of religious or theological accounts of nature. 
Deleuze’s own critique of this style of reasoning consists in the injunction always to seek 
virtual conditions over merely ‘possible’ eventualities. Meillassoux’ position is perhaps the 
most radical possible affirmation of the reverse. His is the thought corresponding to the 
formula ‘anything can happen at any time’. To the extent that Meillassoux’ ‘absolute’ 
depends on this formula it is at odds with Deleuzian metaphysics. By contrast, the open 
evolution of Deleuze’s universe is founded on the underlying conditions of the virtual, there 
where the order of nature lies. To embrace evolution is not to abandon order, but to seize 
it in process. 
There are (at the least) three other areas germane to this reading which have been left 
relatively undeveloped thus far. The biggest omission without doubt is the thermodynamic 
‘arrow of time’. The topic is so intrinsically bound up with questions of order and entropy in 
the scientific literature that each and every line of enquiry pursued here could meaningfully 
be explored with respect to its implications for the arrow of time. In line with his position 
on entropy, Deleuze is quite consistent in assigning an arrow of time to the explicate order 
but not the implicate, yet this does not by any means automatically determine a ready 
response to the question as a whole. In physics, the basic problematic is commonly 
accepted; every law of dynamics or mechanics, at both the macroscopic and microscopic 
level, is neutral as to the direction of temporal evolution of the system they describe. This 
is often explained in terms of video or film footage; any recording of very large scale 
natural processes over a relatively short term would not reveal in itself whether the film 
were running forward or backward; planets orbit, stars expand or contract and so on. The 
laws of macro-scale dynamics work equally well forward and backward. It is only when the 
film depicts a spontaneous increase of order that we detect something amiss; the 
demolished building reassembles, the drained water conspires to organize itself to radiate 
back upward and out of the plughole. None of this contradicts the laws of dynamics, we are 
assured; it is merely vastly improbable that any great spontaneous decrease in entropy, or 
jump from disorder to greater organization should occur rather than the reverse. 
Discussions of the topic have accrued their own routine paradoxes and thought 
experiments; typing monkeys and Boltzmann Brains. Particular variants of the arrow of 
time are attendant on different definitions of order and complexity.  
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Beyond these variables in the debate are more bracing theoretical differences.  Huw Price 
argues that the question of the arrow of time as a whole has been misframed and circular.8 
With respect to radiative phenomena, for instance, such as ripples in water, he claims that 
it is logically no more improbable that wave fronts converge on one point and disappear 
than that they radiate outwards from an initial disturbance. The assignment of 
improbability to such ‘reverse’ phenomena is entirely attendant on a prior assumption that 
radiation proceeds naturally outwards. If the arrow of time were in the opposite direction, 
such convergent phenomena would be unexceptional. This being so, derivations of the 
arrow of time from probabilistic arguments have routinely been guilty of assuming that 
which they are intended to prove. In one respect, Deleuze’s philosophy contains the 
resources to make the same critique; it is a will to impose a good sense and a common 
sense on phenomena which illegitimately presupposes a specific direction to time, from the 
particular to the general, from the differentiated to the undifferentiated and hence from 
the improbable to the more probable. Yet the details diverge. For Price, there is de facto 
only one direction for the arrow of time (it is merely that one direction cannot be 
distinguished on grounds of ‘natural’ probability from the other), while for Deleuze series 
reach both forward and backward in the living present. It is worthy of investigation 
whether Deleuze’s distinction between Aion and Cronos (a linear conception of time) can 
coherently be upheld in light of such a critique. Julian Barbour proposes a cosmological 
model which in effect suspends the question of the arrow of time, arguing that its apparent 
linear progression is the effect of an inherent dissymmetry at the heart of all phenomena.9 
His model entails an account of event which is completely independent of contiguity in 
space and time. Yet once again the similarities to the metaphysics we have laid out here 
are potentially more than outweighed by the differences, not least in that Barbour’s 
account reduces all duration to autonomous instants. These examples are minimally 
suggestive of a rich variety of problematic variants on the theme in contemporary physics. 
A thoroughgoing evaluation of the arrow of time with respect to Deleuze’s philosophy is in 
itself a major project. 
A second line of development lies in a deeper examination of the moments of Deleuzian 
complexity; explication, implication and complication. These moments taken all together 
represent a truly nuanced concept of complexity as such. We have seen in what sense the 
notion of explication serves to orientate our metaphysics with contemporary physics, and 
indeed the recognizable hallmark of implication in holographic paradigms. But what of 
complication? This concept represents the highest order of folding; complication embraces 
all series and series of series, all elements regardless of contradiction, the entirety of the 
virtual and the actual, all difference in itself. It is at once the univocity and the immanence 
of becoming. In what sense can this final component of the triad be said to speak to natural 
science? It would seem approachable only transcendentally. Which forces a decision; are 
we finally to say that there will always be some transcendental sense to the project of 
science?  
These questions underly the final potential line of development; what is ‘transcendental 
empiricism’? Of all Deleuze’s scandalous and iconoclastic innovations, this phrase is 
perhaps the most resolutely oxymoronic. As Marc Rölli puts it,  
Let’s face it, almost everyone, both historically and philosophically, is convinced 
that the systematic positions taken respectively by empiricist and transcendental 
philosophers are incommensurable. 10 
I certainly would agree; empirical principles, the insistence on observation, would seem to 
rule out in advance any recourse to that which must remain in principle unobservable for 
scientific explanation. The initial question becomes for Rölli, ‘Can Empiricism Have a 
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Transcendental Aspect?’ The response necessarily engages a long and fraught negotiation 
between two grand philosophical traditions, alongside an interrogation of Deleuze’s Hume 
and his Kant. Our initial framing question, from a cosmological point of view, might focus 
on a more specifically contemporary problematic: ‘What is the relationship between 
observed enduring pattern in this universe and others in principle unobservable?’ It is a 
question prompted by the readiness of so many fields of contemporary cosmology to speak 
in terms of a multiverse rather than a universe. It hardens the question; not only must we 
ask whether there can be a transcendental aspect to empiricism, but given seemingly 
insurmountable barriers to empirical enquiry, is transcendental speculation ultimately 
avoidable? The questions fall out: ‘given that other universes are in principle unobservable, 
do we discount their existence as a factor in scientific explanation?’; ‘what scope is there 
for identifying underpinning conditions for any universe whatever?’; ‘how might we be 
forced to adapt our own understanding of the patterns of this universe in light of any such 
adduced underpinning conditions for the multiverse (perhaps analogously to the 
conceptual reconfigurations cast backward onto plane geometry by the geometry of curved 
surfaces)?’. For a Deleuzian these questions call on some of the core resources in the 
corpus – the idea of univocity, of immanence and the nature of the Plane of Immanence 
(are there one or many?), of expression, and now as I hope to have established, of 
evolution. 
           
    
  
 
 
      
 
 
1 It would be untrue to say that nobody has drawn this inference; Karl Popper, writing in 1956, drew 
on the early results of Ilya Prigogine’s work to suggest that Heat Death could legitimately soon be 
deposed from the cosmological account. Prigogine himself has been more circumspect about 
arguments extrapolating from or to the cosmologically long term, not least because they tend to 
depend upon the assumption of exquisitely ordered initial conditions for the universe, a surfeit of 
improbability. ‘Whatever the past,’ he says, ‘there exist at present two types of processes: time-
reversible processes, where the application of existing dynamics has proved to be successful…and 
irreversible processes l ike heat conditions, where the asymmetry between past and future is 
obvious. Our objective is to explain a new formulation of physics that explains, independently of any 
cosmological considerations, the difference between these behaviours.’ See Popper, K., The Open 
Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism (UK: Routledge, 1988), pp.173-4, and Prigogine, I., The End 
of Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the New Laws of Nature (US: Free Press, 1996), p.28. 
2 Koyre, A., From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (UK: Forgotten Books, 2008). 
3 Weyl, H., The Open World (US: Ox Bow Press, 1989). 
4 Popper, K., The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism (UK: Routledge, 2007). 
5 Meillassoux, Q., After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency (UK: Bloomsbury, 2008), 
p.65. 
6 Ibid, p.64. 
7 Ibid, p.60. 
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9 Barbour, J., The End of Time: The Next Revolution in Our Understanding of the Universe (UK: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999). 
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